Will the new wave of calm, which was brought about by the holding of a Lebanese-Syrian summit on Sunday, continue, after a wave of loud shouting and screaming and threats? Or will the Lebanese see a return to tension, until the impact of recent political discussions runs it course, as some incident overcomes the calm, and does away with some of its positive impact on the Lebanese situation, which is approaching crisis? In the ongoing search for the regional reasons for the rising tension in Lebanese political rhetoric about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon over the last two weeks, there have been many explanations and analyses about the external stance that many believe is behind the phenomenon. Political circles that wish to locate justifications for the rising campaign against the STL, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his allies, are not convinced that the issue is restricted to Hezbollah's fears about seeing its members accused of complicity in the crime, despite the importance of such a development. There are events and developments that are bound to influence the sharpness of the battle underway in Lebanon over the STL, or controls over this battle – these certainly might not be related to the court's work in direct fashion, as much as they are related to regional and international struggles and maneuvers during this phase. While there has been considerable talk about a dispute over the formation of an Iraqi government in recent weeks, some do not see this as a sufficient reason, or at least the only reason needed to understand the justifications that explain the rising domestic tension in Lebanon, then the return to a calm situation, just because the Riyadh Summit between Syria and Saudi Arabia discussed the Iraqi crisis. Opponents of the STL believe that the big powers created it to use as a tool of pressure on countries in the region, for reasons connected to policies that are opposed to those of western countries in the Middle East, whether these involve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Iran's nuclear program its regional role. In parallel, groups that support the STL or are enthusiastic about it implicitly believe that discovering the truth about the assassination of former Premier Rafik Hariri will embarrass a number of local and regional groups that have become used to using oppression and assassination in setting the balance of power; the STL will have a negative impact on their current strength and thus hurt their credibility. This debate reveals, irrespective of the correctness of a given reading, the degree to which the Hariri killing is linked to regional projects. The crime was a political one and has had a political impact; revealing the truth will necessarily have political implications. Although some believe that Hezbollah can overcome any accusation that its members might face in the awaited international indictment, these people believe that the party and its allies are intentionally exaggerating everything connected to this issue that is related to what some of its leaders call “correcting” the situation in the country's post-2005 political authority. Although the party continually denies its intention to launch a coup, it does not hide its desire to change the balance of power within the political system, since it and its allies, especially General Michel Aoun, believe that they defeated the other side at various times, such as the July war of 2006, and the civil strife of 7 May 2008, and through the changes that the other side has made vis-à-vis its policy toward Syria, in terms of recognizing its influence in Lebanon. One of the most prominent developments have seen Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, change his stance, and President Michel Sleiman respect the other side's influence in military terms. This belief by the parliamentary minority and Syria, that they and not the other side, wield political power, is based on their continued ability to paralyze the government and block it from exercising power, and forcing the other side to conclude political arrangements with both it and Damascus, according to what serves its policies, and what Damascus wants. In fact, Hezbollah has been able, via its ongoing preventative media and political campaign, to mobilize the public that traditionally supports the party, against the indictment; thus, it no longer needs to do anything against such a decision on the ground, in order to eliminate the impact on the party's image before its public and that of its allies. This increases the belief that the goal is power and holding on to it once again, as it was prior to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. With every wave of escalation, followed by a wave of cooling-off, the public is being prepared for the change that the opposition minority hopes for. But with every wave, the ground is being laid to take Lebanon back to square one, with the rise in sectarian and religious mobilization.
