For Lebanon, 2010 draws closes on a relative decline in tension, which has produced economic paralysis and recession and upset the work of state institutions. This situation has resulted from the political wrangling that has stalled the work of these institutions, already subject to the logic of sectarian shares of power and narrow interests, which are draped in grand political slogans exploited for cheap gain and trivial matters. The only hope for the Lebanese lies in announcing the completed agreement between Saudi Arabia and Syria, which tackles ways to treat the Lebanese crisis over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the continuing repercussions of the assassination of former Premier Rafik Hariri more than five years ago. In reality, although the announcement of this settlement, awaited at the beginning of the New Year, will permit Lebanon to move to a new phase that will see its institutions resume their activity, if only in relative terms, instead of the current paralysis, this does not necessarily mean that the tensions will disappear completely. This is especially because the issuing of the indictment by the UN prosecutor of the STL will prompt the accused to take steps to defend themselves, leaving the country open to domestic and regional tension. However, the “S-S” (Saudi Arabia and Syria) agreement, whose importance is praised by Lebanese leaders, and has been sought after for several years, will act as a control mechanism for these reactions, and a means to contain the likely tensions produced by the opposition side's rejection of the accusations contained in the indictment. The awaited “S-S” agreement might based on separating several items from each other: the STL, Lebanon's domestic relations, and the roles of regional and international forces concerned with the country as an arena for influence that has been a battlefield for foreign conflicts over the last five years. If this is the case, then it will lead to a new positioning of local and foreign political forces in this arena. Although the promised agreement, which leading figures in the know say is complete, has yet to be announced, local and foreign groups have begun preparing for what will come afterward. This phase will see competition over magnitudes of influence and roles to be played in the new formula that this agreement will produce. Many Lebanese groups share the implicit belief that the new positioning will mean enshrining the political weight of several groups, led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri, while reducing the influence of others, for which the previous phase necessitated a stronger position on the political stage. The current stances by some local groups are part of their anticipation of the coming phase since they feel that they must guard their positions, or that they need to benefit from the opportunity to overtake their competitors. Not unrelated to this is the attack on the president, Michel Suleiman. He is also being attacked for his stance on the earlier struggle over reaching the agreement, whose implementation, if announced, will be accompanied by a struggle over new shares of influence. The Christian political scene constitutes the main arena for this struggle, which includes the presidency, and this explains the attack on Suleiman by the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun. Meanwhile, this does not cancel the fears and aspirations of political groups on the Muslim political scene. Opposition groups believe that the “S-S” agreement will cement the role and influence of Syria, recognized by the other side in the agreement, namely Saudi Arabia, and by other countries that it supports. They believe that Damascus' allies will certainly reap the fruit of this enshrining of Syria's role, while political groups in the majority and the 14 March coalition believe that the settlement will not mean Syria being delegated, once again, responsibility for managing internal balances of power, as was the case in the past, i.e. before 2000. Within select areas of the Lebanese political scene, the atmosphere is full of expectations and wagers about the post-agreement phase. Meanwhile, there is a belief that this phase will lead to containing Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon in a way that reassures Damascus. Thus, the struggle over shares of political influence among the Christians might be the key theme of the next phase. Some have gone as far as to talk about a government re-shuffle and change in the shares of some Christian groups. President Suleiman believes that Lebanon “has been managing its own affairs since 2008 in administrative and security terms,” while some Christian leaders who are allies of Syria believe that the time has come to reap the fruit of standing with Damascus, to the degree that some have returned to the old refrain that Suleiman will not finish his term, and the expectation of a radical change among the Christian groups. This explains the boycott of presidential invitations to revive the National Dialogue sessions, which takes Lebanon back to a struggle similar to the one that preceded 2005, when the main issue was the marginalization of Christian political groups that had a sizeable following and weight.
