Ever since the military council in Egypt came to power after former President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 1, the relations between the "military" and the Muslim Brotherhood group remained controversial, to an extent that talk started emerging about deals or agreements between the two sides which were of course denied by both; and as soon as the Muslim Brotherhood group and its Freedom and Justice Party opposed the military council decision to activate the emergency law, the Egyptian media outlets detected a transformation in the MB's position and the beginning of a clash between the group and the military. This belief grew stronger after statements were issued by the party's leaders, warning the military council against staying in power for a period exceeding the one specified in the constitutional declaration, and against postponing the parliamentary elections whose procedural details ought to be announced within two or three days at the most. Articles were written and analysts started tackling the reasons behind the "transformation" in the MB ranks, while the satellite shows focused on the extent which might be reached by the clash between the two sides! Personally, I do not expect a clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military council, not only because the interests of the two sides will be massively damaged in the event of such a standoff, but also because the MB's behavior, acts, as well as their political and media rhetoric since the eruption of the revolution reveal how much its leaders drew the lessons from their experience with the Nasserite era, their clash with Abdul Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council in 1952 - which reached its peak in 1954 - and what followed in terms of repercussions that forced them to flee the country or enter prison. True, times have changed; the current revolution was carried out by the people and was later on supported by the army, unlike what happened on 1952 when the "Free Officers" movement emerged and was backed up by the people. This time however, the military men are insisting they wish to return to their barracks after the parliamentary elections, the formation of the civil government, the ratification of the constitution and the election of a president for the country, denying any intention or desire to stay in power despite all that is being said in regard to scenarios going against what is announced. For its part, the MB is aware of the fact that a wide faction of the Egyptian people fears for the army, refuses to clash with it and does not differentiate - as it is done by the elite - between the military council and the army itself. Hence, These people are worried whenever they see reasons for a clash between political powers and the army, which they consider to be the only institution that maintained its bases and capabilities following the fall of Mubarak's regime. This is especially true after they saw security mayhem causing the collapse of numerous institutions in place, which eventually turned out not to be built on solid grounds, thus collapsing due to the cancer of corruption or because the officials in them refused to believe that a revolution occurred and that the regime has fallen. If the military council announces the parliamentary elections' plan in the next couple of days it would have respected what it had announced a while ago, knowing that political forces other than the MB demanded the postponement of these elections due to fears of seeing the victory of the Islamists who are the closest to the street. This would also dissipate the group's fear about the fact that the military will remain in power. True, the MB is opposed - like the other political forces - to the extension of the state of emergency, the slowness of the political process, the military trials of the civilians and the staging of the parliamentary elections based on the proportional lists and individual constituencies system, and rejected - also like other forces - the divisions affecting the electoral constituencies. However, all these issues can only be opposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, or else it would become part of the military council. At the same time, these issues can be debated with the military without pushing toward a clash, while the threats issued by some MB symbols, regarding the beginning of a "comprehensive revolution" in case the elections are postponed, are irrelevant since the military council will not postpone them. Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood escalated its tone vis-à-vis the military council without changing its ways and positions for several reasons, namely its wish to refute the accusation saying it has distanced itself from the goals of the revolution or to eliminate the suspicions surrounding its coordination with the council. This is happening at a time when other forces whose principles go against those of the Islamists in general are anticipating the elections occurrence and outcome, and maybe even preparing to question the results, in case the candidates of the Freedom and Justice Party - i.e. the MB's party - were to win a large number of seats, which is expected from the very beginning. The Muslim Brotherhood is playing politics in all directions, while its opponents in the other forces are playing with "words" on the social networking websites and the satellite shows.