If the Iraqis do not manage their current crisis in a good way, their first prophecy regarding the fact that the Americans' withdrawal will undermine the existing balances and fuel the conflict over who will fill the vacuum that will be caused by this pullout will become true. This will also apply to their second prophecy which says they will not be spared by what is happening on the arenas of the close neighbor Syria. On the domestic level, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki rushed to finish the battle he had started on the eve of the last parliamentary elections. Back then, the Accountability and Justice Committee was able to exclude candidates from the Iraqi List, including his current deputy Saleh Mutlaq, while Al-Maliki – with Iran's support – prevented the leader of this bloc, Iyad Allawi, from assuming the premiership despite the support he enjoyed on the regional and international levels. And following a long labor that lasted many months, the Kurdish command managed to achieve concord among all the sides over a national unity government. At that point, many expected that in his second government, Al-Maliki will be different than in his first. But now, the leaders of the Iraqi List are accusing him of what his partners in the National Coalition used to accuse him of, i.e. of being “a tyrant and a dictator,” or “another Saddam” as he was described by Muqtada al-Sadr before the consensus. The repercussions of the crisis triggered by Al-Maliki exposed the absence of any understanding among the components of the national unity government, even among the components of the country. It is as though there was an inclination to undermine the “no winner, no loser” formula, which was accepted by Iraqi powers under American and regional pressures to see some sort of balance translated into “quotas” or the so-called “consensual democracy” - despite the fact the Iranian neighbor is still the one prevailing - considering that the alternative was and still is the return to civil war. In addition, the crisis revealed the absence of consultations. President Jalal Talabani was not informed in advance about the judiciary's inclination to open one of the old files of his deputy Tarek al-Hashemi. And although the step featured the disregarding of the presidency, what is worse is the embarrassment it caused and is still causing to the Kurdish command which cannot surrender the “wanted man” to the judicial authorities in Baghdad, cannot facilitate his exit outside the border, and cannot provide him with a permanent stay. Indeed, this would escalate the crisis with the central government and might prompt accusations saying that the Kurdish government was providing a safe haven to the outlaws! What is more dangerous is that the Kurds are finding themselves at the heart of the current confrontation, based on their insistence on maintaining the minimum level of balance in the country's management, as their bitter and bloody experiences with the central authority in Baghdad are still vivid in their memories. They thus prefer seeing this authority governed by frail balances, instead of having one party monopolizing the military, security, economic and political sectors in the country, which would lead the relations between Kurdistan and Baghdad back to the old conflicts, disputes and wars. The Kurdish command is facing a scenario similar to the one faced by some Sunni leaders, and there is more than one pending file between the province and the center, not the least of which being the future of Kirkuk, the disputed territories, the oil and the fate of the Peshmergas. Today, Al-Maliki is pushing the Kurds toward a Sunni alignment which they do not want and do not wish to see enhanced. The Kurds did not join many players domestically and abroad and were pushing Iyad Allawi to the premiership following last year's elections. They chose the center and the building of balanced relations with the political blocs, regardless of their sects. They adopted Iran's stand in supporting the renewal of the term of the leader of the State of Law Coalition, preferring to go back to a balanced formula which would maintain their province's stability, unless the battles ends with the emergence of other provinces that would actually establish the idea of federalism, so as not to say division. In any case, if Al-Maliki knows how to manage his current battle and succeeds as he did at the level of the battle to renew his current term following the last elections, in the face of wide Gulf-Syrian-Turkish-American-European wishes and with complete support from Iran, he will come out stronger than he was. But if he fails, his credit will decrease. In the meantime, Al-Hashemi received a blow which might be lethal, especially if Sunni powers are reluctant to support his battle and choose what might be offered to them by the prime minister in terms of gains, positions and rewards. On the other hand, the future of the Iraqi List is also at stake. This is particularly true at the level of Iyad Allawi's leadership, especially if some Sunni powers, blocs and leaders attempt to directly assume the command of the sect. And in today's calculations the bloc was subjected to further damage, considering that the premiership belonged to it after it earned the largest number of seats, but that the regional pressures – especially the Iranian ones – deprived it of that right. And when the Erbil conference offered it the Council for Strategic Policies in the form of compensation, it also failed to earn this privilege despite the fact that it built many dreams on it, to the point of giving the impression that this council will be equal to the Cabinet. But those who prevented the List from reaching the premiership, buried the Council along with all that was agreed on by the blocs during the Erbil meeting. Now, they are dropping the dirt over the national unity government whose main ministers have not been chosen until this day. While the Kurds and the Sunni forces do not want to see Al-Maliki monopolizing the authority, the partners of the leader of the State of Law Coalition in the National Coalition might also not want to see him acting as the sole “master” at the level of the management of the country's affairs and the security, defensive, economic and financial decisions. Indeed, such monopolization would mean the possible annulment of any power transition and would weaken the position of the partners, whether in the Sadr Movement or the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which would not be to the liking of Al-Hakim, Al-Sadr and their blocs. Al-Maliki knew when to launch his battle following the withdrawal of the last American soldiers from Iraq. Moreover, a few weeks ago, his security apparatuses launched a wide scale campaign affecting many among those accused by the State of Law Coalition of being involved in terrorism or of belonging to the disbanded Baath Party. This situation emerged in light of heated and troubled regional circumstances, amid the escalation of the crisis in Syria and the heated conflict – on the regional and international levels – to control the outcome of the events in the country. There is no doubt that Iran, which stood behind Al-Maliki, converges with his current battle to liquidate his opponents and its own. Some might have perceived the campaign of the leader of the State of Law Coalition as being an Iraqi-Iranian attempt to preempt the repercussions of the Syrian incidents on the Iranian Crescent, even an attempt at containing the Iraqi arena and sparing it from any negative consequences which might be caused by the ailing neighbor. The same had happened in Lebanon when the allies of the Islamic Republic chose to hold the strings of the political game, i.e. to control the entire government, preserve the safety of their positions and manage their battle with further easiness. Hence, it is likely that Al-Maliki will resort to a government of one inclination, if the efforts to find an exit that would ensure the stay of his current government fail. The crisis in Baghdad proved that the role of the Americans retreated even more than before the departure of their last soldiers, although they keep reassuring themselves by repeating they have not yet left Iraq and that what happened was a mere ending of their military presence. We do not know what their ambassador James Jeffrey will say today, after he had announced mid last year – when the pullout started – “we are not leaving Iraq. We are merely allowing ourselves to end our land military presence.” He also reassured those fearful over the future of Iraq by saying he did not detect the extent of the Iranian influence in this country, hinting to the inability of the Shiite alliance to form a government around one and a half year after the parliamentary elections! But in reality, the American administration is now finding itself forced to deal with Al-Maliki, due to its inability to impose any alternative from the other blocs, namely the Iraqi List. It is known at this level that many godfathers were behind the birth of this government, but that Iran was the midwife. However, Iran which is trying to enhance its positions from Lebanon to Syria and Iraq and is opening other fronts – not the last of which being with the United Arab Emirates – is aware of the fact that it cannot win on all those fronts in the face of the mobilization carried out by the Arab, Gulf, Turkish and Western powers. Hence, it must engage in compromises and trade-offs, or in a best case scenario, achieve victory on one arena to compensate for the loss on another. So, will the victory in Iraq compensate for the loss in Syria, or will the players along the course of the Arab initiative reach a settlement that would maintain the minimum level of balance in the Fertile Crescent?
