It would be better for the Lebanese not to rush to celebrate the consensus reached by their various parliamentary blocs over Mr. Tammam Salam as the prime minister of the new government. They can however be relieved, because at the very least, this consensus secured a truce which will remain linked to the developments across the eastern and northern borders. Prime Minister Najib Mikati provoked a positive shock with his exit at the right time, a time that suited him and which he personally chose. Still, this exit did not undermine the existing balance of powers. Indeed, he has exercised the role of the March 14 forces and the Future Movement in the March 8 government – as he said – and his successor Mr. Tammam Salam will have to practice that same role, but in reverse. This is due to the fact that the support granted to him by Speaker Nabih Birri, Hezbollah, and the Aounist movement constitutes a burden and implies a high cost during the formation stage. This is especially true in the case of General Michel Aoun who was defeated twice, i.e. when the page of the pending electoral Orthodox Law was turned and when he lost ten ministers in the outgoing government. There is no doubt that the consensus over Tammam Salam has brought some life back to politics, and even retrieved it – albeit temporarily – from the street, to defuse the sectarian tensions between the Sunnis and the Shiites. Indeed, following Mikati's resignation, these tensions appeared to be pointing to the impossibility of seeing any understanding between the leaders of the two major sects in the country, let alone the common people! Still, this consensus might not be easily secured over the shape of the upcoming government, in light of the diverging tendencies and wills between those who want a national concord government, a neutral government to deal with the upcoming developments - the first of which being the parliamentary elections - and a technocratic government to handle the citizens' affairs. In any case, the prime minister-designate, who came up with a third formula for a “national interest government," has to translate this formula based on his father's slogans of which he was reminded by General Aoun and featuring: “One Lebanon, not two," “No winner and no loser" and “understanding and agreement." One can go far in explaining this consensus, while attributing it to regional and international facts and circumstances related to the Syrian crisis and the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear file. Nonetheless, one cannot neglect the convergence between the interests of the Sunni and Shiite blocs over the necessity of reinstating balance to the internal political game – a balance which was missing throughout the past two years - knowing that what Mikati's government achieved is in no way lesser than what could have been achieved by any government led by the Future Movement. Still, a step was needed to allow the two blocs to regain the political discourse from the extremists, who, on more than one occasion and at the level of more than one incident, almost drowned the country in a bloody sectarian war. Hence, it was in the interest of al-Hariri's movement to contain the retreat of its popularity on the street in favor of extremist sheikhs and powers from Tripoli to Sidon and the Bekaa, while Hezbollah had to translate its wish not to be led into internal provocation attempts which it perceived as being a trap to deplete it and keep it away from its major battles, whether the existing ones in Syria or the deferred one with Israel. It thus had to avoid waging multiple wars in several locations. This might not mean that Hezbollah has made up its mind in regard to the domestic situation and has adopted one view. But at least, it will not lose anything by reconnecting what was severed with its partners in the country regardless of the developments in Syria, and will not lose if the crisis were to last longer over there, if the regime's opponents are unable to push it out of Damascus - whether politically or militarily - or if they achieve victory in the capital. Indeed, it is in the interest of all the Lebanese to rally behind a concord government which will have to deal with the flow of more refugees in parallel to the escalation of the violence, if it is unable to close the border to prevent the flow of weapons and fighters. Some perceive Tammam Salam's selection as the prime minister of the upcoming government as being a return by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese scene, after the Iranian-Syrian axis prevailed during the coup against Saad al-Hariri at the beginning of 2011, and right after the eruption of the revolution in Syria. But in reality, Riyadh was never absent from Lebanon, just as it was never absent from any of the Arab arenas that witnessed a similar action. It remained, along with the other GCC states, at the head of the Arab action and at the heart of its crises, from Morocco to Iraq. This role was translated on more than one scene, from Tripoli to Tunis, Cairo, Sana'a, Manama, Damascus, Beirut and even Baghdad. Moreover, the activation of the Saudi role in Lebanon does not necessarily point to the retreat of Iran's role, as the latter is converging with its Lebanese allies over the necessity of ensuring calm, in preparation for the surprises which might be generated by the Syrian crisis. And consequently, it does not point to the retreat of Hezbollah's strength, knowing that Tammam Salam made sure to contact the party's leaders before heading to Riyadh! Beyond that, some of the aforementioned Lebanese attribute this sudden consensus over the appointment of Tammam Salam as the prime minister of the upcoming government to regional and international facts. At this level, they are insisting on the possible achievement of a breakthrough in the negotiations between the P5+1 states and Iran, and the beginning of a stage of appeasement along the confrontation line between Saudi Arabia and its sisters on one hand, and the Islamic Republic on the other. This was naturally reflected in the appeasement seen in Lebanon between the two sides of the conflict. Whether this is true or not, Tehran's allies - who did not support the stay of Mikati's government as it was done on many occasions - had no choice but to meet Speaker Nabih Birri and Walid Jumblatt over a middle ground course, that is certainly not similar to the course which was represented by the trio including President Michel Suleiman, Mikati and the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party. Had this not been the case, they would have insisted on the sustainment of their government. Furthermore, Hezbollah probably grew sick and tired of this trio, the biggest proof for that being the fact that it did not try to convince Mikati not to resign and rather left it up to him to decide what was in his best interest. This is why it engaged in this consensus, in the hope of containing the Saudi return to the Lebanese arena instead of entering a confrontation. In that sense, the consensus might not be a reflection of new or expected regional and international circumstances, heralding a breakthrough which ought to appease the sectarian tensions throughout the region, considering that this is not revealed by the current climate in it. It was probably due to domestic considerations and calculations before anything else. And at this level, one must point to the role played by Speaker Birri and Mr. Jumblatt who have been calling for centrism for a while now, in order to reshuffle the alliances and relations, revive the political game to end the division between the sects, and provide the minimum level of understanding to deal with the repercussions of the escalating crisis in Syria. And there is no doubt that the parliament speaker knew how to seize the right moment to accompany his partners along this turn, thus shifting away from the March 8 course without exiting it. Also, the leader of the PSP knew how to exit the chains of the previous stage and government, without going back to the March 14 ranks. It is too early for this alignment to transform into a final positioning by all the sides involved in the conflict, just as it is too soon to say that it is a coup against the near past or a final convergence between the hostile powers to turn the page of around a decade of gradual divergence which reached the level of confrontation. Hence, the formation stage and the time the prime minister-designate will take will act as the real indicator of the drastic change, on the internal, regional and international levels. Nothing on the horizon points to the imminent settlement of the Syrian crisis, whether politically or militarily, while the developments since the staging of the Arab summit in Doha and the escalation of the Damascus battle reveal that the worse is yet to come, and that Lebanon will not be far from this escalation. In addition, the developments do not herald truce between Iran and its Arab opponents, although some had hoped to see the rapprochement attempts between Tehran and Cairo reaching the other Arab fronts, and especially the Gulf ones, because what is firstly required is an understanding between Cairo and these fronts. In the meantime, it is feared that the consultations which will be held by Tammam Salam will be prolonged until the situation in both Damascus and Tehran is cleared up. But can the Lebanese maintain the minimum level of their current consensus to avoid falling in the web of the Syrian war, or will they be taken off-guard by a second shock that will cause the emergence of a miniature government of neutral figures to run the people's affairs, while the political powers proceed with their internal conflicts and wars outside the border?
