It has become clear that the Iranian government's management of the nuclear file does not solely aim anymore at obtaining peaceful nuclear energy. It does not also seek a mere settlement with the regional and international forces that reject the increasing spreading of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This administration aims at introducing further ambiguities regarding the Iranian intentions vis-à-vis the nuclear program, which entails further tensions with the world. As such, the official Iranian nuclear policy and the tensions it entails with the world, conforms to the internal escalatory approach in facing the reformist opposition. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the announcement of additional enrichment locations – despite the enticing Western offer – coincided with more accusations leveled at the opposition forces and the suppression and detention of its supporters. The policy of uniting the internal ranks amid the foreign hostility once succeeded during the first Gulf War, due to the miscalculations of the Iraqi Government at the time. The late Leader Ayatollah Al-Khomeini managed to finish off his domestic oppositionists under the slogan of unification to face the national threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. However, the circumstances of the battle which Tehran wants to impose have dramatically changed. The safety of Iran's territory is no longer under threat. For it to attract such a threat, Tehran renders its nuclear intentions even more ambiguous, and this might entail a military threat to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear military energy. Also, Iran raises slogans to defend its sovereignty, accuses the foreign world of conspiracy and holds the opposition as treacherous. However, this tactic has depleted a great deal of its purposes, as it is constantly reiterated whenever an internal crisis breaks out, and after the failure of Tehran's wager on divisions within the international forces that oppose its military nuclear program. This is in addition to the fact that China and Russia joined the Western countries in voting on the recent resolution of the International Atomic Energy agency and called on Tehran to adopt transparency and respond positively to the offer put forth by the "5+1" group. In the Iranian periphery, the openness of the current Turkish Government to the issues of the region in eliminating the causes of tension with Tehran – even though the latter needs Ankara in light of any escalation for the sanctions – did not curb the Turkish opposition to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, despite its emphasis on the peaceful solution to the crisis. It seems that Tehran has found "the foreign hostility" it wants in the Arab periphery too, although Saudi Arabia was the first country that suggested an international solution to the enrichment problem for peaceful purposes in general in the region through forming a consortium in a neutral country, one that would provide the countries of the region with the enriched uranium they need for their peaceful programs. But Iran refused to deal with this proposal, just as it refused to deal with other projects, as it was not comfortable with the Saudi rejection of the nuclear arms' race in the region. Iran's behavior toward the Arab neighboring countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in specific, is based on the fact that these countries will provide it with the pretext of foreign hostility. Accordingly, the Iranian dealing with the Houthi insurgency in Yemen comes in this context, as well as the Iranian attempt to extend the insurgency toward Saudi Arabia. Since the eruption of the so-called Sixth War in Yemen, Tehran did not miss any opportunity – whether in an indirect official manner or through the Iran-affiliated media outlets – to point to a Saudi intervention in this war, until the Houthi infiltration of the Saudi territory. Riyadh has received the message, and has thus manifested all forms of firmness in dealing with this infiltration, which is still being repeated with surprising obstinacy, while Tehran started viewing the Saudi defense of its sovereignty as an attempt to target the Houthis because of their confessional affiliation. The reason behind Tehran's emphasis and insistence on this aspect is to put Saudi Arabia in a confessional confrontation with a party that is affiliated to Iran. Iran also wants Saudi Arabia to become an "external enemy" against which it wages a military battle through the Houthis. But this course did not convince anyone, and no one in the region supported it, as evidenced by the consensus reached over Saudi Arabia's right to defend its territory. This course has also failed, just like Iran's previous attempt to turn the pilgrimage season into an Iranian-Saudi crisis, thanks to Riyadh's insistence that all pilgrims abide by the well-known obligations and its announcement that it will not be tolerant with any attempts to undermine the security of the pilgrimage. Today, Tehran has come out to accuse Saudi Arabia of conspiring against it by handing over an Iranian nuclear scientist to the United States, in an attempt to make Riyadh part of the Iranian enemies' camp in the nuclear file. Therefore, Iran's vision of Saudi Arabia and its role become complete.
