Today, many types of crimes coexist in Lebanon, some of which are due to the mounting poverty and the social tensions accompanying it, while others are part of pure political violence. Yet, all of them come together to draw an alarming image for this country. And among the crimes that are seen more often nowadays are ones that can be described as "why not?" crimes. Indeed, if the security bodies' practicing of their tasks is so terribly flawed to the point where a journalist is detained and insulted over a "suspected" blog on the internet, while convoys of armed men move around the country and spread anarchy and corruption, "why not" kidnap this or that citizen in exchange for a ransom. Why not carry out shootings using heavy machine guns between homes upon the return of the dead who were participating in the battles in Syria? And why not render the discovery of bullet-riddled corpses a daily event that is not worth mentioning in the media? This is not to mention the explosions, assassinations and silent security wars that are ongoing in Lebanon between known and unknown forces. This is happening at a time when the state apparatuses seem to have exited the control of the law, thus blatantly and un-reluctantly joining the system of sectarian-political loyalties and its mechanisms of hegemony. And it is not new to say that the emergence of hundreds of armed men in broad daylight to participate in the battles of the clans and the (honorable?) families – which happens almost every week – is a clear sign of the state's dissolution and disintegration, and that the mutual kidnappings against denominational and regional backdrops are deepening division and increasing the threat of seeing the sectarian conflicts widening and turning into civil war. The fact that this talk is old does not annul the necessity of repeating it, while wondering about the required solution to exit the current situation and about the direction where this country is heading. Obviously, the anticipation of the formation of a new government is useless, considering that the Lebanese crisis has reached the regime's bones and marrow. And whether or not the contacts and settlements facilitate the task of Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam in his government formation, the next government will not be able to operate outside the current balances of power. It would actually be safe to say that these balances will render whichever governmental formation quadriplegic. The difficult situations inside and around Lebanon will not allow any Cabinet to be productive at the level of the services, which have transformed into a dueling arena between the political powers. This is seen for example with the electricity and communication files, but also with the political reform file, seeing how the failure to ratify an electoral law clearly shows it would be impossible to achieve such reform for the time being. Anticipating the Syrian developments by both Lebanese teams is a game in which the participants are at the very least irresponsible towards their country. And at a time when they believe they can go on with this tug of war, dynamics and social mechanisms are evolving within each group and between each other in a way threatening with a collapse which will be so acute that constructors will find it hard to get good enough stones to build the next country and its meaning. Just like small-time merchants, Lebanese politicians prefer to deal with small pieces and day to day politics, instead of trying hard to seal major agreements that would guarantee a certain level of stability for the next generations. They have two excuses for that, the first being their mere inheritance of a rotten structure which has become impossible to reform, and the second being the non-existence of any serious opposition by their supporters who are ready to offer all that is near and dear to defend the honor of the sect and denomination.
