The swift agreement reached by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom lures us into comparing it to the endless obstacles hindering the formation of an Iraqi Government based on the results of the general elections. In brief, on May 6, the Britons elected a “hung” parliament, in which none of the three major parties (the Conservatives, the Labor, and the Liberal Democrats) has a vast majority that allows monopolizing power. On May 11, Labor Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced his resignation, suggesting to the Queen to task the Conservative Party Leader David Cameron with the position. The next day, the details of the agreement to form a coalition government that comprises the Conservatives and Liberals were announced. This solution is many light-years away from the overt and hidden conflicts, aimed at seizing power, in Iraq. The visits to the neighboring countries to attract support, the meetings among the officials of the blocs, the recounting of the votes in Baghdad, and the announcement of an alliance between the “State of Law” List and the “National Iraqi Coalition” that was backed by the Kurdistan Alliance, are all measures that failed to put an end to the political crisis witnessed in Iraq after the elections that took place on March 7. Although the media made a connection between the recent bloody explosions and the death and arrest of some terrorist leaders, there are signs of another association between the growth of murderous activities and the increase of political-sectarian tensions. It is no secret that fears of seeing a return to the situation witnessed during 2006-2007 and characterized by sectarian infighting are overwhelming in Iraq. It goes without saying that there are so many differences between the nature of the problems in Iraq and Great Britain. While the former is facing a crisis that has to do with its entity, unity, future, and occupation, the latter is passing through economic and social difficulties that are not the first and will most likely not be the last throughout its history. This is not to mention the differences between the political and demographical structures, as well as the historical and ideological background of the forces influencing the general picture in both countries, and the social backgrounds they come from… However, this should not stop us from raising a question about the deeper meanings for the lengthy hesitations in formulating a political agreement in Baghdad and the swiftness in reaching it in London. If we add a recent Arab elections' experience, i.e. the parliamentary polls that took place in Lebanon last June, the picture becomes further complicated. It is true that the close number of seats obtained by the supporters of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rival Iyad Allawi (89 to 91 according to the official results) justifies to some extent the conflict over who is more entitled to head the coming government and draw the general Iraqi policies. However what happened in Lebanon is much more bitter and disastrous: the winner was not allowed to form his government, because of a number of sectarian and confessional considerations and threats it received to resort to force and foreign pressures. As a result, the parliamentary majority group had to succumb to the demands of the losers. This is not to mention the shallowness of the majority's ideas and visions to solve the numerous Lebanese crises that keep on engendering new ones. Accordingly, comparing the situation in Iraq (as well as Lebanon, Sudan and all countries that witnessed “Arab elections”) to the one in the UK is not seemingly possible, unless we consider that this comparison is a source of paradoxes and questions pertaining to the extent reached by the Arab political consensus, and to the ability of our countries and peoples to draw conclusions and lessons from the past, old and new alike. There is nothing new in saying that this ability is extremely poor.
