The stay or departure of Prime Minister Najib Mikati's government is not the solution or the answer to General Wissam al-Hassan's assassination. The decision at this level is not only linked to domestic balances between the March 14 and March 8 forces, but rather to wider regional and international balances and calculations. The Lebanese government, with its fighting parties, resident impotence and the powers opposing it, is awaiting the end of the impasse in the Syrian crisis. The tense balance of powers prevailing over Lebanon to the beat of the ongoing war across the border will not be appeased, whether the government continues its routine work or leaves, as its fate is no longer linked to the wish of its prime minister, that of the forces partaking in it or that of the powers demanding its resignation. Indeed, there are fears that this resignation will lead to the inability of the Lebanese to form a new Cabinet due to their vertical division vis-à-vis their country's position in the ongoing conflict in the region, at which point the current Cabinet will become a caretaker government as it is today, and will distance itself from everything. In the meantime, the stalemate and decay that are obstructing all the institutions and facilities would continue, in the absence of an electoral law and elections! The only course that is open before the fighting Lebanese powers leads towards the escalation of sectarian instigation and further involvement in the neighboring crisis. Hence, those who warned against the expansion of the fires of the Syrian war were not reading a new or unknown book. They rather knew that among the reasons that pushed President Hafez al-Assad in Lebanon to put an end to its war was to prevent their transfer to his country. This intervention was made with Arab-international consensus, and there is no need to recall how it ended, after this war was fueled and the “smaller brother" was divided to serve interests, ambitions and aspirations. There is also no need to recall all the other regional interferences in Lebanon. Today, the rule did not and will not change: Civil war must break out at the heart of the Middle East region and must be sustained, so that the states of this East are not spared by its flames. This explained and continues to explain why Mikati's government adopted an abstinence policy since day one, which is a headline for resignation from politics on the external and internal levels. This is also why the members and sponsors of this government have no other choice but to hold on to it, and why its opponents have no other choice but to demand its departure! However, this policy was not limited to Lebanon, as resignation from political life in its overall national sense is being adopted in Jordan and Iraq, as well as in Turkey to some extent, after the Kurdistan Workers' Party rekindled its fire and after the Alawites of the Hatai province started to pour their anger on thousands of Sunni Syrian refugees. Hence, the absence of politics in Baghdad and Amman is similar to what exists on the official level in Beirut, seeing how the leaders in the three capitals can sense the heat of the war coming from across the border. In the meantime, the different powers and parties are leading their battle with further implication, in parallel to the extension of the Syrian crisis, thus confirming geographic and historical facts saying that no civil war in Syria can be contained or prevented from reaching all the neighboring countries. This also stresses new facts which enhance this reality, at the head of which comes the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States in the Middle East. Hence, it seems impossible – or rather difficult to the point of being impossible – to push Nouri al-Maliki's government to leave, while it would be risky to oust Mikati's government. In the meantime, Jordan found no other way but to change its Cabinet, thus preferring an alternative for the wide-scale confrontation while awaiting the end of the impasse in Syria. Drastic change in the three countries would mean a change in the regional and international balance of power in the region. At this point, Mr. Walid Jumblatt was right when he blamed the international community for its shortcomings and for failing to act to achieve change in Damascus. He was also right when he held on to the existing government, in light of the inability to induce change on the domestic arena unless one is seen in the region. In that same sense, Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabni knows there is no alternative for Nouri al-Maliki today, unless a new consensus or understanding is reached between the influential foreign powers in Baghdad. Clearly, the regime in Syria is trying to activate the existing balances of power on the internal scene, by changing them on the foreign arena. Since the beginning, it has been relying on the position adopted by Russia and China that are providing it with international cover and the required protection, and has relied and is still relying on the absolute Iranian support. And while the armed Syrian opposition on the internal arena is continuing to advance on the ground and threatening with what is worse in case it receives the weapons that are still blocked, the regime is attempting to open the road towards the neighboring states in order to export its crisis, in the hope it would hasten the eruption of sectarian and denominational war throughout the region. But these attempts did not work with Jordan, at a time when it has tried and will not stop trying with Turkey. It thus unleashed the hands of the Kurdistan Workers' Party on the border and did not hesitate to carry out military harassment. It did the same in Lebanon where it is wagering on expanding the confrontation, in the hope that General Al-Hassan's assassination would achieve what former Minister Michel Samaha failed to accomplish. For their part, the international opponents of the Syrian regime have been slow to react. So far, the United States was unable to initiate any new steps, while Europe is showing reluctance as it has done in the past, whether following Saddam Hussein's occupation of Iraq or following the breaking out of the Balkan wars. The American and European argument at this level was and still is the fear of seeing foreign intervention lead to further anarchy and its spread in the region, and the fear from the unknown. But while they buried their heads in the sands, their rivals did not hesitate to blatantly interfere, thus threatening with the spread of chaos throughout the region and the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. So far, the American administration has been hiding behind the Russian-Chinese veto, while the same goes for Europe. They refused to intervene in the Syrian crisis, at a time when their adversaries, from Moscow and Tehran, have been interfering in public and without any shame. This international abstinence is hastening the anarchy they fear and has hastened the summoning of extremist Islamic powers from all around the world and the expansion of the fire outside the border to the point where the search for an alternative has become more difficult. Moreover, the efforts to intervene to achieve settlement and change have become more strenuous, and linked to complex regional and international calculations. At this level, it is unlikely that United Nations Human Rights Chief Navi Pillay's comparison of the situation in Syria to the sectarian war which erupted in Bosnia at the beginning of the 1990s will push the NATO member states to intervene as they did in Bosnia without a Security Council assignment. On the other hand, the rush of the regime in Damascus to implicate its neighbors in its civil war is not a sign of strength, but rather a sign of weakness and retreat, which might increase in case its oppositionists acquire the necessary weapons to face its air force. It probably feels the noose tightening around its neck and sensing the imminence of the political solution, which is why it is attempting to lead more powers into the confrontation in the hope it could summon its allies to the table to seek their support! General Al-Hassan's assassination addressed a strong blow to the frail truce that existed between the fighting Lebanese parties, and tampered with the rules of the internal game. The March 14 forces have the right to raise their voices and demand the departure of the government of which they were stripped on the eve of the Syrian crisis. Also, the assassination crime of the most prominent security leader does not only aim at retaliating against his role in upholding civil peace but also at leading Lebanon towards sectarian strife. But Syria's allies in Beirut should reconsider their calculations and positions and move closer to their partners, so that the country does not fall in a state of political vacuum, which would lead to further collapse and towards the Syrian fire. As for Prime Minister Mikati, he should draw up a clearer position, considering that it would be illogical to implicitly accuse Syria and remain at the head of the government of its allies. Can President Michel Suleiman and Mr. Walid Jumblatt reactivate political action to instate a new Doha Accord and a truce, in order to spare Lebanon from civil war and lead it towards a safe zone while awaiting the upcoming change that will be seen in Damascus sooner or later?
