The call made by President Dmitry Medvedev on his Syrian counterpart to implement reforms or step down does not necessarily mean that Russia is about to amend its policy imminently. Indeed, it would be too soon to expect such drastic change. A few days ago, it had used its veto right to prevent the issuance of a resolution condemning the Syrian regime and warning it against international sanctions, while its president himself had warned President Bashar al-Assad a few months ago against a “sad fate” in case he were to abstain from listening to the demands of the oppositionists and implementing his promises. As for his Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, he had preceded him by saying that his country had no “interests or investments to defend in Syria”! Does this mean that Russia actually has no interests in Syria or that it has interests in other places which it wishes to defend and recognize? Does it really want to avoid the repetition of the Libyan experience where it found itself distant from whatever is being drawn up for the country's future and had no other choice but to belatedly recognize the National Transitional Council in Tripoli? Putin himself had noted that “the speed with which the military operations against independent states are being carried out on the international levels has become alarming in our current day and age.” This even reminded him of the “medieval calls for Crusades. To me, it resembles some sort of medieval call to crusade when somebody would appeal to someone to go to a certain place and free someone else.” The Russian prime minister did not forget to express his disgruntlement toward the United States' policy, recalling its bombing of Belgrade during Bill Clinton's presidency and that of Afghanistan and Iraq under George Bush Sr. then Jr. to mention that his country opposed “foreign interference in internal political conflicts, or even in armed ones to defend one of the sides” in whichever country. Hence, Moscow is clearly saying what it wants: the opposition of any attempt to change any regime, i.e. any regime whose policies are not to the liking of the West! In other words, it opposes Washington's and its allies' changing of regimes through direct interference, and this is not a new policy as it resisted the attempts to induce change in countries which until two decades ago were revolving in the Soviet or Russian space, from Ukraine to Central Asia, going through Georgia which it punished by annexing the Abkhazia and Ossetia provinces to it. The West for its part did not disregard what was happening in Syria while awaiting the unification of the opposition solely, although this was an additional card to facilitate its action. It was waiting – before mobilizing its machine inside and outside the Security Council – for Russia to draw the lessons from the previous experiences and convince the Syrian regime to introduce the required changes and reforms on the domestic arena, especially following the eruption of the Arab Spring. Turkey tried and waited for a long time, but to no avail. President Nicolas Sarkozy – along with Qatar – also tried, led Syria out of its isolation following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and waited, but to no avail. As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it tried then distanced itself from the entire issue. The United States and the European Union both awaited the outcome of the Russian efforts, after more than three months ago Moscow invited the Syrian sides to resolve the problems through political dialogue and to convince all the powers – whether in the regime or the opposition – to engage in this dialogue. But what is the outcome? The regime does not want to recognize the opposition on the domestic street and in exile and is still promoting the fact that the protesters are “terrorist elements.” Moreover, it did not even bother to cooperate with the efforts to secure concord, the last of which was the Arab League's initiative that could have granted it enough time to arrange its cards and conduct some reforms that might have shaken this consensus over its confrontation until the end. For its part, the opposition which has had long and bitter experiences with this regime is unwilling to back down after it broke the barrier of fear. It cannot return to the pre-action phase and can consequently not tolerate anything less than the regime's departure. So far, Russia has not succeeded in its efforts to achieve concord. Despite that, it opposed a resolution condemning Syria and warning it against sanctions. However, its Western opponents will not stop in the face of its success at the Security Council. True, they have so far given it a lot of time, but what is also true is that they attributed the slowness of their action to reasons and circumstances. They did not conceal the fact that the Syrian situation is different than the Libyan one, that its geostrategic position is sensitive and that the issue affects an entire region, from Iraq to Lebanon going through Turkey, Jordan, Palestine… and Israel. But Russia wants more time, and Medvedev's call on Al-Assad two days ago to introduce reforms or leave was nothing but an attempt to convey the obligations that prompted the veto, i.e. giving Damascus another chance to move toward a political solution. But what the Russian president must realize is that his policy is being subjected to depletion in the face of Western diplomacy. Indeed, a few hours following his last position, Washington escalated its tone, warned against the seriousness of the situation in Syria and called on Al-Assad to step down immediately. There is no doubt that the opposition movements' support of the National Council will also contribute to the erosion of Russia's position which had opposed NATO's intervention in Libya then finally succumbed and recognized the National Transitional Council. This is a situation which it might have to face with the deterioration of the crisis in Syria. But this time, it will not take any risks as it did toward the Western action to topple Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi's regime. It might thus repeat its experience at the level of the Iranian file, i.e. when it conducted a trade-off with the West and the United States in the context of the confrontation with Iran, a trade-off whose chapters are still unfolding in the conflict between Tehran and Moscow that relinquished its “nuclear” commitments and “missiles” contracts with the Islamic Republic. This had caused it to be accused by the latter of using the Iranian card to arrange its relations and interests with the United States, as well as with Europe, which is what actually happened. Indeed, Moscow made a deal with the West in Georgia, Ukraine and Central Asia, while Washington also reaped benefits, the most prominent of which probably being the facilitation of the delivery of weapons to Afghanistan. Hence, the issue is not a matter of principle as much as it is a matter of interests. Moral values and bases have no place in politics, or else what would be the meaning of Russia's opposition of any international resolution to stop the bloodshed in Syria, regardless of the logic or story on which it relied in its perception of what is happening in that country? On the other hand, this does not mean that these values are behind the Western policies, although they are wrapped in slogans related to the spread of democracy and the defense of human rights and freedoms. Had this been the case, how would one explain Washington's shameless rush to topple any resolution demanding the recognition of Palestine's membership at the United Nations and why would the West be postponing the handling of the situation in Yemen where the action was firstly launched since fall of last year? None of the two positions are prompted by the moral factors. It is a matter of interests first and foremost. Hence, Russia's position will not be final, as it might repeat its experience with Iran and reach a deal which would secure the interests of the international players. The West no longer perceives the Syrian regime as being a helping element in the system whose establishment it wishes to see in the Middle East. It has not forgotten what this regime did in Iraq, its alliance with Iran – with whom the West did not know how to settle the confrontation – and its alliance with Hamas and Hezbollah, the two movements that are perceived by America and Europe as being an obstacle in the face of the settlement, any settlement regardless of whether or not it is fair. At the end of the day, what the United States and the European Union want is the fall of the regime because that would undermine the so-called rejectionist alliance, address a strong blow to Iran and its allies and facilitate the drawing up of the new regional order in the region – or complete what was started in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In light of this reality, it would be useless to say that the Arab action is not only linked to internal factors, and that the foreign circumstances and interests surrounding it almost constitute a key element in determining its outcome. Russia, as opposed to the West, does not wish to lose its arms deals with Syria, the position of its military fleet in the Mediterranean or its role in the Middle Eastern settlement. It has long attempted to host the second sessions of the Annapolis conference, but no one listened to it, and has long opposed the deployment of NATO's missile shield near its border to no avail. Now the early warning system on Turkish soil is reminding it every day that Ankara is reviving the memories of the Cold War, i.e. back when it formed a high dam in the face of the Communist system's expansion toward the Arab region. In other words, the West should deal with Russia as being a superpower enjoying historical interests in the Middle East, while Putin should have clearly said that his country “has interests in Syria” and outside of it! But the question remains: Can Russia maintain its interests? Can its policy stand fast in the face of a wide scale depletion war featuring a stringent Western diplomacy, the rise of the action on the Syrian domestic arena and the action of the National Council abroad, and the Turkish actions, sanctions and military maneuvers in Antakya?
