Between the thugs on Tahrir Square before the victory of the January 25 revolution and yesterday's thugs in Abassiya around the headquarters of the Egyptian Defense Ministry, what has changed apart from the number of dead and wounded during the Camels Battle and the ministry incident? And while the mission of the men of the former regime on the street was to prevent its collapse at any price, with whom are the thugs currently working while trying to disperse the Salafi sit-in near the ministry with Molotov cocktails and live ammunition? When the number of victims yesterday amounted to ten dead, the army's decision was not to interfere despite the deployment of reinforcements in Cairo. It seemed that the clashes seen at dawn on Wednesday aimed at undermining a meeting between the military council and parties which it had invited to discuss the crisis of the constituent assembly assigned to draw up the Constitution, knowing that the Muslim Brotherhood group was excluded from the meeting – although it denied that. Between one crisis and another, the Egyptians are saying that each party has its thugs and everyone is eluding what is happening on the street while saluting the martyrs and justifying additional pressures on the military council in order for it to leave. In the meantime, the council is reiterating that it will leave, but not before D-day at the end of June, i.e. once the authority is surrendered to a civilian president who should be elected this month. And just like it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood group is attempting to rush the formation of a constituent assembly that suits it based on its parliamentary legitimacy – knowing its controls the majority in parliament – doubts were raised once again over the role of the group in fueling the tensions with the military with the imminence of the presidential elections. By doing so, it is either trying to temporarily obstruct these elections if the chances of its candidate Mohammed Morsi are still weaker than those of Abdel Moneim Aboul-Foutouh while holding the military council responsible for the delay, or trying to exploit a new clash with the Salafis on the street while standing by and hoping for the best. In both cases, the military council will have to succumb to the MB “surprises” along with the liberal and leftist forces. In Egypt, to each side its thugs. This is not an accusation to the MB of being implicated in the Abassiya incident, of having attacked the protesters among the supporters of Salafi candidate Hazem Abu Ismail who was excluded from the elections with Molotov cocktails or of having killed twenty people within hours. But what is certain is that it is not in the government's or the military council's interest to pave the way before a massacre three weeks prior to the presidential elections. Killings in this case, no matter how much they were to escalate, will not have a negative impact on the MB's popularity since the group is not present on the street. Its problem however is that it says one thing and its opposite. Indeed, it reassures the others then issues slogans renewing the fears and the doubts surrounding its goals. At this level, what does the MB candidate's slogan “the resumption of the Islamic conquests” mean? More important is the backdrop of what was said about promises to introduce a governmental change within Al-Ganzouri's Cabinet as promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood, which allowed once again the prevalence of the crisis affecting its relationship with the military. And while some are still doubting the credibility of the Freedom and Justice Party's flaunting of the existence of a conflict between parliament and the authority to make it look as though a conflict between popular legitimacy and a transitional power, it is feared that the party will exploit the crises to delay the military's return to the caserns. Indeed, the insistence of the Islamists among others on besieging the military institution with intention tests will not allow the prevalence of reason, at least to stop the duels with Molotov cocktails, tear gas bombs and bitterness. The death rate in Egypt in the post-revolution phase cannot be compared to its omnipotence in Syria. But what wisdom behind the one-million men marches, at a time when the crisis of trust between the military, the Islamists and the liberal forces is preventing the dissipation of the fears surrounding the collapse? What wisdom behind the convoys of thugs who are once again proving their “competence,” as though the goal is to fuel the clashes between all the parties to kill the dreams of the revolution with each revival of the killing season and the distancing of stability. Some want the “Friday of the end” to be staged tomorrow with the participation of a million people. If this does not trigger concerns over further mayhem and allow the thugs to undermine the revolution, it certainly does not ensure a truce allowing the prevalence of reason. In parallel, the Muslim Brotherhood group did not give itself a chance to settle for its parliamentary victory, and realize the consequences of its control over all the powers, even if through polling and maneuvers.
