Some detractors of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rule in Egypt and oppositionists of President Muhammad Morsi are counting on the army to rid them of the predicament they are in, and save the country from the predicament which they believe cannot be escaped with the help of the politicians, the elite or even the action on the street, but rather through a force surpassing the MB in number, influence and control. But others are absolutely convinced that the situation will remain unchanged - or could even deteriorate - without this affecting the MB authority over the country, until the Americans change their position. They are also convinced that the army cannot intervene to begin with, unless its leaders are certain that this action will earn an American acceptance leading towards an international consent. The latter are thus pointing to the position of the American administration vis-à-vis Hosni Mubarak's regime, and the details of its dealings with the Military Council during the stage which followed his resignation and until the election of President Morsi. They are also monitoring the American reactions towards the MB policies and behavior, believing that change can be induced whether popularly, militarily, or by whichever means necessary, once the Americans are fully convinced that their interests are threatened under the MB regime! It is no secret that Mubarak's regime lost its ability to survive following the launching of the revolution, as soon as the Americans announced loud and clear that the time had come for change in Egypt. The stocks of Mubarak and his regime consequently plummeted and the seat started shaking strongly beneath him when the Americans ended the support they offered them. Hence, Mubarak and his men became confused and the entire regime felt it was without backing in the face of popular will, large crowds on the squares, and a revolutionary insistence on their departure. So they departed. On the other hand, the issue of the American administration's dealings with non-Jihadist Islamic groups in the Arab world since the days of President George Bush Jr. was documented, widely researched, and has become known. In addition, many details were carried in regard to this issue and many testimonies were made by some of those who set up the contacts between the two sides or meetings between MB symbols and Americans experts or officials. Everyone reached the conclusion that after the end of the war on terrorism, the Americans assumed that dealing with the Islamists was a necessary evil, especially in light of the deterioration of the situation in several Arab countries and the increasing popularity of the Islamists in general and the MB in particular. In addition, they took into account the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to move the crowds and mobilize them in all elections. This does not mean that the American calculations are always accurate, but the American administrations always focused on their interests and not on regimes in particular. Therefore, just like they changed their position towards their ally Mubarak when they realized that his stay in power will harm their interests, the Americans will definitely alter their position which is supportive of, coherent with, and acceptant of the existence of the MB in power in Egypt, if they realize that their interests are at risk and that the American principles are threatened in any way. There is some American criticism of the way President Morsi is running the country or the way the MB is dealing with the freedoms issue and the opposition. But in reality, this does not represent a change in the American position towards the new authority in Egypt, and is even less acute than the criticisms which used to be addressed to Mubarak's regime whenever it used to adopt a decision that is not to the liking of the Americans, or abstained from adopting another which they had asked it to. Washington's stand towards the MB rule or that of any other power is clearly related to Egyptian-Israeli relations and the sustainment of the peace accords, while avoiding the creation of tension pits by the Egyptian regime when dealing with Tel Aviv. There is also the status of the Egyptian army, its arming and the sustainment of its unity as a balancing force in regional conflicts against Iran, in addition to cooperation in the intelligence sector between Egypt and America, especially at the level of the fight against terrorism as a key principle which cannot be disregarded by the Americans. Finally, there are less important issues, namely internal popular acceptance and the position towards freedoms or the minorities, knowing that no American administration favors an Egyptian regime that can violate these freedoms. However, these issues are not the only ones pushing towards drastic change in the American position towards the authority in Egypt, but they are often good reasons to exercise pressures and earn privileges eventually serving America's interests, and consequently Israel's.
