Many leading figures in the Lebanese opposition and allies of Hezbollah are making more frequent threats about bringing down the National Unity cabinet in Lebanon. This is part of their attack on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the likely indictment that will be issued; they give the other side a choice between the survival of the government and the survival of the STL, just as earlier they raised their voices to demand a choice between the STL and stability. If the first remains, there will be destabilization. However, just as these people link the change in government to the demand for abandoning the STL, they are ignoring that regional agreements link the government to the STL, but under a completely different formula: the impossibility of eliminating the STL requires the national unity government to continue, because it is one of the safety valves of security, in dealing with an indictment by the special prosecutor. This formula is a clear and fundamental result of the Saudi-Syrian understanding, added to the agreement to try to delay the indictment, with efforts made with leading capitals, although the difficulty of such a development is apparent. The secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was keen to affirm that the party had no intention of bringing down the government. Perhaps this was an expression of his commitment to this understanding, which he picked up in Damascus three weeks ago; bringing down the government by resignation is impossible, unless the effort is joined by ministers close to President Michel Suleiman, or ministers allied with the head of the Democratic Parliamentary Gathering, Walid Jumblatt. Both men are committed to the Saudi-Syrian understanding to the utmost extent, not to mention the fact that the speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri (three ministers), has become a symbol of calling for the Saudi-Syrian understanding, and sees its fruition and enhancement as a constant objective. The Saudi-Syrian understanding over the STL and the government is no joke. In addition to the fact that the Syrians are convinced that the Lebanese government, and particularly its prime minister, Saad Hariri, cannot be asked to do away with the STL, the insistence by some on making such a demand resembles their insistence on preventing the establishment of the STL and their conviction that it would not be established in 2007. Back then, these groups were convinced and reassured that the STL would not come to pass, but this proved to be a disappointment. Meanwhile, there are facts that cannot be changed, and concerned countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Syria, are aware of this. The STL is now an independent entity and has come to resemble a train that has left the station and cannot be stopped, until it comes to a rest at the designated station, where it pauses before resuming the journey. Moreover, manufacturing a government crisis to bring about a government not headed by Hariri, in order to ask the Security Council to halt the STL or prevent Lebanon from paying its share of the funding, or prevent state bodies from cooperating with the STL, is an unrealistic dream. No concerned country on the Security Council will accept a government decision to retreat from the decision to establish the STL. Such a government requires influence by Hezbollah and its allies, which would remove the “national unity” aspect, which the party needs for cover until further notice, so that European countries do not move toward marginalizing Lebanon in this case, which makes things worse. This is because the international community is moving toward washing its hands completely of the Lebanese situation, which still requires its umbrella. Even if some presume that Hezbollah can co-exist with a situation such as this, Damascus cannot, due to its understanding with Riyadh and its opening to western countries. As the talk of a change in government, ending the STL, and destabilization has turned into unending media pressure and intimidation, the opposition's insistence on trying the false witnesses is added to the evidence presented by Nasrallah to accuse Israel of guilt in the Hariri assassination. If the public prosecutor at the STL checks this evidence while waiting for more that was promised by Nasrallah, the false witnesses issue raises many questions about the benefit and feasibility of such a move, if the goal is to see enthusiasts accuse the STL of standing by some of them, while some of them are in Syria, and raising the issue with Damascus will return tension between it and the groups that have reconciled with Syria, led by Hariri. Is Damascus comfortable to the extent of returning to accusing Hariri and his allies, and seeing it being accused, meanwhile, of responsibility for being responsible for some of these false witnesses? Does all of this suit the new phase of Lebanese-Syria relations, and Saudi-Syrian relations?
