It is not easy to consider the beginning of the settlement in Iraq as being an overwhelming victory for Iran, although the latter may be the regional power that is the most capable of filling the vacuum that might be left by the Americans following the pullout of their troops next year – and although it was the first to join the invading troops during the first years that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, as though it was preparing to succeed it. Had it enjoyed the final say, the crisis would not have lasted eight months and it would not have failed to force the Shiite entities on which it relied to enforce its influence to begin with, to run on one list during the last elections and nominate one candidate to the premiership position. Moreover, its favorite candidate would not have been forced to conduct an Arab tour and offer the necessary commitments and pledges to promote his candidacy, starting in Syria and ending in Egypt! There are certainly several reasons for this obstruction, so as not to say this failure. Some of them are related to the political and military authority exercised by Nouri al-Maliki, which almost annulled the other Shiite powers. Others are related to these forces themselves, after they found support in the ranks of regional sides to alleviate the Iranian grip, in addition to the long history of rivalry, competition and disputes between the two neighboring states. Since the beginning, Iran did not conceal its wager on a major victory in the last parliamentary elections, thus rendering Iraq a bargaining card in its hands in the context of the efforts to settle the nuclear issue with the United States and the other major states. It thus tried to unify the entities which are traditionally close to it, but to no avail. This prompted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to publically call for the non-return of the Baathists to the rule, a call which was rapidly responded to by the Justice and Accountability Committee that deprived a large number of figures from running under claims that they were Baathists who should be “eradicated.” The main goal was to force powers, parties and entities to boycott the elections, a thing which was not reached and which achieved the complete opposite with the victory of the opposing alliance (the Iraqi List). However, Iran's “failures” during the elections were met with an ability to obstruct any solution to the governmental crisis, causing the depletion of eight months of intensive efforts. While it had the final say in “imposing” Nouri al-Maliki as the primary candidate to the premiership, this was not reached without a settlement taking into account the wishes of its rivals on the Iraqi arena, at the head of which is the United States that – since the first day of the electoral campaign – did exactly what the Islamic Republic was doing. It thus intensified the warnings against the blunt Iranian interference in the elections, put all its weight in support of the Iraqi List, interfered to lift the sword of the Justice and Accountability Committee via a campaign against its director and members and was able to convince those who were damaged by the committee's decisions not to boycott the elections. However, the United States also failed to achieve the required victory, or more like was not fiercely defeated. Consequently, the results led to the “no winners and no losers” equation. If the agreement which was sponsored by the president of the Kurdistan province, Massoud al-Barzani, and was ratified by parliament two days ago were to reach its desired ending, and if the Iraqi leaders were to overcome the complications of the allocation of the seats and the ministerial portfolios peacefully, this formula would be the victor and would carry – once again – the “quotas” formula which prevailed during the term of the previous government. In light of this reality, Washington did not hesitate to humor the Iranian wish to renew the term of the leader of the State of Law Coalition, while dividing power with the leader of the Iraqi List toward whom Tehran did not conceal its hostility and its refusal to see him assuming the premiership of the new Cabinet. Furthermore, the leader of the State of Law Coalition offered many guarantees and concessions, whether to his rivals in the Shiite ranks – at the head of which is the Sadr Movement – or his regional rivals – at the head of which is Syria. Moreover, the visits he conducted to some Arab countries also aimed at offering guarantees and promises. However, the question remains: Will Nouri al-Maliki respect these promises or will he ignore them as he did during his previous term, thus leading him into major rivalries with certain neighbors? In addition, the United States believes that the continuation of the political process in Iraq is the only real guarantor for maintaining the minimum level of security which would allow the calm withdrawal of its remaining troops next year, after more than two thirds of these troops were pulled out and after the combat missions of around one hundred thousand soldiers were terminated in August. Also, the continuation of the political process guarantees to a large extent Iraq's distancing from the threats of its neighbors and from the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is also worth mentioning that throughout his first term, Washington did not perceive Al-Maliki as being an obstruction in the face of some of its decisions and wishes, hoping to eventually set his beat via the Kurds who have become the side which decides the way the balance tilts in the political process. In order to uphold the minimum level of balance of interests between the United States and Iran, Washington proposed the establishment of the “National Council for Strategic Policies” and made Allawi relinquish what he considered as being a constitutional right to form the government after he came out first in the elections, in exchange for his assignment as the head of this council. The agreement, which was sponsored by Barzani, stipulated that the new council would get executive powers limiting the absolute prerogatives of the government, especially in the areas of security and foreign policy. For their part, the Iraqi List and its allies would be mistaken if they were to think that the prime minister and the sides supporting him will allow this National Council to turn into a competing or parallel executive command to the prime minister's authority. Had the issue been so easy, there would not have been any meaning for this dispute which lasted eight months. In other words, the division of the authority between the prime minister and the Council's chairman will not go by so easily, and will even be quasi impossible regardless of the texts adopted by parliament in the establishment of this Council. The tense relations between the Iraqi components and the way power is being divided between them will render the agreement very frail and will force the weak in it to seek foreign support at each turn or whenever they sense an imminent existential threat. Is it logical for example for the Kurds to allow the damaging of the American, Turkish or Western interests in general through the recognition of the Iranian almighty control? Will the Sunni entities which relied on a clear American support to reach political participation relinquish this support? This is extremely naïve. The settlement that was adopted to exit the predicament in Iraq reveals the ongoing “understanding” between Washington and Tehran to take their respective interests into account, even if without any direct or indirect dialogue. This made the Arab and non-Arab sides which were counting on playing a bigger role in this country settle for following this “understanding” to contain the losses. What remains to be said is that the new “government of quotas” cannot – in light of the external “quotas” – draw up the regional role that is required from Iraq. The divergence between the different Iraqi entities at the level of the position toward the sides fighting on their soil – whether the close or the distant neighbors – renders their agreement over a unified foreign and security policy very difficult. However, this is the role that the “National Council for Strategic Policies” is required to propose to the government! While Washington is unable to annex Iraq to the axis which it wants it to join in the region, President Ahmadinejad will also be unable to annex it to the “People's Resistance Front.” Therefore, Baghdad will remain hijacked by the foreign balances that dictated the agreement, even if the birth is a Kurdish one.
