The two summits to be respectively hosted by Madrid and Granada, will definitely have some impact, whether negatively or positively, on the Sahara issue. The first summit will be held during the state visit by the Algerian president Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika to the Iberian Peninsula, while the second summit, will take place as the first joint Moroccan-European Union summit. However, Spain, which has now become the center of attraction for North African capitals following its assumption of the EU presidency, realizes that Spain's term as head of the EU will not be sufficient to address the causes of the tension beleaguering its southern neighbors. Nonetheless, there were repeated hints by Prime Minister Zapatero to a comprehensive solution to the Sahara problem, which he specified as being the focus of an upcoming quasi-international summit that brings together Morocco, Algeria, Spain and France. Minister Moratinos went even further, declaring a few days ago that Madrid, Washington and Paris are working under a common vision to deal with the recent developments in this regard. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that these capitals will undermine the series of actions being sponsored by the United Nations, since these involve Security Council resolutions that call for encouraging the negotiation option, and that urge the neighboring states to push this option forward. Likewise, it is not realistic to rely on an agreement among the concerned sides to boost the chances of making progress, as every time that there are signs that the end of the crisis is near, disputes erupt again, and hopes are dispelled. The visit by Bouteflika to Madrid puts critical issues on the discussions agenda, ranging from commercial and economic issues to the security concerns regarding the growth of extremism and al-Qaida linked movements in Muslim North Africa, especially after the kidnapping of Spaniards in Mauritania, not to mention the issue of illegal immigration. However, the Sahara conflict will nonetheless be the main focus. Certainly, these areas of concern are matched by the determination of the Spanish government, as it speaks for the EU, to find realistic and encouraging solutions to these problems, which work against the balance in Spain's ties with both Rabat and Algiers. However, in what regards the Sahara issue, Madrid will encounter a difference in positions, if not in terms of adhering to certain principles, then in terms of adopting the proper policies that would pave the way for the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The same situation is likely to apply to the Morccoan-European Summit, which is scheduled to take place in the spring, where issues such as emigration, terror, extremism and the ramifications of the Sahara conflict are grabbing the attention of both the Moroccans and the Spaniards. However, any initiative will benefit Spain first and foremost, for several reasons: First of all, going it alone in the negotiations with Spain and the European partners will weaken both Morocco's and Algeria's chances of having the required impact on a dialogue that is unequal to begin with, and which is rather governed by considerations that almost divide the two sides. Second, Spain, like the Europeans, can always justify giving something with one hand while taking something else with another, by invoking its quest for balance in having its relations with Algeria not developing at the expense of Morocco, or vice versa. This practically means a lower level of support and commitment which will remains weak and open to many different interpretations. Third, the parallel diplomacy that is being undertaken by the United States when it interferes in any crisis in the region means that Washington's stance is equally relevant. This is not something that the Europeans are very fond of; however, it is not angering them over the short term, especially in light of the ramifications of the war on terror. The short-term gains that the Algerians or Moroccans might pick up in their dialogue with the Europeans or the Americans are not significant here. They are givens, as long as the partners live to their conditions, in harmony with defending strategic interests that are not subject to the impact of passing trends and incidents. However, Morocco and Algeria should seek out greater goals, which seem to be a secondary priority at the moment, because each side believes it can score a victory against the other. In the Sahara issue in particular, all sides reiterate that they want a solution. However, there is a difference between those who say that but do not want to make any concessions to turn words into deeds, and those who want a solution but are unable to achieve it; there is also a difference between these parties and those who do not want a solution to being with, and who are fully capable of thwarting the opportunity for a solution, with much insistence and stubbornness. There is nothing that can put people at ease, more than the Europeans and Americans benefiting from the status quo of having no solution, but of having no further deterioration nonetheless. This is a policy in itself. Unfortunately, the other side has no desire or capability to turn the dialogue of partnership to being based on strength, instead of weakness.
