It is too early to say whether or not the Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian agreement will once again place the Iranian nuclear file on the diplomatic track solely, since the train of sanctions has not stopped – although there seemed to be a possibility of seeing it decelerating, whereas the tumult of the military duel has not calmed down although it seems that so far, no one wants to head to war. Therefore, this file will remain suspended on a tight string over the fire of these three options. Nonetheless, the last hours of the time-buying game are dawning, not because the Islamic Republic has reached the threshold of the nuclear club, but because the situation in the Middle East – the small and the great – can no longer tolerate the waiting, the stalemate and the rotting, from Palestine to Afghanistan going through Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf. It is also an exaggeration to say that the major states were caught off guard by the tripartite agreement to exchange nuclear fuel and that this agreement will consequently baffle the action undertaken in the Security Council to impose a fourth round of sanctions on the Islamic Republic. It is quite unlikely that the United States was this far from the Turkish action which started early on, following the failure of the Vienna talks last October between Iran, the G5 and Germany to discuss the possible exchange of nuclear fuel abroad. Indeed, the Turkish foreign minister who was a key party in convincing Tehran of this international exit had spread a climate of optimism around two months ago, at a time when Turkish diplomacy upheld its mediation due to its belief in the fact that the main obstacle facing the solution is the loss of trust. Had the American administration truly been surprised by the tripartite agreement the way it was issued, it would have delayed the announcement of its adherence to the sword of the sanctions and allowed some of its partners to demand clarifications and for others to call for granting more time to the diplomatic track to test Iran's intentions, considering that even Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself stated that the agreement was not sufficient. Moreover, although this administration commended Ankara's role, it corroborated the non-relinquishing of the two tracks or options to handle the Iranian nuclear file, because it is awaiting answers and positions from Tehran in regard to other issues, namely the issues of Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, seeing as to how these two tracks proved to be useful. On the other hand, nothing suggests that Tehran was not expecting the reactions with which the agreement was met, which is why it immediately announced it will proceed with its uranium enrichment activities and threatened to retreat if sanctions are indeed ratified. In other words, it did not settle its final position and does not wish to do so before an agreement is reached once and for all over the other files. It thus wants to secure bargains and trade-offs if a comprehensive deal with Washington over all the opened files is impossible for the time being. Earlier, it had expressed via Iraqi sides and mediators its willingness to reach concord with the United States, provided that real guarantees are made by the latter to discontinue its blockade on the Islamic Republic, stop interfering in its domestic affairs and recognize its regime, vital interests and political, economic and security role as a regional superpower. Iran may brag about having thrown the ball in the others' court, about mastering the game of brinkmanship, gaining time and standing fast in the face of the previous sanctions. In this context, nothing prevents it from doing the same in regard to any future sanctions, considering that there is a quasi consensus over the fact that the sanctions have failed in previous cases, whether with it or with others including its closest neighbor Iraq, and as long as war seems to be a costly and difficult option for a state seeking to exit the Afghan and Iraqi swamps… However, reality reveals something else. Had it not been for the fear from the consequences of any future sanctions, Tehran would not have rushed to accept an old initiative which was revived by the Turkish-Brazilian action. Moreover, the rules of the game have changed, since President Ahmadinejad's administration benefitted from George Bush's clumsy policy in the past and defied the United States after it was reassured by the elimination of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes that had kept it busy in its back and front yard for a very long time. However, during the current round of the confrontation, this administration has failed where Obama's administration has succeeded. Patiently and consistently, Obama tried to lure Iran toward a “policy of engagement” with which it did not cooperate. It thus rejected his extended hand and his messages to the Iranian people, saying they were prompted by the United States' growing “weakness” in the region. By doing so, it overestimated the troubles and difficulties that were left behind by George Bush's administration, while failing to realize that the “international consensus” policy adopted by Washington to preserve its interests, replaced the policy of monopolization and the doctrine of “preemptive wars.” This policy also reopened the door before the prominent international partners to contribute to the resolution of many crises and devastating effects generated by the rowdy neoconservatives in the previous administration. For its part, Tehran did not listen to the messages – the new regional approaches launched by Obama from Turkey and then Cairo – and did not heed the deployed efforts to activate the settlement in the Middle East. It thus rejected the fuel exchange initiative put forward by the G5 and Germany, waged a wide diplomatic campaign right afterwards and hosted the “international conference on nuclear disarmament” in parallel to Washington's hosting of a new international summit to renew the commitment to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also relied on the positions of Russia and China, but lost its international friends whose patience run out after it did not show any interest in their initiatives and attempts. Moreover, it exercised ambiguity and expressed contradictory positions, exerted stalling toward Moscow and Beijing among others, misevaluated their relations and interests with the United States and Europe and did not draw the lessons from the first three rounds of sanctions. Consequently, all it could do was cooperate with the Turkish-Brazilian action in an attempt to gain more time, and in a best case scenario, open a hole or secure a breakthrough in the wall of international consensus over its blockade, thus distancing itself from the new basket of sanctions. In this context, the six major states believe that the agreement over the fuel exchange will remain deficient, unless Iran discontinues its enrichment activities. However, it is feared that Ahmadinejad's government has lost the ability to maneuver after it became confined by its firm position on which it built all its domestic and foreign policies and to which it linked its political future. Indeed, it has transformed its nuclear project into a prime domestic issue which provided it with a national consensus that affected its methods of management, thus preventing any internal side from criticizing or questioning these methods. Furthermore, the confrontation with the outside world over this project was used as a cover for the violence and oppression practiced by the tools and apparatuses of the regime against the opposition. In the meantime, Obama's administration learned how to change the rules of the game, turned the pages of the past American policy and adopted the policy of extended hand with Iran. It was thus able to render the protection of its goals and vital interests in the Middle East and the Gulf, part of regional and global peace and stability, and pushed its regional and international partners to join its project to protect the latter peace and stability. This is how it earned consensus over the current sanctions threatening to impose a suffocating isolation on the Islamic Republic, without relinquishing the military option. Washington translated its possible resorting to this option by deploying a missiles network in the Gulf region, approving the funding of the “Iron Dome” project to protect Israel from Hezbollah's and Hamas's short-range rockets and continuing to raise the issue of Syria's provision of the resistance in Lebanon with weapons that pose a threat on the balance of power. The latter factors can also be added to the Israeli threats to Damascus, Beirut and Tehran through the staging of war preparations aiming at pressuring Iran into thinking very carefully and stop ignoring the international stand in regard to its nuclear program. Regardless of the course which the tripartite agreement will take during the next few days after it was transferred to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Obama's administration will not stop waving the sword of the sanctions and rolling the war drums, even if it were to give the deal a new diplomatic chance. This is the “policy of soft power and hard power both at the same time.”
