If the organization of the Geneva 2 conference is linked to the Syrian opposition's achievement of military balance on the ground, following the progress secured by the regime's forces during the last couple of months, the optimists should not set a date for it yet and should not expect its staging to be in September or any other month. Indeed, they must await further escalation, which has so far only led to the destruction of the Syrian towns and cities and the deepening of the schism between its components. And if some are awaiting regional and international understanding over some sort of a settlement, they should not expect it before the end of President Bashar al-Assad's term in July of next year. The achievement of military balance on the ground is not linked to the provision of weapons to the Free Army factions, regardless of these weapons' type, as they might improve the conditions of the confrontation but will not alter the equation as long as the regime is receiving all that is needed by its arsenal from Russia and Iran, and as long as men are supporting it from inside and outside the border, i.e. from Lebanon, Iraq and the Revolutionary Guard. On the other hand, the regime troops' control over the city of Qusair did not change the balance of power on the ground. And even if Homs were to fall in their hands, this will not change much to the locations' geography. This is due to the fact that the various armed groups are imposing their control over wide areas of the country's eastern, northern, and southern parts, even if over the rubble of the cities, villages and homes. There is a great illusion obstructing progress towards the political resolution of the crisis, whether in Geneva or elsewhere. The regime believes it can defeat its opponents and impose the elements and conditions of a settlement with the least political losses possible, based on its military strength and the steady support it is getting from its regional and international allies. This would be done for example by giving the opposition – the one it chooses – a limited political role in the concord government that ought to emerge following the end of the fight. As for the opposition, it believes that the achievement of progress on the ground or the regaining of the balance will corner the regime and threaten it with collapse, which would force it to negotiate over the surrender of power before the expiry of its term and allow the preservation of some of its structures and the minimum level of coexistence between the country's ethnic, sectarian and denominational components. But there is a reality which neither side involved in the conflict can disregard or ignore, i.e. that the economic situation is heralding a revolution of the hungry, in light of the frightening rise of the dollar in the face of the Syrian pound. And no matter how hard the regime's administrations try to intervene to contain the deterioration of the national currency, they will not be able to stop it. Are Lebanon's experience and what happened to its pound during civil war and Iraq's experience and what happened to its dinar during the three Gulf wars, not live examples until this day of such situations? National income from oil revenues – which constituted a large portion of the budget's funding - is almost non-existent, considering that most of the wells are under the control of the armed groups. And even after the lifting of the European sanctions imposed on the exportation of Syrian oil controlled by the Free Army, the opposition cannot benefit from this decision because most of the wells had their plants, extraction tools and transportation means destroyed. At this level, there is no need to mention what happened to the agricultural, industrial, tourism and investment sectors. As for Iran, which is still providing the regime in Damascus with some cash for its men, military elements and militias, it will definitely not be able to prevent the major collapse or ensure the livelihood of around 24 million people. Moreover, the new president in Tehran, Hasan Rohani, will find it inevitable to reconsider his predecessor's policies and fix the economic situation in a country burdened by extremely harsh sanctions, which will not allow him to distribute aid left and right. So will the hunger sword lead the Syrians outside their homes and away from their current alignments? And when? On the field, arming the opposition at the current pace might not be enough to settle the war. True, Arab countries are providing the Free Army with its needs in terms in equipment and ammunition, which might suffice it to persist and maybe even achieve progress in certain positions and on some fronts. But this armament will not allow the army to settle the situation. Indeed, all the Western estimates and the reports of military experts exclude the regime's defeat, unless there is foreign European or American military intervention, as it happened in Libya. However, this scenario seems not only difficult, but also impossible. The biggest proof for this is the retreat of Britain's and France's enthusiasm – which were the two most eager European states to arm the opposition – for many reasons, including the political opposition voiced by domestic powers in both countries and the increasing fear of seeing sophisticated weapons fall in the hands of extremist forces or Mujahedeen who emerged from most of the European countries. In addition to all these considerations, Russia has kept defying everyone with its stable and fierce defense of the regime in Damascus since the eruption of the action, while Iran – which invested a lot in Damascus and Beirut – will not end its involvement or pull out its troops regardless of the pressures. More importantly, and in order to secure an intervention, London and Paris need NATO's support, i.e. the United States', not to mention political support. And so far there does not seem to be an American green light, considering that President Barack Obama's administration chose since day one to distance itself from any involvement, which goes in line with its overall position towards the storm that swept the Arab world, from Tunisia to Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. Indeed, it did not show any willingness to help these countries overcome the effects of the change that occurred and did not practice its leading role around the world. It thus relied on the public's mood, which opposed any military intervention or new war, while arranging its safe exit from Afghanistan following its pullout from Iraq. At this point, there is no need to repeat what was reiterated by officials in Washington regarding the fact that the United States' priorities today were East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Hence, the Middle East is no longer the object of attention, except when it comes to the security of Israel that has lost all the enemies which enjoyed great armies and could have posed a threat to it. And after what happened to Iraq and its army, it was the Syrian army's turn, amid fears that the situation in Egypt will deteriorate and that the challenge facing its armed forces will deepen. American diplomacy is preoccupied with the resumption of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian authority, at a time when the big Arab players are busy with their crises and repercussions. Hence, it is not worried and its circles are not moved by the fall of more than 100,000 dead in Syria until this day, or by the millions of displaced and the hundreds of thousands of refugees in the neighboring states. There is also the threat the latter poses on the security, social and economic situation in Jordan and on the demographic structure in Lebanon, where sectarian tensions reached the brink of a wide-scale bloody explosion, had it not been for this flaw affecting the balance of power between the Shiites and the Sunnis in a country which will not survive the negative effects, sooner and not later. In light of these circumstances and facts, military settlement seems unlikely – if not impossible - for whichever side. Even the Geneva conference appears distant. Indeed, the opposition is not willing to negotiate and engage in dialogue before it secures prevalence on the ground, imposes the desired change and sees the regime's departure, at least its symbols who participated in the war. Moreover, the regime is not ready to leave as long as it believes in its ability to defeat its rivals. In addition, it is not showing any willingness to go easy on the opposition symbols, considering that whoever wants a settlement involving mutual concessions does not resort to terrorism courts to issue sentences in favor of the execution of opposition leaders and symbols, with whom it will supposedly be sitting down to discuss the political solution and the establishment of a transitional government with full prerogatives, with the participation of its men. The goal behind the calls to hold the Geneva conference or ensure a political solution in general has always been and still is the prevention of the collapse of the state and the preservation of its remaining structures, institutions, social fabric and territorial unity. But no one has any doubts regarding the fact that what is happening in Syria today is a war between militias, the biggest of which being the regime's army and its Popular Forces. And one look at the country's map would show how its regions have become divided into areas of influence, not only between the regime and its oppositionists, but also between the opposition forces themselves, i.e. the Free Army, An-Nusra Front, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and armies which do not lack names, slogans and sources of financial support and armament. This is not to mention the western coast and its countryside that have become the most prominent safe haven for the Alawites, some northeastern regions which the Kurds are preparing to proclaim as an autonomous region like the Iraqi Kurdistan province, and the project to proclaim an Islamic Emirate in the northern part of the country near the border with Turkey. Do these facts not confirm that the Geneva conference is as distant as the military settlement and that the political solution might have to wait until the presidential elections in exactly one year? By then, Russia and Iran might be willing to accept a consensual international-regional formula featuring President Al-Assad's exclusion from these elections and the return to Kofi Annan's plan as an inevitable path towards settlement. But what is worrisome is that until that date, there might be nothing left of Syria, which is transforming, decomposing and disintegrating every day into areas of influence for various militias, at a time when its primary war is producing other wars, not the last of which being the escalating confrontation between the Free Army and the extremist powers, or between the Kurds and An-Nusra Front.
