The problem of secular forces as a revolutionary faction in Egypt is that they build their political vision according to what they wish to achieve, not according to what they can actually achieve. They thus get surprised that what they have sought after has not been achieved, and subsequently exhaust themselves in the heat of confrontations with a new reality they are not comfortable with, despite the fact that they could have avoided its occurrence. These forces are now hoping for a president affiliated to them, as with the experience of Tunisia, despite the fact that they have previously failed to drive towards the Tunisian experience on the issue of the constitution or the elections first. Nevertheless, they are doing the same thing again. They wish for a Leftist or Liberal president – the important thing is that he should be a revolutionary. Will they then have the ability to achieve what they want, or will they find themselves in a few months having entered in battles against the new president whom they reject, and thus seem to be placing obstacles to plans and attempts to rebuild the state, or appear as eternal rejectionist revolutionary rebels, because the balance of power in society is not to their advantage? Secular and revolutionary forces wage their battles, with their major figures having in mind that an alliance has been established between the Military Council and the Islamists in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Thus their thinking is dispersed between confronting the popularity of the Islamists in the street, and the control of the military, its presence and the power it holds, at the same time. And it is no secret that secular forces suffered terrible failure at the parliamentary elections, having fallen into blatant mistakes that weakened their ability to mobilize the public or to obtain people's votes at the ballot boxes, starting from the referendum on constitutional amendments, and up to the parliamentary elections. The facts indicate that this will be the case again in the battle of the presidential elections. Indeed, these forces have still not admitted to their mistakes, and in fact have increased them. This means that they will repeat them and will fail to achieve a political gain in the victory of a president that would be affiliated with them, or even close to them. They believe that merely pointing out the mistakes committed by the Military Council, slandering the Islamists, or shedding doubt on the methods used for drafting the constitution or for holding the presidential elections, will be sufficient for them to achieve what they seek, and convince the masses of the people of the soundness of their stances. Regarding the presidential elections, the majority of secular forces reject supporting any official who served under the Mubarak regime. They are therefore opposed to the election of Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shafik, and have taken a stance against Doctor Salim Al-Awa, considering him to be an Islamist candidate, as well as against Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, considering him to be affiliated at first with the Muslim Brotherhood, and later with the Salafists. They are divided about supporting Doctor Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Hamdeen Sabahi, despite the fact that they were both the closest among all the candidates to Tahrir Square and the revolutionaries. Indeed, the Liberals and Leftists have reservations regarding any Islamist candidate (even a former Islamist), as well as any Nasserist candidate they believe to adopt ideas opposed to their orientations. Some of the information being circulated states that secular and revolutionary forces seek to nominate a new candidate whom they would support, but disagreements between Leftists and Liberals are preventing them from arriving at a candidate with whom those forces could confront the candidate who would be supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, for example. In the world of politics, one should not reject a whole that cannot agree with one's capabilities. Rather, one can accept part of it, and this is what the Muslim Brotherhood often succeeds at. Indeed, if they fail to agree with a new candidate, they will support one of the potential candidates being put forward now, not merely for the sake of declaring a stance, but at least in order to make the candidate “owe them”, and therefore not clash with them after assuming the presidential seat. Secular forces could support a new candidate, but what is most important is for such a candidate to have what it takes to win. And if the information about attempts being made to convince Doctor Mohamed El-Baradei to return to the presidential race proves true, then secular forces would have found in him their long-sought boon, not just because he has what it takes to compete, but also because he could unite them, seeing as they suffer from division. If secular forces were to focus their efforts in this direction, they would have started heading down the right path, instead of wasting time and effort demanding a temporary president, or a civilian presidential council, or even the extension of the transitional period – all issues that have been overtaken by reality, and left behind by events. The Islamists are not faced with a big problem – they only have to define their choices. And even if they lose the presidential race, it will not be such a grave matter to them, having secured forming the government after the constitution has been completed. As for secular forces, they have no choice but to unite behind a presidential candidate… And Baradei is the one most likely and most able to compete from among the prominent names affiliated with the Liberal and Leftist movements, who do not enjoy much popularity in the street, despite their constant presence on satellite television shows. Baradei's victory is not guaranteed of course, but his mere candidacy, even if he loses, would give weight to secular forces – or else let them accept to remain in the background.
