Through his handling of the reports which spoke about the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons, President Barack Obama confirmed that he will not change his previous position and will not alter the rules of the game, even if President Bashar al-Assad's regime violates the red line. And when he and members of his administration talk about the necessity of having irrefutable evidence proving the methodic use of such weapons, this means one of two things. Either that Washington does not have enough evidence and consequently does not wish to repeat the Iraqi experience – i.e. when President George Bush carried out his invasion under the pretext of destroying WMDs, before it turned out later on that Saddam Hussein's regime did not have any – or that it is evading any intervention, even if the American president is forced to draw a new red line. Had President Obama had any intention to intervene at the level of the Syrian crisis and implement his repeated calls on the regime to leave, there would have been no need for him to restrict his policy by drawing a red line vis-à-vis Damascus. For what is the difference between the victims falling everyday with bullets, rockets, barrel bombs or the shells of tanks, mortars and aircrafts, and those falling with chemical weapons, as long as the regime has used all its arms and violated all the red lines? What difference is there between one death and another or the fall of a victim with this or that weapon? What about the international reports talking about collective massacres, the last of which was in Al-Bayda? Since the eruption of the Syrian crisis, it was clear that the American administration will not intervene. Indeed, the president – who conducted his electoral battle based on withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan – would not repeat the experience of his predecessor and engage in a new war in the Great or Small Middle East, while fearing that this war might set the entire region on fire in light of Syria's complex network of regional and international interests. It was no surprise that President Obama's red line became gray, just like his position since the beginning, as this has been his policy since his first term until this day. It features the adoption of diplomacy as a weapon and showing willingness to include the international powers in the efforts to reach solutions and settlements, even standing in the backdrop at times and pushing the partners or regional powers (as it happened in Libya for example) to perform roles which until a few years ago were handled by the American forces. And while he is insisting on having more evidence and while he and the members of his administration are saying that all the options are on the table, the only option that does not seem to be on the table is non-intervention. How can there be more evidence if Damascus does not want to host the international investigation commission and if Russia is unable to convince it to facilitate this commission's work, knowing that the American president did not define the steps he would adopt when he warned President Al-Assad against changing the rules of the game. In addition, getting evidence is not impossible, even without the international investigation commission. President Obama can only resort to these pretexts to respond to the pressures exerted by the Republican camp to ensure an intervention, either by arming the opposition, bombing the regime's positions, or establishing safe havens to host the refugees and protect the oppositionists and their committees. He might have even pulled back behind the line he drew, which is encouraging the regime to proceed with its campaigns with all available weapons. Did his administration not practice – and is still practicing – the same policy with Iran for years, thus threatening with all the options on the table while the nuclear reactors are continuing their work? Washington was patient for much too long, just like its European partners. They thus wagered on time in the hope that some sort of a surprise would tilt the balance of powers and cause a change that would result in the defeat of the regime or in a political settlement to end the bloodbath. They stood behind the Arab League's ineffective initiatives, then behind Kofi Annan's mission, then Lakhdar Brahimi's mission, knowing that the latter relied since the beginning on the achievement of a quasi-impossible breakthrough at the level of the positions of the superpowers, in addition to those of the conflicting parties on the ground. They were all reluctant for far too long under the slogan of preventing the collapse of the Syrian state and its institutions and the protection of the minorities. This reluctance also fell under the headline of fear over the rise of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda among others, and the country's slide towards a crushing civil war that would not spare the neighbors and would threaten the United States' allies and interests in the region, among other excuses that repeated like a broken record. The members and president of the American administration might have forgotten that President George Bush Jr. decided since the first day he entered the White House to focus on the domestic arena, far away from the complex international issues and especially the Middle Eastern one. But this policy provoked fear among his European partners and the states which had started seeking a new path following the collapse of the Soviet grip. Soon enough, Al-Qaeda carried out the Washington and New York invasions, which caused the retreat of this policy and the adoption of the decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, with all the open wars they ensued against the extremist groups until this day. Hence, it seems that the time game did not serve the goals which made America and Europe reluctant. Syria is heading fast towards an inevitable sectarian war, and while the regime appears to be resorting to its Lebanese and Iranian allies in the Homs and Al-Qusayr battles to strengthen its coastal province project and secure its passageways towards the Lebanese Bekaa, its opponents launched the coastal battle in its face during the last few days in order to undermine this project. There is no doubt that these two fronts are hastening the Syrians' implication in a sectarian war, following which the talk about a political settlement will be useless, whether based on the Geneva plan or any other. In the meantime, the most dangerous facet feared by the American administration has also started to materialize at a fast pace, in light of the flocking of extremists into Syria. At this level, there is no need to recall Al-Nusra Front, its discourse, slogans and the threat it poses on the identity of the Syrian state and its neighbors. But what is even more dangerous is that the Syrian flames have started to spread beyond the country's border, considering that the political crisis in Iraq - which features a confrontation between the Sunni provinces and Nouri al-Maliki's government - is about to transform into a wide-scale sectarian confrontation. And while Washington was able to pressure the leader of the State of Law Coalition and the Kurds to appease the tensions and seek solutions with the protesters, this success might be short-lived in light of the escalation and threats exchanged between the government and its opponents. In addition, the Gulf States have not agreed and will never agree to the Islamic Republic's unrestricted movement in Baghdad and the enhancement of its bases in a number of Arab countries. But the threat is not limited to Iraq, considering that Lebanon – whose parties have so far managed to keep their fight on the Syrian arena by supporting this or that side – might not last long before the dissociation test. Indeed, the battle could be transferred to the domestic scene, especially if a new government is not formed and if parliamentary elections that have become impossible in light of the current division are not staged. In the meantime, Lebanon is sharing with Jordan mounting numbers of refugees, who will sooner or later become time bombs threatening the two countries' political, security, economic and social stability. Amman is louder than Beirut in seeking help – without anyone cooperating with its calls – but the threatening of its stability has different calculations at the level of Washington's and Europe's policies, but also at the level of the GCC states' policies. And while Israel has so far settled for monitoring the situation and interfering from time to time, Turkey, which mended its ties with the Hebrew state and was able to arrange a deal with Abdullah Ocalan, is preparing to deal with the future situation on its southern border and publically saying it will not host more refugees on its soil. Until now, the United States might have benefitted from the stalling policy, the depletion of President Al-Assad's regime and some extremist powers such as Al-Nusra Front, Iran's preoccupation and the threatening of its presence near the Mediterranean Sea and the implication of its ally Hezbollah in a battle that is depleting it as well. However, the expansion of the confrontation throughout the region is no longer threatening Syria and its future solely, considering that the fire is growing closer to Washington's friends and interests, and the price it might have to pay is much higher than the one it would have paid had it exited its reluctance early on. Today, its options are very limited and stepping back towards a new red line – as it was and is still being done by Recep Tayyip Erdogan – will not do it any good. The same goes for military intervention and for remaining in the back rows. Indeed, if it does not regain the initiative to impose an end to this war and the desired change, the options of its opponents in the confrontation will not remain limited to Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, and will reach the China Sea and North Korea. For their part, the Syrians will wait until after the meeting between Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin next month, and until after the results of the presidential elections in the Islamic Republic.
