Nature has separated the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean; but the gulf between them might grow wider in political terms, at the least because the relationship between Morocco and Spain could enter the realm of the dangerous unknown. The trip into this dark tunnel might begin with the issue of the occupied cities of Ceuta and Melilla. As Moroccan demands in support of opening a dialogue about the future of sovereignty over the two regions are on the rise, the Spanish responses have become more hard-line, with a mere difference in tone between the ruling party and the opposition. However, the surprise came from the south. It seems that the decades since the withdrawal of Spanish civilian and military officials from Saqiet el-Hamra and Oued ad-Dahab at the beginning of 1976 have done nothing other than dig up people's memories. Perhaps the various sides that long for a return to the years of confrontation between the two neighboring countries over the Sahara will be happier in Spain vis-à-vis the current impasse, as if General Franco continues to impose his grip on the kingdom of Juan Carlos. What everyone feared came to pass: the linkage between the Sahara conflict and the two occupied cities in northern Morocco has emerged due to the strength of events. While the Spanish used to expect that the wager on the continuation of the Sahara issue would weaken Moroccan demands for sovereignty over the two cities or delay them for a longer period, it now seems that the pressures being exerted in the south might lead to an explosion in the north. This is not the only area likely to develop when it comes to relations between Morocco and Spain. There are other issues, governed by total political agreement, that are now candidates for re-evaluation, such as dealing with illegal emigration and the war on terror and fighting drug trafficking, or agreements involving coastal fishing, investment areas and the centralization of linguistic influence on the Iberian Peninsula. The Moroccans used to blame their neighbors for using Moroccan issues to settle internal scores, for electoral reasons. Today, this formula, which has penetrated the emotions of Spaniards and become sharper in tone thanks to the grandstanding rhetoric of returning the Sahara issue to the forefront, cannot be ruled out. Some hard-line circles are even describing the region as “Spanish” and saying that Madrid has a historical responsibility to the people of the Sahara. Throughout history, the relationship of a former colonialist power with old centers of influence has never seen this amount of sectarian tension, even though this does not go beyond nostalgia, and to the degree that the Spanish have not accepted the bitter pill of withdrawing from the Sahara, they are trying more today to re-open the Ceuta and Melilla issue. From Spain's point of view, there is only one path, and it lies in seeing the Sahara conflict remain unsolved. In fact, one may think that Spain prefers a policy of crisis over defusing the tension. Only recently, all eyes were on Madrid, which became a prominent stopping-point for United Nations envoy Christopher Ross. There was a prevailing wager on a “big solution,” hinted at by Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero, to convene a summit with Spain, Morocco, Algeria, France and the United States, and that this solution would be able to make a significant breakthrough, although electoral struggles in Spain dashed these hopes. Zapatero's government acknowledges that relations with Rabat have strategic dimensions. For its part, Morocco has affirmed that there is no alternative to understanding and coexistence. However, the public in both Morocco and Spain have almost pulled the rug out from under this approach, due to the recent events. It is a new chapter in the confrontation, one that is outracing the official channels and settling into a pattern of emotional responses. The Moroccan Parliament responds to its Spanish counterpart with denunciations and condemnations. Demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Casablanca have become a method of violent protest. Spain is certainly aware of the significance of the decision taken by the municipality of Beni Ansar, at the entrance to Melilla, to refuse to supply water to the occupied city. Likewise, the Moroccans are certainly aware of the meaning of Spain's prompting the European Parliament to pass restrictions on their country. Throughout all of this, the two countries have been unable to seize any opportunities, caught up in the rush toward surrendering to emotion. Who said that the confrontation with Spain over the Sahara ended in 1975?
