On Friday, Egypt entered the second stage of the “revolution.” It entered a new round that is open to a corrective or beautifying action or to additional anarchy and concealed conflicts between all the actors. As for the slogan of the “youth” during this stage, it is that the revolution did not achieve its goals in full, which consequently means that the action should not stop and that there must be a resumption of the policy of permanent and ongoing pressures. Some sides, who contributed to the launching of the “January 25 revolution,” believe that the military council that is managing the transitory stage has not presented a clear roadmap based on which they can reposition themselves and deal with its requirements. Some rising powers did not have and will never have enough time to organize their ranks and run in the parliamentary elections in September in the face of the most organized Muslim Brotherhood group that played a prominent role in managing the protests after it joined the “revolution youth.” The absence of this map is confusing the rising powers or those that were prevented – along with their legitimate political work – by the former regime. Consequently, they are conveying fears over the preludes and circumstances surrounding the establishment of the new regime that will succeed to that of Hosni Mubarak. Those who gathered on the squares on the “Revolution First Friday” three days ago sent a clear message relaying their rejection of the existing internal equation between the MB and the military institution. This is why they exaggeratedly attacked head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Issam Sharaf's government and the judicial system. They were provoked by the sentences issued vis-à-vis symbols of the former regime and the confusion prevailing over the government's decisions and the judiciary. Some are even concerned about seeing powers previously active in the former National Party running in the elections and rearranging their ranks under various names to reenter the race. Indeed, the latter powers still enjoy financial and economic capabilities and supporters in the ranks of some institutions, namely the security ones, and some among those who feel that change will marginalize them, if not cause their sanctioning. What is increasing these fears is that the MB's possible control over the new parliament will allow it to have the final say in regard to the shape of the new constitution that will be drafted following the elections. This could happen in agreement with or joint participation of the military, as the recent developments and events showed that the latter figured out that Issam Sharaf's government failed and must be changed, and that there might be a need for a government that is more able to control the situation to allow the military institution to remain in the background. This is why these forces are seeking the postponement of the elections until after the drafting of the new constitution, so that they are given the opportunity to arrange their ranks. However, those insisting on the staging of the elections on time, are saying that the referendum conducted over the constitutional amendments about three months ago, showed that the agenda drawn up by the military council had the upper hand, and that consequently, there was no need to poll the people's opinion over this controversy. In light of these fears and amid this concealed conflict, the “youth” returned to the squares and raised the slogan of “change” as the basis and primary goal of their action, without being deterred by the preemptive decisions with which the official sides tried to please them to alleviate the tensions. The political forces thus came up with a “supra-constitutional principles document” to appease the ongoing controversy over which should be seen first, the elections or the constitutional amendment. This document should constitute a ceiling that would guide the side which will handle the constitutional amendments after the promised elections are held. For its part, the date of the elections might also be postponed for a few months to please rising political sides that have not yet completed or started setting up their organizational structures. Moreover, Interior Minister Brigadier General Mansour al-Issawi announced the forced retirement of hundreds of senior security officials and officers suspected of being involved in the oppression of the demonstrations, as it was done by the judicial authorities who brought a number of symbols from the former regime before justice. The people on the squares did not pay any attention to these steps, and the spokesman for the Revolution Youth Coalition, Khaled al-Sayyed, commented on these decisions and measures by refusing the “handling in batches,” i.e. the achievement of the revolution's goals step by step. And this is the whole point. The military council does not want any clashes or confrontation with the “youth.” It thus tried to please them with new steps but it could not dissipate their fears over a possible deal with the Muslim Brotherhood at their expense when the time is right. As for the “elderly” among the latter - unlike the enthusiastic youth - they believe that there is no interest in clashing with the military as they recall over half a century of “oppression” to which they were subjected, the prevention of their public political work and their repetitive imprisonment, exile and displacement. But the “youth” who sparked change do not want anyone to “steal” what they have accomplished so far. Some fear that the insistence on returning to the squares will lead to some sort of anarchy while the country needs a period of calm so that the economy can breathe, and so that work and the institutions can be revived. In addition, the rise of the voices criticizing, and in some cases demanding, the departure of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi could create tensions in the ranks of the army that cannot allow the hands of the demonstrators to reach its command. This is a “red line” which the military will not allow anyone to cross, as it is known that – in principle - they do not favor the civilians and that the military council eventually cares about the creation of a “civil state.” Therefore, it does not want to risk any clashes with the “youth.” In that same context, the military council certainly wishes to see the election of a president who is on its side, or whom it approves and provides with a cover. Some believe that the army's infiltration of all the institutions, factories and farms - i.e. the essential aspects of the economic wheel in the country – can allow the person it wants to win the next presidential elections following the legislative ones, if its agreement with the MB were to be upheld. This means that the former regime is long gone but that the institution which carried President Mubarak for around half a century – and carried Presidents Abdel-Nasser and Al-Sadat before him – can still produce another regime with different characteristics. This also means that the revolution did not achieve all the dreams of the “youth,” and that the military will continue to supervise and monitor the situation, whether up close or from afar, as it is dictated by necessity. Another issue is that of the police and the security forces whose poles believe that all the sides concerned by the action are holding it responsible for what happened since the eruption of the revolution until now. This may be due to the role played by Mubarak's regime in the context of the “bequeathal plan,” through the removal of all the army institution's commanders who could have prevented this scenario. It also relied on the police, the intelligence services and other internal security apparatuses, which would probably explain the blunt absence of these bodies at the peak of the action from the squares, the residential areas, the commercial neighborhoods and the markets. There is no doubt at this level that their concealed conflict with the military council and the leaders of the “youth” will escalate following the recent decisions announced by the interior minister on the eve of the “Revolution First Friday.” Indeed, the decision regarding the forced retirement of hundreds of senior security officials and officers suspected of being involved in the demonstrations will make the latter feel more excluded and discriminated against. As for the big question during the second stage or round of the revolution, it is the following: Will the warring sides – the military, the security men, the civilians and the political powers – agree over settlements and middle ground solutions that would protect the roles of all the sides so that Egypt does not slip into a obscure stage of anarchy?
