It is natural for those responsible for the formation of the new Lebanese government to benefit from its birth to focus on the positives of its completion, after a vacuum in the executive branch that lasted four months and 18 days. During this period of vacuum, the Lebanese, and all of the country's economic sectors, have become exhausted by the harmful repercussions on their daily life, amid the paralysis that has struck many state institutions. Moreover, some groups in the new majority have suffered in terms of their relationship with their wide base of supporters, because they have been unable to settle matters and return to taking office and managing the affairs of state and society, after they brought down the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri; they set down a timetable for offering some accomplishments, but these were blocked by the political crisis and the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, despite the efforts that were made. Trusting in the positives of filling the vacuum and ending the negatives of the lethal period of waiting, which has governed the lives of the Lebanese for the past months, resembles making the Lebanese feel grateful about an accomplishment that they paid for out of their socio-economic capital, as much as it permits expectations that some benefits will be reaped when the work of the new government begins. This is particularly true for the summer, when the arrival of Diaspora Lebanese and some tourists to Beirut compensates for some of the rise in the trade deficit during the first quarter of this year, and limits the effect of the drop in some deposits in Lebanese banks and the fall in economic growth rates to their lowest levels. The new government and the political groups in the majority will benefit from making 200-300 appointments to vacant posts in the senior civil service, to demonstrate their activity, compared to the 'weightlessness" that has dominated the country for more than a month. This includes the state of paralysis that struck the former government, due to the dispute over the issue of "false witnesses" in the STL. However, the Lebanese will also observe the extent to which the "spoils will be divided" in making these appointments, and the extent of the disputes over these shares of power among sectarian and religious groups. They will also see the extent of the impact of sectarian and religious calculations in the political requirements of some of these appointments, especially in security bodies and related institutions, on the delay or promptness in reaching agreement within the government. In traditional Lebanese politics, all of this is natural. And it is also natural for the opposition to wait for the lapses into revenge-taking and maliciousness – even if Prime Minister Najib Miqati and National Struggle Bloc parliamentary leader Walid Jumblatt deny this day and night – and benefit from these lapses when facing off against the new group in power. There are many ministers fond of revenge-taking and maliciousness in the government and they have announced their intentions, with no beating around the bush. But it is more natural that this government was born during an impasse that Lebanon reached at the beginning of this year, when the Saudi-Syrian initiative to settle the issue of the STL broke down. If bringing down Hariri represented the collapse of this settlement, then the alternative government is the result of the same crisis. Its formation cannot lead to a renewal of the chances for a Saudi-Syrian settlement because the other side in the equation has been excluded, and is in fact rejected, since some of the chief partners of this government aspire to establish an election law that eliminates this other party, or limits its political weight to a minimum level. This will likely have counter-results, just as in 1998, when President Emile Lahoud sought to get rid of Rafiq Hariri, who swept up the parliamentary seats in Beirut during the 2000 elections and extended his influence in other areas, despite the Syrian military presence at the time. The coming of this government has allowed Lebanon to avoid an explosion as a result of the collapse of the "S-S" initiative, which is the chief positive that Miqati attributes to his decision to accept the nomination for the post of prime minister. But it is also true that accepting this conclusion leads to the belief, in the best case scenario, that this government is for a temporary or transitional period, which will end when the opportunities for a political settlement re-appear, or when the possibility of an explosion, which the current make-up of the government has delayed or avoided, re-emerges. Even though President Michel Suleiman is keen to deny Syrian intervention in the formation of the government, the regional moment in which this government was born can only work against this stance. It was impossible for this government to be formed without the party that brought down the previous government, and along with it the S-S initiative, which cannot be resurrected despite some of the wagers on the possibility of such a development. The timing is related to the crisis that Damascus is experiencing. The Syrian leadership wanted to form this government and send a message to whomever it concerns, that in light of the offensive against Syria and the possibility of a change in the international community's stance vis-à-vis the regime (there are attempts underway in the United Nations Security Council), it is able to solidify its ability to take matters in hand, not just in Syria, but in Lebanon as well. This leadership believes that defending its stance and position, or negotiating for its interests, requires managing official decision-making in Lebanon with its allies, and this turns Lebanon into a part of the Syrian crisis. It is thus natural for the new government to be one of Lebanese impasse, with multi-sided regional ramifications, both new and old.
