In Egypt, there is more blood, fear and hope. The pace of the defiance and killing on Tahrir Square in Cairo addressed a message to the military council that the time has come for the army to return to the barracks and that its credit at the level of the protection of the January 25 revolution has been eaten up by its mistakes in managing the country's affairs. And while Issam Sharaf's government was among the most prominent victims of this management, the protesters' insistence yesterday on handcuffing the council while eagerly attempting to besiege the Interior Ministry, increased the concerns among some Egyptians over the ability of the revolutionary youth, parties and powers sympathizing with them to find an alternative that would handle the supervision of the parliamentary elections within five days. The cry of defiance on Tahrir Square - hours after the head of the military council, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, accepted the staging of a popular referendum for the “immediate” transfer of power – recalls the street's response to the late concessions that were offered by deposed President Hosni Mubarak, but to no avail. Among the protesters on the square, some considered that the acceptance of the referendum, “if necessary”, is a mere maneuver enhancing the doubts surrounding the council's intention to surrender power. In parallel, the heated confrontation to impose a national salvation government is prompting questions in regard to the ability to stage parliamentary elections in ten days. Far away from the Israeli leaks regarding the “disappointment” over the military council's fall in the “trap of the Islamists and the Salafis,” and the claims pointing to its attempts to postpone the first polls following the revolution to distance the ghost of the “Muslim Brotherhood's” hegemony over the seats of the People's Assembly, the parties and the new political elite do not seem distant from the days shaking the revolution. Indeed, although the “mother of the world” [Egypt] appears to be - from the outside - filled with hope in regard to the “second revolution” following the difficult marriage between the January 25 revolution and the military council, some among the Egyptians on the domestic arena have become fearful of seeing a tunnel of blood and the price of the hostility with the military. No one can deny the lethal mistake which affected the military council's credibility, considering that it stalled for months before ratifying the law to politically isolate the elements of the former regime, and only undertook this step when it was forced to do so under the pressures of the street, just as it was the case with the military trials of the civilians. However, the facts of the days that are shaking the revolution do not annul big interrogations being concealed by the commotion of the confrontation with the youth, whose blood is hiding the priority of calm to secure the launching of the voting on time on November 28 and the march toward the democratic state. Among these questions is one revolving around the timing of the confrontation and the MB's abstinence from participating in the one-million man march for salvation, at a time when this allowed the emergence of the popular base of the liberal and secular powers. Indeed, the accusations made to the MB of trying to lead the army toward confrontations with the protesters without it being involved are no longer being whispered, while the primary goal behind this is to eliminate any chances of seeing a surprise, such as Marshal Tantawi's running for president. It is therefore an “attempt to implicate the army,” to which the MB is responding with the complete opposite. And while the military council is blamed for its reluctance at the level of the settlement of Mubarak's trial – along with his sons and aides – some in Cairo are also accusing certain symbols of the “rising” elite of misleading and duping the council with mined pieces of advice regarding the management of the transitional stage. As for the talk about the division of the forces on the streets and squares and the parties' competition over the shares, they are not distant from the questioning by the April 6 Movement of the extent of the representation of Tahrir Square by certain political powers that were called for dialogue by the council, which pledged to form a salvation government. Another scenario related to the days of “decisiveness” before the elections, is related to disgruntlement of the non-Islamic powers and parties of the revolution over the consequences of “a silent conspiracy” between the council and the MB. Indeed, these parties are convinced that such collaboration exists and that it will facilitate the group's acquisition of a majority at the People's Assembly, in exchange for upholding the military institution's influence and interests. As for those who are pessimistic toward the course of the confrontation and who are wondering about who will manage a state the size of Egypt if the army were to pull back to the barracks, they believe it is unlikely that the polling centers will be opened if the salvation government is not formed within hours. But in reality, despite the deterioration of the army's status with the fall of additional victims and while the Supreme Council is unable to protect the demonstrators, all the parties share the responsibility of dragging Egypt into the dark tunnel, ever since they failed to define the hour of the confrontation to save the revolution and also fell in the trap of stalling to divide the shares.
