New York-Iran has returned to the forefront of international concern this week, after political analysts delved deeper into the details of the relationship between the US and China and how it reflects on the Iranian issue, and after Russia expressed irritation from Tehran's maneuvers in the nuclear issue. It has returned to the forefront through the international community heading towards new sanctions and from the perspective of US stances voiced by President Barack Obama, stressing the aspect of sanctions of the dual policy without taking diplomacy off the table. International activity took the shape of meetings, visits, threats, reassurances and a movement of US officials towards countries of the Middle East. Thus, after the US Secretary of Defense met with Turkish officials in Ankara and then with a group of ministers in Munich, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew to Qatar and to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey's Foreign Minister flew to Tehran, and a series of “over-the-phone” meetings began between political directors in the foreign ministries of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, China, Russia and France) plus Germany. The US handed out to these countries a document containing its “vision” of the kind of system of sanctions it has in mind, and thus began the slow advance towards a draft resolution to reinforce sanctions, one which might never see the light of day if Tehran takes yet another reassuring half-step to buy time for itself and for the six countries that are daunting it, even if to different degrees. Indeed, the differences run deeper than sanctions. There are, for example, those who are of the opinion that any system of sanctions will quicken the process of toppling the regime, which is still besieged domestically, because sanctions will effectively harm it and will contain its domestic and regional activity and ambitions. There are also those who are of a completely different opinion, considering that sanctions are most likely to lead the Iranians to line up behind their country (and their regime), which would mean lifting the pressure being suffered by the regime in Tehran from the inside. Then there are those such as Russia for example who insist that any sanctions – if and when there are to be sanctions – must be entirely restricted to the nuclear program alone, and must avoid anything that might appear to be targeting the regime. Thus the road towards reinforcing sanctions will be long and grueling, and it might never reach its destination, but rather remain a side track that must be followed because of the significance, and perhaps consequences, that it holds. It is also useful to analyze some of the striking current trends, some of them almost “novelties” in terms of the stances they hold, stances that call for estimating the “benefits” of Iran possessing nuclear weapons, and making use of these benefits in the interest of the United States, in terms of security, oil and the economy – it might perhaps also be of great help to US military industries. Let us start with a survey of these trends, which first found their way to some scholarly institutions in the United States and Europe, as well as in Russia, before some began to publicly write about them and to promote them. One defense analyst at the US Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Adam Lowther, wrote from the Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama an article published by the New York Times this week, which he asserts to reflect his personal views and not those of the US Air Force. In any case, the man made sure to emphasize the place, affiliation, title and experience accompanying his truly very striking article. He says that there are at least five positive aspects that would benefit the United States if it were to allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. First, Iran's development of nuclear weapons would, according to the author, “give the United States an opportunity to finally defeat violent Sunni-Arab terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Here's why: a nuclear Iran is primarily a threat to its neighbors, not the United States. Thus Washington could offer regional security – primarily, a Middle East nuclear umbrella – in exchange for economic, political and social reforms in the autocratic Arab regimes responsible for breeding the discontent that led to the attacks of September 11, 2001”. The writer adds that those regimes “were protected by the wealth of their petroleum reserves. A nuclear Iran alters the regional dynamic significantly, and provides some leverage for us to demand reforms”. More than this, in fact, as this military analyst says that there is some benefit for the United States in terms of oil, benefit regarding OPEC, if Iran were to become a nuclear power. Indeed, by turning the United States into the main provider of regional security in a nuclear Middle East, it would give the US a way to “break” OPEC, which would lead to lowering oil prices and saving billions of dollars for American consumers. At the very least, Lowther adds, “President Obama could trade security for increased production and a lowering of global petroleum prices”. The third point raised by the author is almost acrobatic. Indeed, it states that a nuclear Iran would pose a threat to both Israel and the Palestinians, as any Iranian nuclear strike against Israel would certainly do away with the Palestinians there. Therefore, “shared danger might serve as a catalyst for reconciliation” between the Palestinians and the Israelis, thus leading to a peace agreement. Fourthly, and this is an essential part of the “real point”, the military analyst from Maxwell Base says that “a growth in exports of weapons systems, training and advice to our Middle Eastern allies” – in light of a nuclear Iran – “would not only strengthen our current partnership efforts but give the American defense industry a needed shot in the arm”. Within such a framework, the author points to reduced Pentagon budgets in the coming years, budgets which would mean losing “American jobs” and weakening the US's position “should [it] be threatened by a rising military power like China. A nuclear Iran could forestall such a catastrophe”. Finally, in a wholly candid proposition, the author says that allowing Iran to become a nuclear power would enable the United States to stop the flow of dollars to “autocratic regimes in the region”, not just by reducing oil revenues through reduced oil prices, and not just by exporting weapons to these regimes, but also by forcing them to “bear a real share of [the] cost” of American security in the region, which they would be benefiting from. In his view, this would also lead to “a victory in the war on terrorism” which “would save [American] taxpayers the tens of billions of dollars a year now spent on overseas counterinsurgency operations”. Such a proposition is not entirely new in closed-door forums and councils in the United States, and specifically in scholarly institutions. It is part of a series of propositions signifying that Iran, like Israel, can be trusted not to use nuclear weapons – unlike the Arabs who cannot be trusted. It is a stance bordering on racism against Arabs and one that is widespread in American councils in New York. What is new is the frankness in publicly speaking of the “benefits” of a nuclear Iran for the United States, especially from the perspective of “humiliating” the Arabs at the security level as well as economically and politically, and from the perspective of the benefits of an arms race – even a nuclear one – for American military industries. All of the Arabs who express their Arab identity by standing with a nuclear Iran – merely for the fact that the world does not reprove Israel for having nuclear weapons and does not even dare to talk about it – should analyze in depth propositions that call for encouraging the rise of a nuclear Iran, and not just the ones that call for ignoring its possession of military nuclear capabilities as a matter of fact. Indeed, those who are being targeted here are essentially the Arabs, under different means, pretexts and justifications, for the purpose of subjugating and then blackmailing them. The great powers do not adopt these policies, and officials in their governments in fact rush to say that those who call for rehabilitating a nuclear Iran – either frankly or by waiting for what the de facto situation will impose – are speaking of personal opinions, not of official policies. Perhaps these countries are sincere in publicly insisting that they will not allow Iran to breach the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And perhaps Iran itself is claiming more than what it actually is capable of at the level of nuclear capabilities by hinting at military nuclear capabilities while insisting that its nuclear capabilities are strictly civil and peaceful. A long time ago, when former President George Bush's Administration announced its policy of opposition to the “Axis of Evil”, comprised of Iraq, North Korea and Iran, it was mentioned in this column that the real target would solely be Iraq, and that evil would probably not reach Iran and North Korea, but would remain aimed towards Iraq. So far, that prediction still holds true, and there is no indication that a radical change will occur, despite an increase in the atmosphere of pressure on Iran. What will decide how true such an assumption will prove is whether the leadership in Tehran is walking in the footsteps of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or not. The most important factor in Iranian developments, which had been missing in Iraqi developments, is the internal factor, meaning the uprising from within against the regime. In the case of Iraq, no coherent uprising had taken shape internally. In the case of Iran, on the other hand, the decisive factor is that of the Iranian interior. Every step at the foreign level takes into account its domestic impact in Iran. Some countries, such as Russia and China, are not sure of what change will bring in Iran, and thus oppose to the same extent any sanctions that seem to have the ability to do away with the regime, with which they are both on good terms. The United States led by Barack Obama is taking the utmost care to remain “neutral” with regard to the internal struggle in Iran, and Obama is repeatedly being blamed for this. Indeed, he has recently begun to talk about taking determined steps on the track of sanctions, yet he has continued to cling strongly to the track of diplomacy, even if it results in obscure steps from Tehran. It might seem that China alone is singing a different tune with regard to pressures and sanctions against Iran. But the fact of the matter is that Russia – despite its public criticism – is in no hurry for sanctions, has reservations over most of them as the Americans imagine them to be, and is clear in its stance that the track of diplomacy has not yet been exhausted. The difference between the stances of Russia and China in fact seems to be tactical rather than fundamental. All of this does not mean that the five countries plus Germany are ready to allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. It is clear that the military option is not on the table, that there is faith in the efficiency of the option of sanctions if it is exercised, and that the wager – at least that of some – is on internal developments in Iran, either in terms of changing the regime or of forcing the current regime to alter its behavior. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will arrive to Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and it will be useful to discuss with her how the US views the Iran of tomorrow – nuclear or non-nuclear – as well as the cost of any of the two possibilities at the Arab level. It would also be useful for the Arabs to rush to lay down the necessary policies before the next summit conference to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would be useful for them to carefully and repeatedly examine the meaning of the propositions of a military analyst who dared to mention them publicly.
