When will Iraq leave behind the politics of revenge and settling old scores, inherited from the Saddam Hussein era? Throughout the country's political path since 2003, when the invasion toppled the former regime, Iraq has been stuck at this point in time, seeking to go forward. We are asking this question on the occasion of the announcement of an alliance between the State of Law coalition and the National Coalition, and the Kurdistan Alliance's desire to take part in the government with the two above-mentioned groupings. This will head off the chances of Iyad Allawi and his Iraqiya list to head the new government. The recent parliamentary elections, and the re-production of sectarian and religious struggles it produced, could have been a step on the way to transcending the repercussions left behind by the former era. These elections raised hopes, which now appear to have been premature, that Iraqis, through their majority vote, even if a simple majority, for the Iraqiya List, wanted to send a message of internal unity and national alignment. However, the message that was sent by the attacks on Iyad Allawi and his Baathist background was stronger. The former Iraqi prime minister, a Shiite, moved away from the traditional sectarian polarization. On his list, he included people who were accused by the “de-Baathification Committee,” the famous body that has come to symbolize the full-out policy of revenge in a country that needs to turn this page and move toward state-building. The attempts made to deprive Allawi of his natural right to try and form a government have not succeeded. This right was based on not only the election results, but the Iraqiya List's presenting the widest image of representation for all Iraqi groups, and was thus most qualified to reflect this representation in the Cabinet. With the failure of these attempts, the two blocks representing the Shiite foundation of the coalition resorted to joining efforts, despite the political and personal differences among their leaders. The leaders of the Iraqiya List believe that Iranian pressure led to this alliance, as Tehran guides both groups, and has an interest in seeing them retain their influence in the Shiite bloc in Iraq, and in the country's official decision-making system. In addition, the Kurdish coalition and the Shiite blocs could agree on this policy, meaning that the formation of a new government coalition in this fashion, if it takes place, will be a new version of the Iraqi opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime, which is not denied by the two sides; they are proud, as they believe it proves their adhering to old alliance, that led to the building of the political process, the formation of the last government, and the drafting of the Constitution. It is clear that the principal goal of the new alliance between the two Shiite blocs is to deprive the Sunnis of any weighty impact on government decision-making, or in the best of cases, make them dependent on this decision-making power. This message was picked up on by the Iraqi List, and the message accuses of this Iraqiya List of not only threatening the political process, but also security stability. This reminds us of the Sunni boycott of Iraqi politics in the previous round of elections, which allowed terrorist groups to exploit this boycott. Therefore, and perhaps more importantly, there are reasons for the accusations of Iran's interference in Iraqi domestic politics, in the form of reactions and reservations by Iraq's Arab neighbors, whose fears have not been countered by the government of Nuri al-Maliki. It is worrying that the new Shiite alliance will only produce further fears, not to mention the fact that they create an image of Iraq in the Arab world as a place of sectarian struggles and ethnic divisions, at a time in which Iraq needs to be laboratory for unity, not a center for the expansion of sectarian fragmentation, which is prevailing in the region.
