The results of the first round of the Egyptian presidential elections featured numerous signs, imposed new and shocking facts on the ground, shuffled the cards and the calculations, and shook powers and positions. Hence, during the second round, they will push the voters toward two options, the sweeter of which might be bitter! And without any exaggeration, this sweeter choice will determine the future of the revolution, the country and the Arab and regional system. The results of the first round led the Egyptians back to square one and to the preliminary question: was there any change and has the time come to reap the fruits of the revolution, or is the old regime preparing to reproduce itself in a new version taking into account all the mistakes committed by the consecutive administrations of deposed President Hosni Mubarak and his National Party? The results and the figures have confirmed the existence of three major voters. Firstly, there is the Muslim Brotherhood bloc that showed great commitment to the group's decision, despite all the analyses which surrounded the weakness of its candidate Muhammad Morsi and the division within its ranks between the sheikhs and the youth. Secondly, there is the bloc of the former regime and its disbanded National Party with all its sectors and faces. This bloc also includes the army that is considered to be a major voter, with all the interests, positions and capabilities that it enjoys and that provide it with wide presence among large factions of Egyptian society, and qualify it to maintain control in a way serving the status, fate and future of the military institution. Thirdly, there is the bloc that gave its votes to Hamdin Sabahi who came third, and maybe includes the factions that chose those who came fourth and fifth, i.e. Abdel Monem Abu al-Foutouh and Amr Moussa. The reading into the results does not require great effort to reach the conclusions known and realized by all the powers, some of which showed arrogance and procrastination. The votes reaped by the Brotherhood candidate defined the group's real size, while the figures did not reveal that the group represents the majority of the Egyptians as it had claimed following the parliamentary elections. It is definitely the biggest voting bloc, but not the prevailing one, considering that it has failed to represent even one third of the voters. As to the supporters of the former regime, those fearful of the unknown and those concerned about the security mayhem seen in the months which followed the revolution, they chose General Ahmed Shafik and appeared to form a bloc equal in size to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the votes earned by Shafik clearly revealed that during the last few months, the revolution lost a lot on the ground. If this is not true, why would five million people march behind the last prime minister under President Mubarak's rule and the one who was at the head of the authority on the day of the Camels' Battle, i.e. one of the darkest points during the last days of the former regime? The results proved, without the shadow of a doubt, that the “remnants" are not a mere neglected or forgotten bloc, and that they rather constitute an influential power with the ability to organize, act and commit, just like the Brotherhood bloc. As to the liberals, the nationals, some revolutionary youth and the leftists, their size was conveyed by the figures scored by Hamdin Sabahi, and they are not negligible when compared to the votes earned by the two candidates who will be competing in the runoff. And if this Nasserist candidate can assemble this electoral bloc and bring it together despite the contradictions between its components, he will be able to present himself as a third power or course and use this power to reinstate balance at the level of the political game, by leading the country away from the inevitability of the clash, or the bilateral clash between the Brotherhood, the military institution and the so-called antirevolutionary forces. Certainly, the alignment of a Coptic majority behind General Shafik confirmed the seriousness of the fears prevailing in the ranks of this majority. It also featured numerous meanings, the first of which is that the Church prefers the old – despite its oldness – even if it has suffered a lot at the hands of the former regime. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the behavior of many Islamic forces was behind this tendency in the first place, although this does not spare the Church from its responsibility for that option which could have been avoided had it supported Sabahi or Amr Moussa, instead of appearing as though it is standing in the face of the aspirations of the revolution. Can the Church tolerate going down in history as having stood in the face of the change movement? In any case, this alignment converges with the turn of the Christian minorities in the region toward the old formula at the level of power and the identity of the state that are perceived to be safer. This is the case of the Christians in the East, whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Iraq before that. Regardless of the circumstances that led to these results, the political map featuring the distribution of power had become clear, and all the latter forces have no other option but to deal with the new situation as a fait accompli whose meanings cannot be disregarded. It is not enough for Issam al-Aryan, the leader in the Brotherhood, to realize belatedly “that the nation would be in danger" if Ahmed Shafik were to win, just as it is not enough for him to call for dialogue “to save our revolution." Moreover, it is not enough for the Brotherhood to call on Abdul Monem Abu al-Foutouh and Hamdin Sabahi to engage in talks, unify the ranks and divide the positions in the next authority if an agreement is reached. Indeed, unless the Brotherhood climbs down from its high horse and changes its rhetoric, the revolution youth, along with the liberal, leftist and secular powers will not be reassured by what it is concealing, based on the previous experiences during the revolution. And is it too late for it to restore the severed dialogue with the Copts who are haunted by the fear of seeing the Islamists controlling all aspects and institutions of the state? The Muslim Brotherhood knows that the votes reaped by Sabahi and Abu al-Foutouh do not follow an ideological course or an organization forcing those affiliated with it to commit to the decisions of the group. Furthermore, its leaders know that their former colleague, the independent Islamist, might have been let down by the Salafis and some Islamic powers that are extremely hostile to them. What confirms this is the fact that he did not come first in Alexandria, i.e. the Salafis' stronghold. Moreover, a team among the latter will not back up Abu al-Foutouh's intention to support the Brotherhood candidate, while some accuse Salafi groups of having worked with the security apparatuses during Mubarak's regime and of having been assisted by all means to stand in the face of the group. Some are wagering that a faction of them will go back to the military institution to determine their choices, although the logical option for the Salafis is to stand behind Muhammad Morsi. As to Sabahi's supporters, they include forces which have been and still are hostile toward the Muslim Brotherhood, and are concerned about what it has in store after they saw its practices since the beginning of the revolution. Hence, these forces will not find themselves bound by any alliance which their candidate might seal with the group. So, will all those who stood in the face of the Brotherhood and the military boycott the second round, or head to the boxes with white ballots that will blatantly proclaim their rejection of two options, the sweeter of which is bitter, and register their real size in a documented way? Will the group be able to tempt Sabahi and his group by offering them what they cannot disregard? And just as it is the case with the Brotherhood, it is not enough for General Shafik to promise the Egyptians a new era while assuring them that “there is no going backwards," at a time when his exploitation of the sensitive issue among the youth and those who fear the Islamists will not be fruitful, through promises that he will restore the revolution from its “hijackers" and return its “gains to those who detonated it." Everyone knows that – even if it has not made any announcements in this direction – the army will stand behind a candidate who exited its ranks. This candidate is announcing every day how proud he is to be part of this institution, and is the most capable of understanding its fears and concerns. Indeed, Shafik is perceived as being the only one able of reassuring it about its role and position in the new regime, far away from any pursuits targeting its apparatuses and symbols in the future, and from any measures which might reduce the army's role and economic and financial privileges. Apart from the results and the new challenges they are raising, the elections have constituted a leading experience for the Egyptian people who exercised their right to choose for the first time in 5,000 years, as it was written by a British paper. For their part, the European circles praised the integrity of these elections, although they witnessed some flaws and fiddling via electoral funds and media bias. Even the high electoral commission did not receive any appeals worth mentioning, which means that the Egyptians exercised their electoral right as they have never done before, back when the turnout was negligible and revealed the citizens' abstinence from participating in the falsification of their will! What is required during the period separating us from the second round is the appeasement of the spirits, and seeing each side recognizing its real size and relinquishing its tendency to achieve absolute power. Indeed, neither the Brotherhood is capable of reproducing its “accomplishment" during the parliamentary elections, nor is the military able to impose its will by force, regardless of the means. The conflict is no longer limited to these two sides and the other powers' mission is to instate a minimum level of rationality, reason and pragmatism on the political arena. True, the situation in Egypt is going back to square one, but it will definitely not go back to the way it used to be prior to the eruption of the revolution. So, can the Egyptian mind come up with a deal or a settlement that would ensure another path for peaceful change or is a second revolution required? Egypt's rush to choose its president will not only turn a page in its history alone. The rush to get Egypt out of the state of non-influence is an urgent need within the Arab world that is feeling its way toward the reconstruction of a regional order that would maintain the interests of the people of the region. Cairo's resumption of its regional role will redraft the limits and rules of the game in the Middle East and North Africa, just as it will correct the flaw affecting the balance of powers and force the big players inside and outside the region to reconsider their projects and plans.
