The birth of the new government, expected to be witnessed in Baghdad today, will place Iraq before old and renewed fateful events. Its birth means that domestic concord has advanced one step on a long and difficult road, while its timing has meanings extending beyond its premier's commitment to the constitutional deadline. The agreement of the Iraqis after nine months of suffering was preceded by an international concord at the Security Council over the ending of the sanctions imposed on the country under Chapter VII which allows the imposition of sanctions or the use of power. The Security Council thus ratified three resolutions, the first of which ended the “oil for food program” that was adopted during the economic blockade in the nineteen nineties. The second ended the international management of the Iraqi resources through the Iraq Development Fund, effective next June. As for the third, it ratified the lifting of the ban imposed on Iraq's nuclear imports to proceed with the implementation of a peaceful nuclear program. These resolutions carry a clear message saying that the international community has become more confident in the ability of the Iraqis to manage their country - or is motivating them to do so - but not to the point of believing in Iraq's ability to play a regional role, as it was expressed by Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari whose term is expected to be renewed. Indeed, in an interview with Al-Hayat, the latter went as far as to say that his country will play regional roles at the level of the heated files from Lebanon to Iran, even if this means that Baghdad is preparing to regain a role it had lost during the last two decades. However, this role is facing domestic and external obstacles, in addition to the fateful events facing the second version of Nouri al-Maliki's government and the internal agreement that was based on the initiative of the president of the Kurdistan province, Massoud al-Barzani. The challenges that will confront Baghdad during the next stage are numerous, both internally and externally. The first and primary challenge is the way to maintain a unified Iraq, considering that the “agreement of necessity” generated by the multiple external pressures and the conflicting foreign interests at the level of the Iraqi blocs cannot secure the building of a country, unless the new government knows how to manage the political process. This can be done by exiting the sectarian and denominational structure and by building the constitutional institutions on national foundations. Otherwise, the Cabinet will have a short life and the country could reach the parliamentary elections four years from now, while completely dismantled to the point of total division. The new government will be placed under the microscope of the neighboring states, from Iran to Syria, Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the Arab League. These states will wait to see how the second government of Al-Maliki will fix its relations with the Arab neighbors, and how it will manage the game of balances between the different foreign influences, namely Iran's role and the future of the American role following the completion of the US troops' pullout at the end of next year. American Vice President Joseph Biden, who is personally handling the Iraqi file, assured that his country will not relinquish its commitments toward this country, indicating: “It is rather the nature of our commitment that will change from one with a military character to one with a civilian character.” So, how will the government in Baghdad handle this new commitment while it includes representatives of blocs that are against any US presence? Following the elections, the leader of the State of Law Coalition conducted an Arab tour to confirm to the Iraqi domestic arena that he was accepted on the regional level, despite the repercussions produced by “his battles” with a number of neighbors. Today however, in light of the Arab fears in regard to Iran's growing influence – fears that were revealed by Wikileaks – Al-Maliki will be facing a difficult test, i.e. that of balancing between the Iranian influence and Iraq's position in the Arab system. This is especially true since some Arabs called for the appointment of Iyad Allawi as prime minister, while Tehran fiercely rejected that choice and called for the renewal of the term of the leader of the State of Law Coalition at the expense of the other Shiite blocs, even forcing these blocs to support this renewal. Is it not enough what Sayyed Moqtada al-Sadr publicly said in this regard, when he announced that he would never have approved the renewal of Al-Maliki's term, had it not been for the pressures of the Islamic Republic? There were also the stringent positions adopted by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq led by Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim, thus proving the existence of two Shiite currents, one that is loyal to Tehran and the other wishing to proclaim its independence from it! There is no arguing about the fact that the government's birth was the natural result of the “agreement of necessity” between all those concerned about Iraqi affairs, whether they are remote or close. As for the conflict, which accompanied its formation throughout nine months and was also witnessed on the eve of the elections in March, it proved that Iran does not enjoy enough strength to impose its project in Iraq, although it definitely enjoys the ability to obstruct the opposing American project. This prompted the two rivals to meet in the middle by renewing the term of Al-Maliki who will also be facing a more difficult test this time around, i.e. the establishment of balance between Iran's wishes on one hand and Washington's wishes on the other. He will also have to include Allawi and the Sunni components in his bloc to avoid the repetition of the violence that was seen following the 2005 elections, something that is not to Tehran's liking, because it will obstruct the growing role of the Shiite components in the management of the political process and the tightening of the grip over most of the institutions. This is a goal it has sought and is still seeking. It is also the reason why it supported Al-Maliki who showed know-how in imposing his control over the Cabinet as well as stringency and courage in the face of the militias, a reason which also prompted Washington to support his return. The United States can say it has succeeded in making all the Iraqi blocs recognize the principle of the formation of a government with the participation of all the sides, namely the leader of the Iraqi List Iyad Allawi for whom it created the National Council for Strategic Policies to encourage him to participate and monitor Al-Maliki's performance in the government. There is no doubt in this context that the agreement over the pinpointing of the prerogatives of this Council will be among the most urgent challenges facing the new Cabinet. It will thus constitute an indicator for Al-Maliki's ability to secure harmony between the contradicting wishes of all those concerned on the external scene about the Iraqi internal scene. So, will he succumb to those demanding that executive powers that are parallel to the governmental powers be granted to this Council, or will its role be merely advisory? Moreover, who will it include? How will its decisions be adopted? Consensually or based on the majority system? Iyad Allawi's conditions, and consequently his position, are somewhat weak or not as strong as they used to be before the formation of the government. It is no secret that the allocation of the portfolios angered a group, which shook the image of cohesion that characterized the Iraqi List at the peak of the conflict that lasted around nine months before the birth of the new government. However, the Council – with efficient prerogatives – remains a necessity to fix any mistake which the prime minister might be forced to commit under Iranian pressures. It is also necessary for those who proposed it among the Americans and the Iraqi neighbors (Syria, Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), as some of them had no option but to accept the return of the leader of the State of Law Coalition. However, they insisted on the other hand to grant an exceptional role to the leader of the Iraqi List. It is a demand which Tehran could not refuse in order to humor Syria and Turkey and avoid the resurfacing of violence which could obstruct its ambitions to allow its allies to tighten their grip over the authority. Also among the challenges lies the fate of the Debaathification committee. Indeed, two days ago, parliament ratified the lifting of the ban imposed on three Sunni politicians who were prevented by the Justice and Accountability Committee from running in the March parliamentary elections, due to accusations of belonging to the disbanded Baath Party. Still, this decision, which appeared to be aiming at facilitating the birth of the government, might not constitute enough proof for the achievement of domestic concord. Therefore, the question on the table is the following: has trust between the Iraqi components reached a point where the Justice and Accountability Committee can be relinquished, after it was a sword brandished against a wide sect of the Iraqis, as revealed by the last elections? Has the time come for real reconciliation and has a conviction been reached over the necessity of seeing the participation of all the sides and of turning the pages of the past? As for the challenge raised by the Kurdistan province, it is no less important than any of the other challenges. The Kurdish demands are clear and the positions of the others toward them are also clear. In the meantime, the Kurds are insisting on a zero tolerance policy toward any attempt to evade these demands, as this was seen in the past years, especially in terms of the implementation of article 140 of the constitution in regard to the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed areas. In this context, there is no doubt that President of the province Massoud al-Barzani's reminder of the right to self-determination at this stage, aims at enhancing the positions of the Kurdistan Alliance vis-a-vis the oil-rich region and the other regions, as well as at the level of other demands and goals. However, self-determination is facing numerous obstacles which are not only internal, but also international and regional. Indeed, neither the United States nor the West in general will support a secessionist inclination which might detonate civil wars in Iraq and its neighboring states, nor are the neighboring states – especially the Iranian-Syrian-Turkish trio – about to show leniency toward such an ambition that will stir up dreams which these states worked hard to oppress by use of force before the use of enticements. More importantly, there is the issue of terrorism and the manner that will be adopted by the new government to reassess the building of the security and military institutions, after the Wikileaks documents revealed the corruption and nepotism seen in them, as well as their role in the violence, the assassinations and the torture. There is also the issue of corruption as Iraq occupies the lowest position in terms of transparency on the international lists. At this level, it would be enough to point to what is being circulated regarding the theft of billions in the oil sector and the arms contracts, as well as the widespread corruption seen in many ministries. But even more importantly, will Al-Maliki proceed with the policy of strengthening his team at the expense of the Shiite blocs that boycotted him and recanted their vote of confidence, but eventually succumbed to Iranian, American and regional pressures to facilitate his return? Will he go back to the policy of monopolization of which he was accused by his allies before his rivals? The absence of actual participation in the decision-making process is favoring the divisive inclination which has been and is still being fed by the policy of allocation of the positions and seats.
