Amid the revolutions sweeping the Arab world, there is a heated conflict over the Middle East where major regional and international interests and strategies are clashing and competing. This has had a decisive impact on each of the courses of these revolutions. Although the domestic factors were and still are the main elements at the level of this action and its repercussions, the foreign “action” is causing similar impacts. Hence the contradictory positions and the double standards governing the positions of the concerned sides, from the United States to Europe, the Arab groups, Iran and Israel. Several issues are prevailing over this foreign “action,” the first of which being the stability that the industrial states wish to maintain. Indeed, they want to uphold the stability of the states built over seas of oil, on their shores and in their vicinity, in order to guarantee the ongoing flow of this oil which constitutes the life vein of global economies. As for the second issue, it is that of calm on the Israeli “fronts” and the protection of the elements providing this calm. The third is the open war on terrorism, on Al-Qaeda and on the extremist movements. In other words, the American and Western positions toward what is happening in general, along with the positions of Iran, Israel and some Arabs, are not governed by these sides' insistence on democracy, freedoms and human rights. They are governed by the preservation of the positions and interests in the inter-regional and international conflict over this part of the world. And while these sides are trying to adapt to the changes in Tunisia and Egypt for a series of considerations, reluctance, suspicion and fears characterize their positions toward what is happening in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Libya among other locations. At this level, there are many intertwining facts and circumstances. For instance, the American-Western reluctance toward what is happening in those countries is due to the United States' lack of trust in that the alternative regimes will understand its interests and will be more willing to deal with the requirements of the international community, especially in regard to stability, security, the opening of the door before free trade and the protection of the investments to mention a few. In Yemen for instance, President Ali Abdullah Saleh went too far in his exploitation of the existing contradictions between the opposition powers and parties, in order to divide and disperse them. By doing so, he wanted to ensure his stay and secure a bequeathal of power, after he placed all the positions in the hands of his sons and relatives. However, he never took into consideration the fact that these forces might unite, after they were engaged in fighting and clashes not too long ago. They united to ask him to leave. Nonetheless, if common hostility toward the regime combined powers that would not have come together in normal circumstances, will these forces grow apart and return to their old ways once he is gone? This is the unknown that is concerning the United States and the neighbors in the Peninsula. The latter are aware that the balance of powers is frail between the Southern regions, the Center and the North. Still, after a lot of hesitation, they found out it was no longer possible to give Saleh additional time to arrange his exit and secure the reasonable alternative as they had hoped they could, thus suggesting he relinquishes power to his deputy or to a person of his choosing, and form a national unity government that would undertake the required reforms and restructure the military institution and the security bodies during the transitory phase. In case of any mistakes or monopolization attempts similar to the ones witnessed in the past, or in case the opposition powers do not know how to reassure each other, Yemen might turn into three Yemens, or even go back to the times of the Sultanates. Division will occur, along with chaos that will open the arena before Al-Qaeda and its sisters. It will also open the “Houthi arena” in Saada before the Iranian influence, which will allow the latter to score a goal against Washington and Riyadh! Consequently, the Gulf Cooperation Council states entered Yemen and Bahrain, in order to prevent Tehran from tightening the siege in the South and the North. These states are now managing their wars outside the border, while the results will be determined by the outcome in the two latter countries, as well as by the future of the situation in Syria. It is on these arenas that the victor – between Iran and its regional and international rivals – will be defined. Certainly, the Islamic Republic feels it is benefitting from the action, considering it could harm the interests of the West and especially the United States. This was its position toward what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, but not toward what is happening in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. Hence, it is constantly angry and disconcerted vis-à-vis the positions of the Gulf countries and the United States. And just like Washington is monitoring what is happening in the region while closely watching Tehran, the latter is monitoring these transformations while closely watching America. In light of this situation, one can say that Iran's attempts to gain full control over the Gulf have not succeeded, and that the confusion affecting the Syrian situation will certainly impact the extent of its presence on the edges of the Mediterranean Sea and on the frontlines of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, without this meaning there is a Western or regional inclination to implicate Syria in total chaos or civil war. This is due to the fact that the collapse of this front will carry repercussions on stability in the neighboring states which in the past allowed the venting of Damascus' domestic crises. And if the Islamic Republic feels it is losing its position in Damascus, its ally Hezbollah will try to control the entire Lebanese situation, or at least what it can get its hands on. These are the rules and the conditions of the game, as its allies will not stand idle, while Hamas seems to be in an awkward position and is showing more caution in dealing with the situation in the Gaza Strip, considering that what might affect Damascus will definitely affect it, and even be lethal to it. At a time when these considerations and calculations related to the “conflict in Syria” prevented its slide toward the prohibited, the regime will never be the same again. Indeed, it will be forced to reconsider its relations and position on the regional map, as well as the required reforms on the domestic scene. It will find itself pushed toward additional balance in its relations with the Gulf states and Egypt on one hand, and the Islamic Republic on the other. And such a rapprochement toward the other Arabs will force it to take them into consideration at the expense of its relations with Tehran. On the other hand, what is reassuring Tehran so far is the world's preoccupation with something other than its nuclear program. There are priorities that have forced its Western opponents to shift their attention away from it, after the goals shifted and after all those competing in the region have started seeking the consecration of the old positions and the protection of the new ones. Today, there are problems more worthy of attention, i.e. the Arab action. For its part, Turkey is also hesitating to adopt the required steps toward the Arab action. Its reluctance is governed by the fear of losing its wide economic and political interests from Libya to Syria. As for Israel, it is not concealing its positions and fears while what is the most concerning for it is probably the situation in Egypt and its possible rapprochement with Turkey and Iran. For now, Cairo is certainly not about to build axes, and its relations with the Islamic Republic cannot overstep the fears of the Gulf populations. Actually, these fears might stand as an obstacle in the face of normalization, at a time when the new authority in Egypt will require massive economic aid which can only be provided by Gulf states. The same rule governs the position of those concerned about what is happening on the other side of the Arab world. Indeed, a lot was said about the reasons behind the obstruction of the American and European interference to settle the situation in Libya, while the main one is the fact that the West wishes to oust Colonel Gaddafi with the least possible material and military damage. The West is also concerned about the identity of the alternative authority in a country where Gaddafi's regime did not build any institutions, and did not allow the emergence of civil society, partisan life, syndicates and committees. And although Algeria is not actually interfering with what is happening in the Jamahiriya, it is interested in finding a settlement that would maintain some facets of the old regime, because any other scenario will encourage the Algerians to try out that same experience. In the end, one might say that the action in some Arab countries has entered the tunnel of the external struggle over the region. Therefore, it would be too soon to anticipate the outcome of the events, and consequently to expect the rise of a new regional order and a new map of powers and interests. What is certain, however, is that this order will not be drawn up by those wishing to monopolize the wealth of the Middle East, but rather by the people whose actions will not be quieted down, regardless of the size of the interferences.
