New York- The Islamic Republic of Iran besieged itself by itself when it excessively played its cards with the UN Security Council, with worldly skill which has made light of international balances of power and relations with major powers. Indeed, the regime in Iran had powerful allies, like Russia and China, who were willing to protect it from pressures and sanctions, and were determined to ward off any military threats or suggestions of isolating or weakening it. Today, there is consensus among the nuclear states (China, Russia, the United States, Britain and France) that are permanent members of the UN Security Council – plus Germany – over a draft resolution imposing rigorous sanctions, sanctions which would place the Islamic Republic of Iran in economic, military and political isolation. Today, Tehran's attempt to outsmart the five major powers, through the novelty of it granting the “gift” of approving the enrichment of 1200 kilograms of uranium abroad in Turkey and Brazil, while at the same time as such a “deal” announcing that it is moving forward with uranium enrichment inside Iran anyway, has failed. It failed because it tried to hinder the five countries from putting forth the draft resolution on sanctions which those countries agreed over during the weekend by partially engaging in fragmented talks over a partial deal aimed at buying time and at stirring up discord between elected members of the Security Council, like Turkey and Brazil, and the five nuclear permanent members. Thus Tehran has with such a tactic upset its Russian ally, supported in its indignation and anger by its Chinese ally, which had been since the beginning coordinating with Russia in playing different roles to protect Iran. Yet Iran has not only lost many points with Russia and China. Indeed, it suffered a tremendous loss when it excessively wagered on the good intentions of the US Administration towards it. It also assumed that its history of practicing political skill was so firmly established that it became lax and did not take into account President Barack Obama's ability to produce surprises, and to show skill and patience equal to its own. The Islamic Republic of Iran besieged itself because it summoned unto itself a skillful and well-designed system of sanctions that would harm the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) and weaken its infrastructure, leaving the leaders of the regime in Tehran in need to review their choices and to take the necessary decisions. However, if the regime deems it appropriate to take revenge and escalate, especially in its neighborhood and through its proxies, then it would be increasing the danger manifold, not just from but also for itself. Indeed, the regime in Tehran has set itself up as a fighter in the field facing the major powers, thus hindering the efforts of those who called for overlooking Iran's gradual transformation into a nuclear state. Thus the Iranian regime has placed itself in a confrontation it will not be easy for it to elude, unless it decides to reexamine all of its nuclear policies. Some of the leaders of the ruling regime in Tehran may believe that it was an accomplishment of theirs to provoke a dispute between the great powers, permanent members of the Security Council, and “great” elected members such as Turkey and Brazil. Perhaps they concluded that Russia and China had negotiated with the United States, Britain, France and Germany to the greatest possible extent and had toned down the draft resolution as much as it was possible, that there was no longer a need to indulge them during this transition period, and that it would be better to head towards the likes of Turkey and Brazil in order to instill discord at the Security Council. Perhaps Tehran considers itself to have achieved a “master's stroke” when it nearly ensured that abstention from voting on the draft resolution would not be limited to Lebanon, but would include two other countries, each of them considering itself to be a major power at the regional level. Yet at the end of the day, the consensus of China and Russia alongside major western countries over the draft resolution on sanctions is much more important than the abstention of three, two or four countries from voting. Indeed, such a resolution would be adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is binding for all countries, including those countries that exercise the choice of abstention from voting. There is no comparison between the division that occurred within the ranks of the Security Council when it refused to grant the United States a resolution justifying the war in Iraq and the disagreement provoked by Tehran between the five great powers and two elected member-states, each with its own ambitions. Indeed, that had been nearly the only time in the history of the Security Council when the stances of elected member-states had taken on a fateful dimension for the future of a draft resolution put forth before the Council. Back then the draft resolution had failed to obtain the necessary nine votes because of the refusal of elected member-states to provide these votes, which had spared Russia and France from making use of the veto which they are allowed to use to thwart the adoption of resolutions. The issue of the Iranian matter is completely different, first because it is a nuclear issue and because what is being put forth is not a draft resolution to go to war but rather a draft resolution to impose sanctions aimed at excluding the option of war and at convincing the Iranian leadership of the usefulness of diplomatic engagement and to accept the carrot being stretched out to it through the incentive deal offered it by the 5+1 countries. Secondly, the five permanent members have become committed to imposing new sanctions and to strengthening the old sanctions, which have been included in the draft resolution. Thirdly, the United States, which has officially put forth the draft resolution on sanctions before the Security Council, has great confidence that it holds the 9 votes needed, or else it would not have officially put forth the draft before the Security Council. Fourthly, there is no unified stance among elected member-states against the sanctions resolution. In fact, they are divided and most of them realize the importance of their stance towards an issue connected with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thus falling under world peace and security. What drove China and Russia to approve the draft resolution on sanctions and agree over its text, at a time when the President of Brazil was leaving Qatar and heading to Iran? The short answer is that these nuclear states were finally convinced that what the Islamic Republic of Iran wants is to possess military nuclear capabilities. Thus those countries have moved on the basis of such a conviction, especially as Iran had previously rejected similar offers made to it by Russia and France, and had played on time to procrastinate and delay while continuing to refuse suspending uranium enrichment as the Security Council resolution had demanded of it. Thus, what was welcomed by Brazilian President Lula Da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and their Foreign Ministers with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was merely the ratification of a “trust-building” measure and nothing more. Indeed, the Tehran deal, based on sending low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Ankara within a month in exchange for obtaining nuclear fuel to be used in its civilian research reactor in Tehran, is a partial deal and not one of sitting down to negotiate or one of implementing the Security Council Resolution that calls for the suspension of uranium enrichment inside Iran. If the Iranian leadership is serious about implementing the Tehran deal with Lula and Erdoğan, it can send a letter detailing its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within a week from ratifying the Tehran deal to prove its good intentions and its resolve to “build trust” by taking measures. Indeed, the draft resolution at the Security Council is not being immediately put to the vote, and can in fact be suspended until such trust has run out, if Tehran were to tergiversate. Or it can be put to sleep if Iran truly complies with the track of enticement in the twin tracks strategy of dealing with it which has been adopted by the United States and the 5+1 countries, especially after these countries have agreed to activate the track of threats by approving the text of the draft resolution on sanctions. The draft resolution being officially put forth at the Security Council could benefit Turkey's efforts and strengthen it in the process of pressures to draw out the greatest amount of cooperation from Iran. In other words, the draft resolution of the major nuclear states represents ammunition for Turkey – the regional state that strives to become a major leader in the region – so that it may play its role in the strategy of the twin tracks: enticement with dialogue, negotiations and cooperation even by threatening with sanctions. However, in the case where enticement with dialogue and negotiations were to fail, the draft resolution on sanctions unanimously approved by the five countries would remain ready to be adopted at the Security Council – perhaps even with Turkey voting for it. This does not mean that there are necessarily understandings in advance with Turkey, including over the current dispute and the climate of mutual anger and indignation in every direction. Indeed, the great powers at the Security Council are not pleased with Lula Da Silva barging in on what they consider to be their sphere of authority as countries responsible for world peace and security. They see no reason for the Brazilian President's enthusiasm at entering the ring, except for personal considerations and perhaps Brazilian interests that do not reach the level of Russian and Chinese interests in their relationship with Iran, it being a particular regional state, not a country located in Latin America. Russia is angry at Turkey and Brazil, and also at Iran, which has disrespected Russia and China, and also Japan (which is a member of the Security Council) when it seized the Brazilian-Turkish initiative and turned it into a tool to split the ranks of the Council. Russia's anger was expressed in several forms before and during the Tehran deal summit, as agreement over the rough text of the draft resolution coincided with Lula and Erdoğan heading to Tehran. Then after the picture-taking session and the raising of held hands, in an image that has aroused resentment, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov contacted his US counterpart Hillary Clinton to apply the final confirmation on the draft text, which is what led the US Administration to immediately move to putting forth the draft resolution at the Security Council. What Lula Da Silva has in mind might be as vague as it is clear, as the man sees in membership in the Security Council an opportunity for personal stardom and for playing a role on a scope broader than Latin America. Nevertheless, there is certainly a game of bilateral and multilateral interests, bargains and trade-offs for all players. In any case, Lula's adventure is limited and restricted, unlike that of Erdoğan. Indeed, the Turkish Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister are playing a game that might be dangerous, especially as there is division inside Turkey over the directions taken by the country as a whole, including over Turkey entering the track of the Iranian nuclear issue. Indeed, alongside seeking after leadership in the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and even Somalia, Erdoğan seems hungry for a greater role on the international scene through the gateway of Iran. Erdoğan has sought to take advantage of the absence of the Arabs in the issue of international negotiations with Iran, and thus imposed himself as a partner with the 5+1 countries and repeatedly stated that he had the right to address the nuclear issue because he is a neighbor and this is his region. Erdoğan's thinking might succeed and he might impose himself where the Arabs are absent. However, he might also be risking his strategy, as the events have shown that Tehran presented him from the start with an incomplete agreement and drew him into a fabricated disagreement with the club of greats that may lead to dwarfing his ambitions of turning Turkey into a major regional power.
