In less than half a century, the Lebanese have once again found themselves faced with the reestablishment of their country. There is no exaggeration in saying that the devastation has extended to all aspects of life and that bankruptcy is the prevailing characteristic, whether at the level of the state's perception of itself or its vision for public political life. Indeed, the Lebanese arena is now governed by the policies of closed-up identities and ghettos, sectarian mobilization and the callers for the upcoming denominational wars, while the political conflicts are being managed – and the alliances are being built - based on the minorities' concerns, the fears over the future and the strong hostility towards change. Lebanon's current division reveals that the task ahead affects the state institutions, the political system, the internal relations and Lebanon's status and role in the region and around the world, in addition of course to the deteriorating economic situation amid an acute social crisis that is especially sweeping the young generations. It is no secret that a large number of Lebanese are no longer convinced about the settlement instated by the Taif Accord, which was sealed in the context of local and international balances of power that have now drastically changed. The Syrian-Saudi convergence ended with Rafik al-Hariri's assassination, and all the attempts to revive it in 2008 and 2009 have failed. In addition, the Americans withdrew the mandate they gave to the Syrian regime to manage Lebanon's affairs in 2005, and due to the miserable failure of the attempts to build a state during the stage of Syrian peace (1990-2005), Lebanon went back to being an arena for the establishment of regional and international balances. And after the Arab revolutions, Lebanon's role further retreated, even as an arena for the conflicts and the exchange of Arab and international messages, and was thus put aside while awaiting the materialization of the greater picture that is now being drawn in other locations. The retreat of the regional role on the political and economic levels, and the long wait for the outcome of the Syrian revolution in particular, are proceeding hand in hand with the deepening of denominational division in Lebanon and the climate preventing the management of the country's affairs, even if only to provide daily services to the citizens. The government, whose formation is currently being discussed, might be able to achieve a topical breakthrough and alleviate the tensions in the short run (once it is formed). But clearly, it will not be qualified to tackle the Lebanese national issue with its constituent dimensions and pact, let alone handle it and move towards a new historical accord between the Lebanese. Indeed, the domestic balances are not yet clear and there is no room for any talk about an Arab or international sponsorship of any major settlement in Lebanon, as long as the change cauldron in the Arab region is boiling and is filled with surprises. Moreover, there is the climate spread by the propaganda promoting the minorities' fears, or what has become known as ‘Sunni-phobia', which is practically preventing any progress along two fronts. The first is the definition of inter-sectarian relations based on each sect's actual size, without any exaggerated guarantees for the panicked minorities. The second is the building of a civil and democratic state of citizenship, which deals with free and individual citizens. Hence, the horizons of domestic change seem blocked on the sectarian and civil levels, and the situation appears to be heading towards further anticipation while waiting for the change to come from abroad, amid an ongoing bleeding affecting the remaining common areas and the meanings of citizenship. In conclusion, one must say that this slow bleeding remains less costly than the nihilistic calls for the toppling of the state, based on the logic of permanent devastation.
