In Beirut and other capitals around the world, a debate is underway on the challenges that Lebanon faces as it becomes a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for a two-year period, at the beginning of 2010. The debate in Beirut is the result of the insistence by various political circles on a guarantee that Lebanon can play its role in dealing with an untold number of international issues, as well as regional and global crises that require a degree of specialization and knowledge. However, the debate also results from the anxiety by some political groups in Lebanon about this foreign policy mission's impact on the domestic situation, when it involves sensitive matters, and on Lebanon's regional relations, especially with Syria and Iran. Moreover, there may be an impact on Lebanon's relations with influential western states, led by the US and France, and others. The debate is also taking place in western capitals and political and diplomatic decision-making centers, as some of these western states doubt Lebanon's ability to perform the task in light of its sensitive domestic situation, which is intertwined to the utmost extent with the influence of states of Syria and Iran, in contrast to the policies of western states, especially the US. Amid these doubts and anxieties vis-à-vis Lebanon's new place on the international map, the challenge is prompting the political and diplomatic authorities in Lebanon to confront the situation. At the same time, these doubts and anxieties also signal one of the positive aspects of seeing the small country selected for the loftiest international authority: it will provide yet another reason for Beirut's maintaining contacts with all countries in the region and the world to ensure that their interest in Lebanon continues. Washington, Paris, London and other capitals are concerned with Lebanon's upcoming stances in the Security Council; this is a motive for all of them to see the small country remain on their agenda, in the event that their regional and international policies require putting Lebanon on the shelf, as it was for over three decades. This allowed Syria to monopolize the management of Lebanon's domestic affairs and foreign policies. At a time when Lebanese have began to get accustomed to generating political settlements among them, as in the case of the formation of the government, the drafting of its policy statement, and finally the new government's steps (whatever their defects). The challenge also applies to the ability of the Lebanese to produce these settlements in foreign policy, on a new basis: an agreement between a degree of independence, which was gained after Syria withdrew from managing the country's affairs, and the respect for the requirements of normalizing relations with Damascus, based on UN resolutions with regard to its relationship with Lebanon, as Damascus itself tries to normalize its relations with this international community. This renders the exercise that Lebanon is about to undergo, via Security Council resolutions, as important as the exercise that will be experienced by its mission to New York. Lebanon had a similar experience in the 1950s and 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Needless to say, with regard to pressing Arab and regional issues (Israeli occupation of its land, the Palestinian question, Iraq, and others), Lebanon's stances in the Security Council will rely on its core national policies as well as the principles of Arab consensus, and will not deviate from them. The source of anxiety in some Lebanese political circles about the repercussions of some positions that will be required of Lebanon in the Security Council might be limited to one, principal issue, namely the Iranian nuclear program. These political circles are afraid that the pressure of western countries and big powers will be brought to bear on Lebanon if the situation moves toward a confrontation through sanctions or other measures against Iran. Lebanon's stance on this issue will be subject to pressure from Hizbullah and its allies domestically and there will be a domestic reaction to this policy, if it respects the western stance; it will generate a western reaction if Lebanon observes the requirement of domestic stability at the expense of being in line with the international players. Whether it involves Iran or another issue, Lebanon has an opportunity to benefit from this position. It can confront sensitive stances by means of various political settlements, from producing a settlement on any stance in the Cabinet, to bargaining with the big powers over support on issues that do not involve national sensitivities (when these countries feel that Lebanon's supporting vote is vital to getting the resolutions passed), in return for the meeting of demands on issues that involve its national interests, with regard to Israel, or economic support, all the way to its ability to gauge any stance based on its national interest, irrespective of any disharmony with American or western demands on it. The third level was taken by Qatar, when it was a member of the Security Council in 2006 and 2007. It had positions that were contrary to the US stance, even though Doha enjoys a close alliance with Washington, militarily and politically. And finally, Lebanon could simply abstain. This Lebanese exercise may be successful and have a political benefit if it is handled wisely. The head of the Lebanese delegation in New York, Ambassador Nawaf Salam, began to prepare for this when the Lebanese state was gathering itself together after the parliamentary elections. He brought to the mission a team that has qualifications and enthusiasm, despite its small numbers, and that he leads with wisdom, and not bargaining or being hasty. Will the Lebanese Foreign Ministry and centers of decision-making in the state work together with this team to generate the elements of success when it comes to this challenge?
