The headlines of oil, war and sanctions are intertwined in strategic discussions between the United States and China, emphasizing Iran, Sudan and the likelihood of trade-offs in agreeing over them. Sudan is a simpler issue, despite its numerous complexities, and might be yet another place for US-Chinese cooperation, following their current cooperation at the practical military, political and strategic levels in facing the piracy that has been and continues to be exported by Somalia. Iran is a more difficult case, due to the Islamic Republic of Iran's intersecting ambitions in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine on the one hand; and on the other, because Israel is one player that holds the elements of surprise – or the scenario of terror – and closely observes the path taken by the international discussion with Iran, its friends and its “satellites”. The positions held by Gulf countries, in talks of compensating oil for China in the event of tough sanction measures being imposed that would provoke Iran, are certainly important, yet all “strategic” eyes are turned towards Iraq, because it represents a treasure in terms of oil reserves and because it can still be “divided up”. Lebanon is important in the framework of fears from a spark of war that would inflame parts of the region, yet it is not as important as Iraq. Similarly, Palestine has its own importance in the frameworks of discussions about the region, yet to a limited extent, one restricted to the issue of instability, not to major strategic issues as in the case of Iraq. This does not negate the relation between the two options of war and sanctions in the way the great powers are dealing with the issue of Iran, and between the requirements of setting off the spark of war with both Iran and Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, for ends that serve either of them and implicate others. For all these reasons, the negotiation process – political, oil-related and strategic – has begun at the bilateral US-Chinese level as well as between the five permanent members of the Security Council. It is clear that coordination between China and Russia continues, and that Washington and London are in understanding. What is unclear is the French role, which to a great extent resembles both President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, in being elastic, nervous, indecisive and oscillating between Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, to Iranian and Israeli rhythms. Preventing Israel from directing a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is now an international decision over which the great powers are unanimous, and upon which they in fact insist. The cost of such “prevention”, on the other hand, is currently part of the process of trade-offs stretching from the Gulf to the Middle East. The international community realizes that Israel is not militarily capable of carrying out a unilateral operation against Iran, one similar to its bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq or to its obscure operation in Syria against sites it claimed to be connected to nuclear programs. In spite of this, the international community is in the process of meeting immediate Israeli priorities, such as preventing it from being touched upon during the Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) at the United Nations next month, knowing that Israel refuses to ratify the treaty or to be subjected to any international nuclear system that would pave the way for investigation into its military nuclear programs, facilities and reactors. One of the most important things that took place at the Nuclear Security Summit which was held this week in Washington was its focus on the priority of combating “nuclear terrorism” and the emphasis on fears of it reaching the hands of terrorist groups around the world, and most prominently Islamist terrorist groups of the likes of Al-Qaeda. It is true that numerous implicit messages during the summit and on its sidelines aroused fears of Iran and North Korea and stressed the necessity of isolating them and preventing them from developing nuclear weapons. However, the strongest and clearest message was in shifting the attention away from countries possessing nuclear capabilities and towards such capabilities falling into the hands of terrorist groups. Thus, as one of the symptoms of the cards of focus being reshuffled, what took place was a near amnesty for countries that possess nuclear weapons and refuse to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty from being examined and held accountable. This in turn will reflect on the NPT Review Conference in New York and will intertwine with ongoing negotiations over a draft resolution to reinforce sanctions against Iran due to doubts over its nuclear program. These negotiations have crossed a new threshold following the important meeting between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, because the two presidents spoke to each other in the language of strategy, and most prominently in the oil aspect. Indeed, Washington understands Beijing's needs in the oil sector and considers that there is a need to reassure China and to provide an oil alternative for what Iran is providing it if the need arises. This is why the US Administration is turning to oil-producing Arab countries to provide ready alternatives, while it speaks the language of mutual interests with China in two other places that are important in terms of oil, namely Sudan and Iraq. China has the utmost interest in Sudan primarily for oil reasons, and it has always been foremost in opposing sanctioning the regime in Khartoum through international measures, regardless of what happens in Darfur or in the South. Nowadays, the US Administration finds itself more interested in developing the relationship between South and North in Sudan than in the developments in Darfur. It thus finds itself closer to the stances taken by China, which is concerned about the repercussions and consequences of the possibility of the South seceding from Sudan, a possibility which has arisen as a result of a treaty sponsored by the previous administration. Thus, there are ideas going around in the circles of those well-informed about this issue that fall under encouraging a US-Chinese discussion that would trade off US leniency regarding the issue of Sudan and non-insistence on secession in exchange for Chinese strictness towards Iran, in order to inform the mullahs that the options available to them are: either to agree to the negotiations being offered by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, which involves as a matter of fact meeting the Iranian priority of recognizing the ruling regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in disdain of the opposition which will effectively be crippled; to face serious sanctions that would be harmful to the regime of the “Revolutionary Guard” (Pasdaran) and would be aimed at undermining its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons; or to once again rethink the calculations that have led to the conclusion that the United States is unable or unwilling to make use of a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, because these calculations are wrong, especially if they are taken within the framework of domestic and electoral political challenges for the Democratic Party and for President Barack Obama. Those who speak such a language mock those who call for accepting a nuclear Iran and submitting to the de facto situation it would impose as a nuclear state. In their opinion, this is absolutely out of the question, and all US public opinion needs to change its mind about opposing a US military operation against Iran is emphasis on the dangers of Tehran's mullahs obtaining nuclear bombs that could be exported to extremist and terrorist Islamist groups. According to well-informed sources, the United States has informed China that making use of the military option might be inevitable if Iran continues to be obstinate in refusing the “carrot” of negotiations, recognition, rehabilitation and renouncing the methods of isolation and enmity of the previous US Administration. Thus Washington is encouraging Chinese diplomacy to agree to serious, strict and potentially harmful sanctions against Iran because sanctions would delay – if not temporarily disable – resorting to the option of making use of military force. And because such a formula is on its own insufficient in the language of strategy, the discussion over Iraq is one of the most obscure and secretive. In fact, it is not yet clear whether the headlines of this discussion have reached beyond a handful of decision-makers. Indeed, Iraq represents tremendous oil wealth which will change world standards once the Iraqi oil infrastructure becomes fully equipped within four or five years. The George W. Bush Administration sought to monopolize Iraq's oil wealth when it took the decision to invade and occupy Iraq and refused the principle of sharing such wealth with the other permanent members of the Security Council. The Barack Obama Administration, however, speaks a language of US interests radically different from the language of US interests the Bush Administration spoke. The Obama Administration speaks of “partnership” and of “sharing” both responsibility and profit. It resorts to enticing with the sharing of resources, such as through bilateral deals, thus winning over countries like Brazil, which had outbid, competed and contended before joining the ranks of those calling for strengthening sanctions against Iran. Thus, if the Obama Administration is truly willing to speak to the likes of China and Russia in the language of sharing Iraq's oil wealth rather than monopolizing it, and if China is truly listening with interest, Tehran is then at the height of mobilization and concern. Such mobilization does not mean that Tehran has the ability to dictate what it wants in Iraq, especially in terms of who the next Prime Minister will be following the elections. Indeed, Tehran realizes that excessively interfering and driving the coalitions loyal to it to the forefront – despite the results of the elections – will lead to overwhelming chaos if not to a civil war in Iraq. Tehran is unable to bear a civil war or the outbreak of overwhelming chaos and instability in neighboring Iraq because this would expose the Iranian regime to danger, besiege it both from its borders and from within, and restrict its activity and its nuclear and regional ambitions. It would resemble a kind of political suicide which the Iranian mentality does not favor, preferring to be patient and to wager on time and procrastination. At the level of Syria and Lebanon, on the other hand, fears are increasing of indirect military friction between Israel and Iran through Hezbollah. Increasing as well are US and Israeli warnings to Syria of not crossing the “red line” by supplying Hezbollah with weapons of superior quality that would reach it through Syria from Iran. The US stances expressed by Deputy Permanent US Representative to the UN Ambassador Alejandro Wolff at the Security Council this week are not merely a reassurance to Israel in order to restrain it on the issue of Iran, but rather a serious message to Damascus and to Tehran. As for the statements made by the Russian President and his Representative to the UN Vitaly Churkin, warning of the consequences of the “spark” of regional war erupting through Lebanon, it is a message through which Moscow is warning and informing Israel that this is out of the question, while at the same time informing Tehran that the threats against it are serious and that it is time for it to realize this.
