President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could not possibly be naïve to the point of believing what he announced two days ago regarding the “sanctioning” of the world through the postponement of the negotiations with the 5 + 1 group assigned to handle the Iranian nuclear file – considering that the actual sanctions, including the new package recently ratified by the Security Council, affect Iran alone. The postponement of the resumption of the negotiations until the end of August implies the continued sanctions on Iran during that period, and consequently the increase of the damage caused to it. Moreover, Ahmadinejad could not be naïve to the point of believing he is “fining” the world because he does not enjoy the necessary “know-how when communicating with the other nations.” As for the conditions he placed for the resumption of dialogue with the 5 + 1 group, they are expected to be rejected in advance because they have nothing to do with the Iranian nuclear program crisis, even if Ahmadinejad has been denying the existence of such a crisis to begin with. In this context, the clarifications of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki did not present anything new regarding the continuation of the negotiations with Turkey and Brazil over the deal to exchange enriched uranium, after it became clear that the Security Council, by a unanimity of 13 states - including the five permanent members - did not consider that this tripartite agreement provided the basis for the negotiations with the 5 + 1 group. This is why there was not mention of it in the last international resolution 1929. The postponement announced by Ahmadinejad could be connected to the heart of the Iranian strategy, which relies on gaining time while awaiting some sort of development. Indeed, this strategy considers that time will serve the Iranian interests regardless of the direct losses that will be entailed by the sanctions, especially since the latter sanctions are still very distant from the guaranteed Iranian source of wealth, i.e. the oil that can still secure great revenues. True, the new package of sanctions will hinder and complicate the flow of funds toward Iran and the importation of materials for sophisticated military use, as it is also true that Iran relies on the importation of massive quantities of refined oil products which the sanctions will render more difficult to acquire to meet the country's demands. However, the Iranian rule considers that coexistence with these sanctions is possible, as long as the military-economic compound is distanced from their direct impact and especially if they can silence the rising voice of the domestic opposition – even if temporarily. On the other hand, just like the tripartite agreement (Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian) did not provide a basis that is acceptable by the Security Council for the exchange of enriched uranium, the ongoing Iranian announcements regarding the continuation and the amplification of this activity will not reassure the international community. These announcements, in addition to the fact that they include a new element in the negotiations, thus rendering them more complicated and lengthy, are casting increasing doubts over the actual Iranian intentions. When Tehran considers that its absolute right to acquire all the nuclear technologies cannot be separated from the vital scope of its strategic interests, this means that this technology is an element of strength and not just a purely medical or scientific need. In parallel, there are numerous statements being issued by Iran about the principle of reciprocity in case its ships are searched in implementation of the Security Council resolution. While the propaganda purpose of these statements is no secret to anyone, there is a real possibility of seeing a slip that could entail armed confrontations this time around. This would transform the time element on which Tehran is wagering into a new element of complication, whether at the level of the negotiations over the nuclear file or at the level of military confrontation.
