It is quite logical for Egyptian political forces to start preparing for the parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held within three months from the referendum over the articles of the new constitution, expected to take place less than two months from now. Certainly important elements will influence the outcome of these elections, among them President Mohamed Morsi's performance, as well as whether it will meet the approval of the masses of citizens, and achieve a minimum of the hopes that have been sown and have “grown" in people's hearts and minds with the eruption of the Revolution and the fall of the Mubarak regime. Indeed, every achievement the President makes will act in favor of the candidates of the Islamist movement, and every failure of his will reduce the chances of this movement's candidates. It is also certain that the impressions made on citizens by the performance of the MPs of the dissolved parliament will have some consideration, especially with regard to some of the behavior that has been considered not to be suitable for parliament, or to the frustration that has afflicted broad segments of the population as a result of the rift that has formed between their ambitions and the ability of MPs to achieve results. Moreover, the disappearance of the military and the waning of its political role will have an impact on people's desire to vote in favor of a particular faction, to affect one or more parties, or to refrain from voting for one or more parties. Then come the issue of the fragmentation and dispersal of secular forces, and their infighting in confronting the Islamists, which will be the most important factor influencing the outcome of the next parliamentary elections. The facts indicate that there are attempts to achieve a minimum of agreement to confront the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, and efforts to reduce the number of seats won by the Islamists in the previous elections, which exceeded seventy percent of the total. But to what extent will these attempts at agreement or unification succeed, on the background of the race between these forces to achieve their own interests or gains? We are still in the preliminary phase, and there are gatherings, contacts, meetings and efforts being exerted to enter the elections with a single list – a list that would bring together the popular movement led by former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi and the Dostour Party (DP – “Constitution Party") led by Doctor Mohamed El-Baradei, as well as Leftist and Liberal parties and forces. Yet the information that has transpired so far indicates difficulties to agree on a unified list, which is the same thing that happened in the previous elections, when attempts at agreement failed and the result was a landslide victory in the elections for the Islamists and loss for secular forces. And there remain the businessmen and the prominent families of Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta, considered loyal to the former regime, who represent a major element in the balance of the coming elections. Indeed, the revolutionary movements affiliated with secular forces refuse to deal with them, while the Islamists do not have the same reservations, as evidenced by the fact that Doctor Hesham Qandil's government cabinet included the names of a number of them. Similarly, the majority of the businessmen who accompanied President Morsi on his trip to China were former members or supporters of the dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP). They have the money which secular forces sorely lack, as well as a number of votes that is not insignificant, as became apparent during the presidential elections, in which Air Marshal Ahmed Shafik obtained nearly half the total number of votes. In the previous elections, secular forces confronted the Islamists and the candidates of the “remnants" (of the former regime) and lost. And it seems that such a pattern will repeat itself in the coming elections if secular forces do not change their strategy and fail to unite. Then the elections will produce a parliament in which the Islamists would hold a majority of seats, alongside some of those affiliated with the former regime. Here, the same painful question poses itself for everyone: will non-Islamist revolutionary forces, and with them the remaining secular forces, concede their “principles", lift their reservations and accept to cooperate with the “remnants"? Or will they insist on their stance, defy the Islamists, the remnants and the circumstances, and wage a battle of which the outcome would almost certainly not be in their favor? The answer will determine the composition of the next parliament and the way Egypt will be governed over the next four years, knowing that insistence on boycotting the “remnants" may well represent a short-term loss but achieve gains on the long-term – this being contingent on the failure of the Islamists at both governing and legislating at the same time. That same question does not at all pose itself for the Islamists, who have become much more pragmatic and have justifications for cooperating with those affiliated to the former regime, as long as they have not been convicted of corruption, and as long as they – the “remnants" – have accepted the new regime with an Islamist face produced by the Revolution.
