The Arabs are absent from Iraq, in terms of having either policy or a plan. The struggle over Mesopotamia is limited to Iran and the United States. Each seeks to support a pliant political authority in Baghdad in order to strengthen its camp in its confrontation with its rivals, and guarantee its interests in the region. The recent parliamentary elections and campaign period served to clarify the picture considerably. Washington preferred the secular list headed by Iyad Allawi in the recent polls, because Allawi's list brought together Sunnis, Shiites and Baathists who were forced to be loyal to the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, the US had a previous relationship with Allawi and he helped it considerably in brining down the former regime. However, Washington is not angry by Nuri al-Maliki being out in front. He launched a campaign against radical supporters of Muqtada Sadr, the League of the Righteous, and the Mahdi Army. Al-Maliki achieved a considerable amount of security after the sectarian civil war, which allowed Washington to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its troops. It is true that al-Maliki's political-sectarian background continues to worry Washington. However, at the same time, it still needs him, to weaken two earlier allies that are now closer to Iran, namely the Supreme Council and Ahmad Chalabi. The Supreme Council has proved its secular insularity and cannot open up to others. It continues to carry out, with Chalabi, a policy of revenge. Its political alliances have been restricted to traditional parties. It waged a campaign to exclude hundreds of competing candidates on the grounds they were Baathists, event though the US wants to open up to this segment of Iraqis. On the Arab scene, no state wants al-Maliki to remain in power. He is a problem for Saudi Arabia, which has not appointed an ambassador to Baghdad. Damascus does not trust him after he waged a fierce campaign against it and threatened to go to the Security Council to investigate what he called Syria support for terrorists. In Iran, and although he removed his tie while meeting Khamenei out of respect for the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the authorities see him as an Iraqi patriot more than a Shiite who believes in the concept of wilayat al-faqih (clerical rule). It preferred Ammar al-Hakim or Adil Abdel-Mahdi, or the former Badr Brigade official, Hadi al-Amiri. However, Iraqis gave al-Maliki more votes, despite his break with the sectarian alliance. He aspires to form a new situation in Iraqi politics, one that is in harmony with the changes that have taken place after the civil war. The election results proved that Iraqis are divided between Allawi's secularism and al-Maliki's pragmatic sectarianism, allied with others. However, neither of them will be able to gain power alone; the Iraqi political class will be forced to form a Cabinet in which secular, sectarian and ethnic (Kurdish) political trends will be represented. Iraq will move into Lebanonization. Its doors will be opened to more and more regional and international intervention. If we take into account the filling of the vacuum in Iraq after their withdrawal, the Americans will support the coalition government after securing their influence in it. The US will not object to seeing Iran's allies take over non-threatening government portfolios. Each side will try to secure its share of the pie, as a prelude to an even fiercer struggle, or settlement. As for nationalism and secularism, which most Iraqis adhere to during the recent elections, these are being postponed to a later date: when Iraq sees the rise of people who demand that it be Arab, and the Arab world sees the rise of people who seek to maintain Arab influence over Arab issues, beginning with Palestine, and not ending with Sudan or Egypt.
