Revolutionary forces in Egypt remain as they were in terms of their poor relations with the Military Council and their rejection of the former regime, while the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi on the one hand, and the military and some of those considered part of the former regime on the other, is heading towards a state of truce or even alliance. In any case, revolutionary forces that have been confronting the “remnants" (of the former regime) and the military for a year and a half now have to face them both along with the entire Islamist movement, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to the institution of the Presidency with the weight that it carries. In practical terms, and very clearly, on cannot hold as separate the institution of the Presidency, and Morsi in particular, and the Muslim Brotherhood, regardless of the numerous and oft-repeated statements from both sides asserting that there has been a complete separation between, on the one hand, the Brotherhood, its Guidance Bureau, its Shura Council and its popular base, and on the other President Morsi, who has become President of Egypt and of all Egyptians. Regardless of some of the ambiguities, scenes, deeds and words that come out of some of the prominent figures of the Brotherhood and embarrass the President, the truth that cannot be ignored is that Morsi's failure at the task of President would deal a fatal blow to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Furthermore, the President falling from his seat would mean that the popularity of the group, with its history and the weight that it carries, could be in danger of disappearing. Even if some have considered the Muslim Brotherhood to now be heading towards preaching or education and gradually moving away from politics, the relationship between Morsi and the group resembles the two blades of a pair of scissors, which seem to be heading in two different directions. Yet the truth is that each side is bolted to the other, and that attempts to prove the existence of a relationship between the President and the Muslim Brotherhood, or the FJP, therefore represent nothing but a waste of time to prove the obvious. A more useful course of action for the forces now competing against the Muslim Brotherhood, especially those that call and describe themselves as “secular forces", would be to examine the balance of political power in the street, so as to later be able to compete against the Brotherhood – as a group, as a political party and as a President – instead of wasting time and effort, and perhaps funds as well, in an attempt to prove what is already proven. In this context, secular forces are still suffering from acute divisions that do not allow them to enter into competition on equal footing with the Muslim Brotherhood in any coming elections. Even in spite of some developments and repercussions that have taken place over the past few months and weeks, among them the performance of MPs from the Islamist movement in the now dissolved Parliament, as well as the performance of Morsi himself in the Presidency, the behavior displayed by members of the Brotherhood, the statements made by prominent figures of the FJP, and the mistakes committed by some of those affiliated with the Islamist movement, the features of the scene today point to the likelihood of the next parliament also being elected with a majority of Islamists, just like the parliament that was dissolved – not because the Islamist movement has preserved its weight, strength and presence in the street, but rather because its competitors have grown even more weak, fragmented and divided. It is within such a framework that one can understand Morsi's decision to appoint Doctor Kamal Ganzouri as his adviser, after the Brotherhood had considered his government to be “a crime against the Revolution"; explain the presence of a number of those considered to be affiliated with the former regime in Doctor Hesham Qandil's newly formed government cabinet; as well as realize the significance of meetings that brought together prominent businessmen and prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood. Those recent developments have raised questions about the Brotherhood falling into contradictions between, on the one hand, its discourse in politics and in the media during the phase that preceded the presidential elections, and on the other its conduct today, its behavior and its new alliances, especially if this comes accompanied by a new relationship between Morsi and the Military Council. Indeed, after much uproar and expectations of a clash taking place, Morsi's discourse about the Military Council and the members of the army has become as that of one who never criticized the mistakes of the military, not to mention challenged it and chanted against it. In short, President Morsi, and with him the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood, have considered that the time had come to gain the favor of the “silent majority", those who do not engage in politics nor wish to do so, and who do not support a particular faction but fear for the country and always demand calm and stability “under any regime". They include the heads of large families in Upper Egypt and the maritime front, as well as heavyweight businessmen who worked with the former regime without becoming corrupt, and who are willing to work with any other regime, as long as it guarantees them security and stability. The Muslim Brotherhood needs the support of these people at every election, as well as their backing in calming down the street, containing protests and responding to the revolutionaries who have chosen to walk down a path that increases their division, and therefore their weakness – this while the Brotherhood broadens the circle of its supporters, to such an extent that, amid calls for a revolution against them on the 24th of this month, adopted by some of those opposed to the Islamist movement, the conservatives of Cairo, Giza and the Red Sea sent Morsi their best wishes on the commemoration of the Invasion of Badr.
