It was not expected for the Syria's Friends conference to come out with more than it did, as it was preceded by signs that clearly pointed to its outcome. Indeed, the political and military officials in the United States, Europe and NATO renewed their rejection of any military intervention, while the Turks did not even wish to establish safe corridors to deliver humanitarian aid due to fears over the flow of refugees, and maybe even for others reasons! Moreover, none of the latter showed willingness to recognize the National Council as a legitimate representative, calling once again for the unification of the opposition's ranks and for drawing up a clear program for the transitional phase. For their part, the American military warned against Al-Qaeda's infiltration of the protesters and against the armament of the Free Army. In light of these results, the regime in Damascus can proceed with its military campaign in the hope that it will manage to exit the closed circle of violence. It can sustain its option as long as it believes that the Tunisia conference did not change anything at the level of the international and regional rules of engagement, and as long as its opponents are insisting on a political solution which seems far-fetched in light of the obstinacy shown by Russia and its remaining allies. At this level, it would be possible to emulate the Iranian experience, thus fully exploiting the time factor secured by the persistence of all the players abroad on their positions. Some parties in the opposition - which was undermined by the conference - were blaming the Westerners calling for the toppling of the Syrian regime for not addressing any real warnings to it, for failing to make it detect the seriousness of the threat to use of the military option and for not drawing any red lines. For its part, Ankara which assured more than once that it would not remain silent, and that set deadlines for the regime and warned against the repetition of “another Hama”, did nothing. In light of this situation, why would the regime not proceed with its military option, just like Iran is doing, after neither the sanctions nor the blockade prevented it from achieving its nuclear goals, and as long as the military option is not on the table and no sword is brandished over its head? The latter oppositionists recall that Tehran held up its nuclear program, and even suspended it for a while, back when the American troops reached its Western border following the 2003 war on Iraq. It thus became concerned that its turn will come, after President George Bush placed it in the context of the “axis of evil.” Syria also panicked following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, as it was revealed by the statements of presidential advisor Buthaina Shaaban. But when troubles surfaced in the face of the American occupation of Iraq, the two countries dared to contribute to the fueling of the conflict with the Americans. The oppositionists also recall that Damascus pulled out its troops from Lebanon after around thirty years, when it felt the anger mounting following the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005. Before that, i.e. in 1999, it succumbed to Turkey's warnings when the latter mobilized its troops toward the border, and ended the tensions with its northern neighbor by surrendering the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Abdullah Öcalan, whom it always exploited to raise Ankara's concerns. Moreover, throughout thirty years, Syria did not breach the red line drawn by Israel, after it pushed its forces into Lebanon during the civil war witnessed in the country. So far, the Syrian regime is not feeling besieged. Indeed, its border with Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan is still open and its other paths all lead to Iran, Moscow and China. In addition, no walls were built around it as it was the case with Saddam Hussein in the nineties, which is why circles within the Syrian opposition believe that the West should have included in its rhetoric the possibility of a military intervention. This is due to the fact that the exclusion of such an option relieved the regime and unleashed its military machine without any form of deterrence. The green light was not only provided by the Russian and Chinese veto, but also by the American and European reluctance. Vladimir Putin raised the slogan of Russia, which is returning to its imperial times, as a card in his electoral battle. He announced his project to modernize the military institution and threatened that he will not remain silent vis-à-vis the disregarding of his country and its interests in any international actions or measures, namely in Syria and Iran. In the meantime, the Syrian issue was not featured in the electoral campaigns of President Barack Obama and President Nicolas Sarkozy. Since the beginning, the United States showed no interest in wielding the military option, because it does not wish to become involved since it has not yet recovered from the Iraqi and Afghan wars, and because Obama is engaged in a campaign in parallel to the American soldiers' return home as he promised his voters more than three years ago. Another reason is because the reports of the American military do not perceive the intervention as being as easy as the one staged in Libya. These reports thus warned against a series of threats represented by the massive size of the Syrian armed forces, the homogeneity of the units, their missile armament and their deployment in a small country, which could put the civilians in harm's way in the event of any wide-scale campaign. Moreover, the Syrian front is closely tied to two others, i.e. the Lebanese one where Hezbollah is continuously threatening Israel with its missile arsenal and the Iranian one which is engaged in the conflict on more than one front. Moreover, Washington which is so far avoiding the military option to handle the Iranian nuclear file, fears that the military intervention in Syria will lead to the eruption of war with the Islamic republic. It is also aware of the fact – just like Moscow – that Syria's slide into wide-scale turmoil would mean the expansion of anarchy to its neighbors, from Lebanon to Iraq, Jordan and even Israel, especially if powers supporting the Syrian and Iranian regimes were to react. On the other hand, Obama's administration is watching the events unfolding in Libya after the arms spread in the hands of the militias and tribes and flowed across the border, thus starting to constitute the biggest challenge facing the establishment of a new regime and the instatement of the country's unity. And in Syria's case, it cannot help but take into account Israel's fears towards such a scenario. The reports of the American military also believe that the Syrian opposition is scattered and has no position from which to launch its activities, as it used to be the case of Benghazi then Misrata in the confrontation against Muammar Gaddafi's regime. In the meantime, the Free Army is not really a match to the military institution which is still standing behind the regime. Its armament will fail to undermine the balance of power tilting in favor of this regime, and requires structuring and organization, which might take time. So far, Al-Assad's regime has benefited from all these facts, but it should not forget that the time game has limits, especially since the Syrian file has now reached the table of the big players, which have other calculations, files and intersecting interests. And when the United States and Europe feel that the time has come to intervene and raise the challenge in Russia's face, they will not hesitate. At this level, the Yugoslavia and Kosovo experience is still vivid in our memory, considering that despite what Yugoslavia meant to Russia, the West intervened and overcame Moscow's objections and stubbornness. It would be too early to say that Russia is trying to revive the Cold War and risk all its interests with America and Europe, knowing that there is no comparison between those interests and the ones its enjoys with Syria. Moreover, it is well aware of the limits of its ability to establish balance with the American power, despite all that this power is going through. One could say that Syria might head toward a situation similar to the Somali one, i.e. total chaos in which there is no room for unity or division. And if Russia sustains its position and if Syria's Friends fail to find an alternative to the armament of the opposition, the country might turn into a fertile ground for all sorts of armed men, militias and mujahidin. Following the Tunisia conference, the actors have no choice but to change their approaches towards and rules of engagement in the Syrian crisis. And while the Syrian oppositionists were disappointed with their friends in Tunisia, they are mostly responsible for correcting the international approach toward their crisis before the second conference which will be held in Turkey. They will thus have to meet, agree over the minimum level and present a joint document or statement drawing the facets of the next stage and the alternative regime. This would prevent their division from remaining a peg allowing the international community to elude its responsibility for the massacres being committed on a daily basis. In addition, such concord might encourage those still surrounding the regime and holding on to it despite their restlessness and reluctance to abandon it, considering that the latter are definitely not suicidal to risk entering a dark future for the sake of the regime's symbols. Russia on the other hand - which welcomed since the beginning a solution similar to the one adopted in Yemen and is disregarding the moral burden toward the killing - cannot ignore the threat of Syria's slide into a Somali experience that would topple all its interests and positions not only in the country, but in the entire region. Will Russia wait until it passes the Putin reelection test to reconsider its approach? Moscow is refusing to arm the opposition or those whom it dubs the armed gangs, is against any military intervention and fears the arrival of Islamic hardliners to power. Does it not converge to some extent with what was agreed on by the Syria's Friends conference in terms of the insistence on the political solution? The solution requires exceptional courage and should feature some sort of a settlement in which the actors would meet half way. Therefore, the opposition must converge as soon as possible over a document reassuring Russia and the Friends, but also reassuring the population with all its components – i.e. its sects, denominations and military elements – in order to encourage them to distance themselves from the regime.
