Confusion surrounds the statements made by major figures of the US Administration on the issue of Iran, to the same extent as disorder accompanies them as they move between capitals in Europe, the Middle East and the Gulf. Indeed, in spite of what both Vice President Joe Biden and National Security Advisor James Jones said about a UN resolution that would strengthen sanctions against Iran before the end of the current month, there is nothing at the Security Council indicating such action during this month. Rather, it seems that the road to a resolution on sanctions is still long, that is if it even sees the light of day. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton resorted to verbal escalation during her visit to Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, describing the regime in Iran as one subjected to the hegemony of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) and thus turning into a “military dictatorship”. She did this at a time when President Barack Obama is making sure to stress the United States' willingness to deal with the regime in Tehran with the utmost respect and while acknowledging it like any democratic state that does not oppress its people and does not fall under the hegemony of a Revolutionary Guard that tyrannizes people and controls political and economic centers, that is if Iran agrees to accept the “carrot” and the diplomatic and political solutions being offered to it by the United States and five other countries, namely: China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany. Major US military officials have visited important capitals, including Riyadh which the Commander of US Central Command in the region General David Petraeus visited, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Michael Mullen moved from Russia to Israel at a time when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu headed to Moscow to discuss Iran. Russian news agencies reported Russian General Nikolay Makarov saying that Mullen indicated that there were military plans and a US intention to strike at Iran. Yet Mullen was warning in Israel of the “unintended consequences” military strikes against Iran might result in, and asserting his hope for “diplomacy” and “sanctions” to reach the results sought-after and not the option of a military strike. Such confusion and disorder are dangerous and of no use in conveying messages, neither to Iran nor to Arab countries or Israel, nor to Russia or China. The United States is not alone responsible for the atmosphere of tension or for the impression that military action is coming to Iran and the region. General Makarov is also responsible, especially if his words come from a misplaced impression and if the American Admiral was really encouraging Israel to stay away from the military option. Israel is certainly responsible because it constantly resorts to escalation. However, Russia and China are also responsible because they are, de facto, encouraging Iran to continue to be obstinate and providing it with the cover of protection from new serious sanctions that would actually deter it. Indeed, there is no fear of plans ready on the table for military action against Iran, because there is no indication there of US commitment to the use of military force or of the US giving its blessing to a reckless Israeli military operation against Iran. The fear is of Iranian or non-Iranian verbal escalation that would lead both sides to be forced into the corner of clashes and military skirmishes. Nevertheless, all indications now point to group work towards political solutions with Iran, by enticing it or by frightening it, which would meet with the interests of the international community and of international and regional relations. At the United Nations, where there is no movement or a move worth mentioning towards a draft resolution involving sanctions against Iran, there is anticipation and observation of what the talks of capitals and the movements to them and from them will result in. What is clear so far is the following: first, that the United States does not want merely symbolic sanctions against Iran, but rather serious sanctions that include what would harm the Revolutionary Guard, whose tentacles are spread into the nuclear program. The US is willing to wait until negotiations with China and Russia have matured, intersecting with the roles of Arab Gulf states with the two countries, so as to produce effectively deterrent sanctions. It wants to use the track of sanctions to improve the lines of the track of convincing and enticing Tehran to engage in diplomatic solutions. It is clear that what the Barack Obama Administration wants is a political solution with Iran, and that it resorts to pressures through verbal escalation and talk of sanctions, not in order to punish the regime in Iran but rather with the hope of enticing it to cooperate and to reach political solutions. Within such a framework, the US Administration resorts to Russia as a partner in the formula of “pressure to entice” – especially as stringent Iranian stances have embarrassed Russia and aroused its disapproval. Indeed, Washington does not view Moscow as “apologetic” for Iran, as it wagers on its assistance, directly and through its influence on China's stances towards sanctions, and wagers on the fact that the two countries do not want Iran to become a nuclear military power and are in fact willing to stop Iran from reaching such a goal. The Obama Administration is also wagering on the fact that China and Russia are well aware of the scenario of gruesome terror that would result from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and from the Middle East and the Gulf turning into an arena for the race to obtain nuclear weapons. Second, it is clear that Russia is willing to discuss measures against Iran if it reaches the conclusion that the formula of pressure to entice has come to a dead-end. Yet Russia is clear about the fact that the time has not yet come, that the official response has not yet been conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that diplomatic efforts are ongoing, and that the opportunity is available, especially as the United States continues to be willing to engage despite talk of sanctions. Russia is also clear about the fact that, in case the option of sanctions must be activated, such sanctions should then remain restricted to the framework of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it places the condition of focusing measures on the nuclear sector, not on harming Iran as a state and as a country. In fact, Moscow is clear about the fact that it is not favorable to changing the regime in Tehran and that it does not view it as a military dictatorship. Regarding China, it is clear that the stances of Russia and China are not very different in terms of substance and of stances towards Iran and sanctions against it, and there is perhaps some coordination between the two in stances and in the instruments of pressure to convince. It is clear that Russia and China are not convinced that Iran has quickly moved towards building military nuclear force, and they believe that even in the United States there are those who wonder whether Iran really is so far ahead or whether it is maneuvering and pretending to have become a peaceful nuclear power able to quickly turn into a military nuclear power. Thus the two are walking the path of verifying the facts first, at the technical level and at the hands of the IAEA, and consider that such a situation should be discussed then, after the facts have been verified. Third, it is clear that China today has taken the front seat in attempting to defend Iran against sanctions, when in the past it had left the driver's seat to Russia. It might be a matter of distributing roles between the two countries, yet this does not obscure the difference in public stances, even if it is relative. Indeed, China clings to maintaining the regime in Tehran and its oil interests require protecting the Revolutionary Guard from sanctions, especially because, in the oil, finance and trade sectors as well as in military defense industries and civil construction industries, Chinese governmental companies have strong relations with the regime in Iran. China will delay, procrastinate and demand irrefutable evidence before agreeing to a resolution involving non-symbolic sanctions and will work to make them harmless. However, at the end of the day China will be forced to stop hiding behind non-permanent members of the Security Council, such as Brazil and Lebanon, urging them to abstain from voting so as not to find itself isolated. At the end of the day, China will not place its relationship with Iran at the top, above its bilateral relations with the United States, especially if Russia reaches the conclusion that Tehran has brought the diplomatic track to a dead-end. Nevertheless, it will make use of the interplay between the two relationships as well as of the exchange. Noteworthy in China's stances are its view and its interpretation of Iran possessing the ability to develop nuclear capabilities. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) over China's views on the Iranian nuclear issue states that there is a debate within Chinese foreign policy-making circles over whether such capabilities would be a source of “danger” and over what their effect would be on China's policies: “one school [of thought] asserts that Tehran's behavior could endanger peace and stability in the Middle East and is therefore detrimental to China's interests in the region. This school is concerned about the possibility of escalating tensions, particularly if the US were to become part of any possible military confrontation. Proponents of this view believe that China should be alarmed about Tehran's moves and actively seek to mediate between it and Washington”. However, there is another school of thought in Beijing, according to the report, which considers that Iran's nuclear “brinksmanship” policy can continue without serious consequences, and that the United States will prevent any military confrontation: “to a large extent, this second faction is backed by state-owned oil and gas companies and their supporters in the government, for whom energy security is a more pressing concern than Iran's nuclear activities”. Indeed, the interests of these large state-owned companies and industries, especially in the energy sector, play a leading role in Chinese policy-making towards Iran. Yet China receives 11.4 percent of its crude oil from Iran, making Iran its third most important source of oil after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Angola. And according to the report, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have expressed to China their concern from Iran obtaining nuclear capabilities, as well as the fear of these states of falling between the two jaws of a nuclear Israel and a nuclear Iran. As for China, it pretends not to hear, or not to see a need for hearing. What the United States has suggested since 2009, according to the report, is for Saudi Arabia to increase its quota of oil exports to China. China was hesitant at first, but it soon agreed to a US-backed deal that led to “[boosting] oil exports from the UAE from 50,000 barrels a day to between 150,000 to 200,000 barrels a day by mid-2010 [in addition to] Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia [having] agreed to increase their 2010 oil exports to China by 100 per cent, 50 per cent and 12 per cent respectively”. The main idea was brought by Hillary Clinton during her latest visit, emphasizing the United States' interest in Arab stances such as these. Yet oil alone will not convince the Chinese school of thought that ignores the dangers of the region turning into the arena of a nuclear arms race. Indeed, this school minimizes the danger because it is in its benefit. The issue requires adopting a group strategy by Gulf countries that would emphasize their fears from the dangers of allowing Iran to turn into a nuclear power, so that they may put forward these fears to China and insist on them. Military industries and oil companies in China believe that they can play their cards without being held to account, out of arrogance, of hatred for the West or of making light of the ability of the Arabs to unify their stance. The time has come to awaken them in order to avoid military confrontations and even sanctions. Indeed, if China and Russia resolve to inform Iran in a stern message that they will not allow it to manipulate the nuclear card, the two would be able to succeed in their efforts to entice Iran to stop being obstinate and pretentious, and working on becoming, de facto, a nuclear state within a military dictatorship that oppresses the interior and dominates its neighborhood through direct and indirect interference, and through a game which stirs up dangerous sectarianism.
