The Iraqi National Alliance's selection of the candidate for the premiership does not signify that the long-awaited new government will see the light at any moment now, although Nouri al-Maliki's time has come. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Fadila Party both boycotted the session to select the Alliance's candidate. This means that the inter-Shiite battle has not yet been settled despite the massive pressures exerted by Iran, the “obedience pledge” presented by the leader of the State of Law Coalition to the Sadrist Movement, to Tehran of course and to Damascus along with it, and despite the tripartite American-Iranian-Syrian agreement to renew Al-Maliki's term at the head of power in Baghdad. The governmental issue has not been settled, firstly because the Shiite entities have not settled their conflicts once and for all – although they went quite far along the road of the “agreement of necessity.” They will therefore remain hijacked by their fears and concerns in regard to Al-Maliki's renewal, knowing that during the last five years he almost represented the entire Shiite scene. Indeed, the man who held the reins of power in Baghdad on the financial, security and military level, mastered the management of the game to the point where he reaped the largest Shiite bloc in the last parliamentary elections and before that in the municipal elections. By returning to the premiership of the government, he will definitely continue diminishing the influence of these entities. Moreover, those who were absent from the Alliance's session to select Al-Maliki, regardless of their number, represent a moral and numerical addition that can tilt the balance inside the parliamentary council elected seven months ago. This is especially true if the Kurdistan Alliance's choice is different from these entities' wishes, and if they were to reach an agreement with the Iraqi List. As for the leader of the Supreme Council, Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim, he is among the most prominent detractors and is continuously calling for the inclusion of this List in any government. For that purpose, he has not stopped his consultations with the leader of that List, i.e. Iyad Allawi, in search of a possible alliance whose candidate is expected to by Adel Abdul Mahdi. Secondly, the governmental issue has not be settled because the Iraqi List has not stopped announcing it will not partake in a government headed by Al-Maliki and has continued demanding its right to lead the Cabinet based on the constitution, which granted this right to the bloc that earned the most seats in parliament. It has earned 91 seats and came ahead of all the other blocs. It is also opposing the decision of the Federal Court and is blaming it for its political capitulation in its interpretation of the constitutional article related to that right, in a way that served its opponents who rallied in the National Alliance after the elections and consequently became the biggest bloc. This situation is leading the National Alliance toward a judicial-constitutional battle inside parliament, knowing that this battle will easily be settled if the Federal Court were to reiterate its previous interpretation of the constitution. However, the Iraqi List's insistence on its position and its refusal to partake in the new Cabinet opens the door before a more dangerous battle than the one which was waged by the Shiite entities. Indeed, the Sunnis perceive this bloc and its leader as being representative of them and their rights. So will the new government tolerate their presence outside of the authority and outside of the national consensus for which the Americans and Iraq's neighbors – from Syria to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states – worked in order to integrate them in the political process and the security and military institutions? This is happening at a time when the outcome of their integration generated an acceptable level of political stability and witnessed the decrease of the level of violence which struck the country after their Awakening Councils fought the groups of Al-Qaeda and its sisters and undermined Al-Zarqawi's project. Still, the Iraqi domestic requirements and the foreign wishes which imposed the “agreement of necessity” between the different Shiite sides may also constitute another factor in enabling Al-Maliki to overcome that stage peacefully. In this context, nothing prevents the repetition of the previous experience seen following the 2005 elections, i.e. when the blocs' contract was annulled and the government ended up being one of quotas between all the sides. At this level, the leader of the State of Law Coalition will not spare any incentives to break up some ranks and lure those who can be lured from the Iraqi List. And while he promised his opponents in the Sadr movement that he will reassess the previous stage and mend the upshot of the Charge of the Knights Operation, it would not be difficult for his reassessment to include the repercussions of the decisions of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice – the De-Baathification Commission. It would also not be difficult for him to promise compensations to those who were prevented by the commission from running in the elections and partaking in the political process, or at least distance its sword from them. However, this is not the only enticement. The position of the American administration which is in favor of Al-Maliki's return will have an impact inside the Sunni circles, among others who have headed to it during the last few years and some of whose demands it has raised while protecting their presence on the political scene. The latter know that this administration cannot ignore the fact that the rule in Baghdad has fallen in the hands of the Shiite majority, and that based on this reality, it perceives the leader of the State of Law Coalition as being the strongest Shiite side and the most moderate among its peers in the Alliance, or rather the least Iranian among them. Consequently, he can constitute – in the future – a convergence point for the Shiites wishing to expand their margin of independence and limit the Iranian tyranny in Iraq. Moreover, Washington's convergence with Tehran over the renewal of Al-Maliki's term marks a second American “message of reassurance” after it has committed to the date of the pullout of its combat forces from Iraq last August. In light of all this data, Iyad Allawi, who has earned and it still earning support from Washington, Ankara, Riyadh and other capitals, found no door other than that of Damascus to ask President Bashar al-Assad to interfere with Iran and get it to stop meddling in Iraqi affairs! While this call clearly showed the Iraqi List's realization of the fact that its last chance may reside in Syria's hand, it showed even more clearly the supremacy of the Iranian role over all others in determining the future of Iraq. This role may grow even deeper at the expense of the others because the new “version of Al-Maliki” will definitely be different from the previous ones. It would be enough to recall what Al-Maliki went through in terms of “rejectionism” from the Sadrists and Damascus among others until he earned their approval, to raise questions in regard to his future position vis-à-vis the “rejectionist alliance!” Thirdly, the governmental issue has not been settled because Al-Maliki has to pass the test of the Kurdistan Alliance. This is an additional battle that will also not be easy in light of the paper that was presented by the Alliance earlier to secure the formation of the government. This paper featured 19 points, the most prominent of which related to getting the post of secretary general of the premiership, the support of the Kurdish blocs' candidate for the presidency, considering that the government which will be formed as being a resigned government if the Kurdish side were to pull out from it, the implementation of article 140 of the constitution in regard to Kirkuk and the disputed areas between the province and the center, the division of the oil revenues and the future and funding source of the Peshmergas… It is known that all the Arab Shiite and Sunni blocs publicly rejected these demands. There is no arguing about the fact that the Kurds' attempts to annex the oil-rich Kirkuk to Kurdistan are more important than their demands to get the presidency among others. They enjoy security stability which has not been threatened since Saddam Hussein's blockade and until this day, i.e. throughout two decades. This reached a point where the province became the main destination of investments and development projects, unlike the other regions which are still suffering from the lack of security and require a lot of work to catch up with Kurdistan. During the last few years, they tried to resettle many Kurdish families in Kirkuk while well aware of the fact that the Americans' relinquishing of this city's case to the United Nations clearly meant they did not wish to provoke the Arabs and the Turkmen. This is especially due to the fact that they are accused of having given a lot to Kurdistan, since the imposition and until the lifting of the blockade imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime, i.e. throughout around two decades. The Kurds also know that the consolidation of power in Baghdad may lead to the further disregarding of the constitution's stipulations in regard to Kirkuk, which is considered by their hardliners as being their “Jerusalem.” Therefore, they do not like the idea of seeing Al-Maliki returning, as they blame him for the delay which affected the implementation of article 140 of the constitution, in addition to his positions in regard to the Peshmergas and the oil revenues among other ambitions. For his part, the leader of the State of Law Coalition was clear in his public rejection of the Kurdish paper. So, how will he get the Kurdistan Alliance to support him? What commitments will he offer to it, knowing that they could raise the discontent of many domestic and foreign sides? Moreover, will the Alliance agree to alleviate its demands – as it happened during the last five years – at a time when it is cautiously watching the consolidation of the central authority in Baghdad and the possible loss of the opportunity once again? The outcome of this battle will complete the image of the new “version of Al-Maliki.”
