Now that political action is missing and the decision of staging a confrontation in the street lacks sovereignty, the ghost of civil war threatens Egypt. The resignation of Dr. Mohammad al-Baradei and the fact that Dr. Ahmad al-Tayyeb, the Al-Azhar Imam, distanced himself from the current events, constitute indications to the failure of all the domestic attempts at settling the differences between Muslim Brotherhood group and its adversaries. It is as if the road to reconciliation or to striking a deal has been blocked. The only remaining way out now consists of external intervention, even though the interim cabinet keeps condemning such interventions. Washington and its western allies slammed the decision to disperse the sit-ins. The Security Council has also started to act, although no resolution has yet been issued. The UN Secretary General dispatched his assistant for political affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, to Cairo. The European Union is bracing for revisiting its relations with Egypt. These interferences are encouraging the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to cling to their positions and multiply their attempts at mobilizing the international community in their favor. At the same time however, these interferences are discrediting the MB on the popular level. In the face of this international support for the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a quasi unanimous agreement on the Arab side to support the steps taken by the government of Hazem el-Beblawi and the measures taken by the security and military institutions. It is too soon to tell how things might proceed from here. The MB's choice to stage a street confrontation does not mean that clocks will go back. President Mohamed Morsi will not return to office. The MB group members will not regain their decision-making positions or the popularity and upper hand that they had prior to the presidential elections more than a year ago. On the other hand, the security and military institutions will not be able to just "drop" 10 to 25 percent of the Egyptian people. The present cabinet will not be able to revoke the Muslim Brotherhood group just by issuing a decision to dissolve the group or the Justice and Development party. Al-Nuqrashi Pasha dissolved the party in 1948 but it remained. The July 1952 revolution pushed the group to the "tunnels," prisons and the exile. However, the group still persisted and saw the birth of Takfiri and Jihadist groups that are still fighting in Sinai up until this day. If the group's present adversaries were to force it to work underground once again, more radical groups will be born. The MB group opted for an open and direct confrontation with the aim of weakening and draining the military and security institutions and preventing them from implementing the "future roadmap." The group realizes that the power it obtained following the ousting of the Hosni Mubarak regime will not be repeated; and it must now be recalling its stubbornness and failure to respond to the appeals of its political adversaries and the advice of the military. The group must also be revisiting the major mistake it made when it failed to see the millions of people calling on it to step down; and when it failed to understand the meaning of the massive mandate granted to the army by the people. The MB group is now using the prevailing chaos in the country as a means to push people to complain against the growing economic, social, and security crisis in light of the American, European, Turkish, and Iranian support. The majority of the Egyptians are wondering about the reasons for this international support of the MB. People are afraid that the American and European reactions and criticism of the military institution will yield opposite outcomes to what the western capitals are actually hoping for and to the desires of the millions of people who flooded the squares on January 25 and June 30. There are fears that this situation will encourage the army to tighten its grip over the entire political life, which will lead to the demise of the hopes brought by the revolution and to the re-producing of the former military regime. Indeed, the Egyptian people embraced the July 23, 1952 revolution and supported the army in power. However, the external pressure that the post-revolution regime was subjected to pushed it to tighten its grip over the political, economic, and even cultural and social life. Thus, democracy subsided in Egypt for more than six decades despite the meaningless pre-planned elections and referendums. The dispersion of the sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya and An-Nahda squares and the subsequent recent confrontations allowed for a "triumphant" return of the police forces. These forces regained their role in confronting any civil movement in the squares and the streets. The police forces even received governmental orders to use live bullets if they were to be confronted by the MB group when doing their job in breaking the sit-ins. Two and a half years ago, one of the rebelling youth's objectives was to "cleanse the state's services" and to bring them under political authority and civil surveillance. In addition, one of the youth's main demands was for the military to abandon politics and to return to their barracks and to the borders. The expansion of the violence in Egypt will prolong the interim phase, which will serve the interests of the MB's foes despite the clinging of the Beblawi cabinet to the "future roadmap." The prevalence of violence will allow the army to remain at the decision-making position in any future regime, and to maintain its stature as a main ruling partner regardless of the shape of the civil regime that will be produced following the present interim phase, if the Egyptians were to succeed in halting the violence or if they were to succeed in achieving some form of reconciliation to meet the aspirations that the rebels have been calling for since January 25. The decision to halt the violence lies in the hands of the MB group and its supporters from Washington all the way to Ankara. The position of the American administration is in line with the image that President Barack Obama wanted to promote ever since he acceded to power when he offered reconciliation with the Muslims from Cairo to Ankara. However, the American administration must be well aware of the fact that its latest position did not convince the Egyptians and will subsequently push them to show more support to their army. Following the January 25 revolution, President Obama called on President Mubarak to step down immediately. He however failed to do the same on June 30 when many more people took to the streets and called for the ousting of President Morsi. These people had been stressing for months that they do not wish for the departure of the elected MB president. They were rather calling for halting the "Islamization" of the state. They wanted to carry out early elections or a referendum concerning the president's rule. The minister of defense had tried to convince the president to conduct such a referendum. However, his attempts failed and it clearly seemed that Morsi did not have the freedom of choice. The Guide and his administration were the decision-making parties and they wanted to control everything without any concern for the people's suffering, knowing that these people had already endured a lot of pain under the former regime. The MB administration also showed no concern for their national partners. They acted as if the revolution only served the purpose of paving their way to seize power forever, even if this should result in a civil war and the dismantlement of Egypt's social fabric as demonstrated by the current offensives against the Copts and their institutions. The Egyptian crisis will undoubtedly leave its mark on the complicated and conflicting relations in the entire region and on the intricate regional and international network of interests. The crisis will serve to deepen the differences. The international positions regarding the Syrian crisis drove a wedge among several Arab countries; and the present positions concerning the Egyptian events are also leading to a similar outcome. Several Arab countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, openly supported the present interim rule in Egypt financially and politically. Indeed, the one year experience of the MBs in power was not reassuring for these states. The flirting that went on between Iran and the new Cairo regime raised the fears of several Gulf and Arab countries over the possibility of an alliance between these two sides. Such an alliance will be costly for those parties that are locked in an open power struggle with the Islamic Republic. These fears were further exacerbated by Turkey's potential role in leading the MB project in the entire region while the Arabs were hoping that Ankara would support them in the face of the Iranian expansion, knowing that the painful memories about Turkey's actions a century ago are still very much alive in the Arabs' minds. On top of all that, some Gulf security services uncovered plots that the MB international organization was working on with the aim of inducing turmoil in the GCC countries in order to seize control over these countries' economies and establish the MB authority in the entire Levant. Turkey must correct this error, which almost ruined its already collapsing interests and politics in the entire region including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf. Turkey must pressure its "brothers" in Egypt in order for them to revert back to the political path, which is the only path that may achieve the objectives of the January 25 revolution and put all these forces back in their natural positions. Washington and its partners must use their influence over the MB group to convince it of the need to halt the cycle of violence. This is the only way to force the military forces back to their barracks, consolidate the democratic choice, and preserve the Copts and their institutions instead of calling for protecting them and stirring identity fears in the hearts of the Egyptians! Those parties that support the MB group must act quickly in order to rescue them from their own deeds, rescue Egypt and it people, and push for reconciliation not only among the Egyptians but also among the international and regional partners who are responsible for preventing chaos in the largest Arab country and subsequently the entire region. Indeed, no country will be shielded from the effects and repercussions of such a scenario.
