The Iraqis and those concerned by Iraqi affairs expect the birth of a new government before the pullout of the American troops at the end of next month and before the end of the constitutional deadline regulating the formation of institutions. However, what if the four major blocs that have won the last parliamentary elections do not reach an agreement and the crisis of the formation of the anticipated government is prolonged? Will the Americans amend their pullout plan on their own or will the leaders of the country ask them to do so out of fear of seeing the eruption of waves of sectarian and denominational violence? Also, will the constitution and the legal deadlines be disregarded? The Americans and the Iraqis assure that the pullout schedule will be respected, whether or not a new government is formed. Moreover, they are in agreement over the fact that the new formation should not exclude anyone, and especially not the four main parliamentary blocs, a wish which was also expressed by international and regional powers as the only solution for the rising crisis, to consecrate reconciliation and enhance stability. The latest wish expressed in this regard was voiced by American Vice President Joe Biden during his visit to Baghdad a week ago, as he called for “the proportional representation of all the major blocs in the new government.” He named in this context the Iraqi List, the State of Law Coalition, the National Alliance and the Kurdistan Alliance. In other words, and just like the Lebanese, the Iraqis are governed by consensual democracy that has nothing to do with the outcome of the elections, the ballot boxes and the choices of the citizens, and everything to do with the sectarian, denominational and ethnical allocation and division of the positions and the benefits. It is the quotas system no matter how hard they try to beautify the word. This is what they did following the 2005 elections, i.e. when they eventually reached an agreement over a government of national partnership, which they cursed every day but was considered to be inevitable. Today, they are repeating the same experience, i.e. maneuvering on a daily basis against each other, but agreeing over the fact that they will not allow the exclusion of any bloc and that the promised formation should not distance or disregard any side! So why the delay, and what is the object of the dispute? The dispute is over the identity of the bloc that will form the government, and is mainly political before being legal. Indeed, this decision will define the political future of Iraq, i.e. the future of its entities and their position in the domestic balance of power and the nature of the relations which will link them to one another. It will also define the identity of the strongest international and regional influence and its allocation on the international level and on the regional level between the neighbors whose appetites are insatiable! The dispute is also over the nature of the government and whether it will be centralized and strong or federal, weak and unable to control the governorates or the provinces. Consequently, it is over the distribution of the wealth, i.e. the oil, and its regions. This predicament was recently revived by the statements of the Commander of the American Forces in Iraq General Raymond Odierno, who spoke about the possible deployment of international forces in the disputed areas between the Arabs and the Kurds (in the Ninawa, Diyala, Salahuddin and Kirkuk provinces) if faced by the inability to merge the Peshmerga forces with the Iraqi army. While some Kurdish forces welcomed the suggestion, it was attacked by some Arab forces. As though the Arab-Kurdish dispute over the resources, particularly the oil, were not enough, the foreign role will only complicate the situation. This is due to the fact that the Islamic Republic (whose opponents are accusing it of collaborating with militias and local and regional “mafias” smuggling oil via Southern ports) will see its need for Iraq's oil increasing with the new harsh package of sanctions imposed on it, particularly the ones ratified by the American Congress and the European Union states and related to oil, technology and investments among others. All of these factors will introduce difficulties to the political process. The situation would have appeared less complicated had the dispute been limited to the Iraqi components solely. However, it is branched out inside each entity and there is no need to recall what the Shi'i blocs went through in terms of disagreements which even Iran was unable to dissipate prior to and following the elections to allow them to have the upper hand. These disagreements have weakened and are still weakening these blocs, and consequently threatening the future of the Shi'i entity and its ability to lead the new regime in Baghdad. It is also diminishing its ability to confront the other components that are engaged in a purely political battle to prevent the Shi'i sect from consecrating its control over the country thanks to its demographic size, but also to limit the influence of Iran, which is trying to fill the major vacuum that will be entailed on the political, security and economic levels by the American pullout from Iraq. In the other entities, the Kurds believe that the maintenance of their interests and the status quo in regard to their absolute authority in the Kurdistan province cannot be relinquished. They do not seem to wish for anything else as the experience of the early nineties and their domestic infighting over power and benefits is still vivid in their minds. Moreover, they are aware of the fact that they will not be able to establish their independent state for numerous and known reasons, most of which are related to the neighbors Turkey, Iran and Syria. However, while they are settling for their current fate, deep inside they do not wish to witness the rise of a powerful central state in Baghdad since their memories are still filled with the tragedies seen in their towns and villages at the hands of these central governments. As for the Sunnis who have aligned behind Iyad Allawi, they cannot allow their deprivation of whatever they have left in the authority. They are being widely supported by the Americans and the neighboring states, namely Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and most of the Gulf countries. Moreover, they cannot settle for sitting in the ranks of the opposition while the Shi'i majority is holding the decision-making power. This will make them feel further marginalized and excluded and prompt them to engage in fighting, which would provide a fertile arena for the return of the remnants of Al-Qaeda organization and its affiliates. For their part, the Arab states will not show any leniency at the level of what they refer to as being the loss of a key component in the Arab regime and will not remain idle in the face of the Iranian expansion. Iraq is a key article in inter-Arab disputes and even Syria is opposed to the Islamic Republic in this regard. In reality, the more Tehran interferes, the more there is Arab coordination and an Arab need for Syria's role in the country, just like it is the case in Lebanon. Furthermore, Western circles believe that the new sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic will double its economic troubles and limit its ability to support its allies in the region, from Lebanon to Palestine and Iraq. Nonetheless, the way Tehran is managing its battles reveals the opposite! Some even believe that Tehran may not rush the establishment of a concord or partnership government following the new sanctions imposed on it, since as it is accused of opening the arena in South Lebanon before all possibilities, it might be useful for it to leave the Iraqi arena open as well, in case it does not enjoy the upper hand in the new Cabinet in Baghdad. In light of all these combined factors, the major question on the table revolves around what the Americans will do as they will soon start pulling out their troops from Iraq. Although the administration of President Barack Obama is insisting on withdrawing from this country and turning its attention toward other files from Afghanistan to the Palestinian cause and the Congressional midterm elections, will it risk exiting Baghdad after all the human and financial sacrifices that were made? Does it not wish to surrender all the capabilities to a trusted alternative instead of clearing the arena for Iran? Anything else would mean the loss of the war by the Americans on the military, political and oil levels. Moreover, will they allow Iran for example to control the decision in the Gulf after they mobilized more than half a million troops supported by international troops to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and prevent him from holding the oil decision-making powers? So far, the Iraqis have been unable to establish an alternative authority to replace the one which was destroyed by the American invasion and was bequeathed to the opposition that would have never dreamed about assuming this position had it not been for the American forces. As for the formulas that are currently being proposed for the establishment of the new government, they do not herald the rebuilding of a real state capable of managing its own affairs without the help and interference of others, knowing that the Iraqis' fears over the foreign attempts to regain control in the country are as strong as their fears over the return of dictatorship or even the military in a worst case scenario! So, is this option the only available one or will the pressing developments, the complications and the threats facing the region push toward the establishment of a new government of partnership while awaiting the dissipation of the clouds throughout the Middle East region?
