Ever since it was founded, the Security Council has never in any period of its history been an institutional body independent from the climate of bilateral relations between the great powers or from the regional and international interests of the five permanent members, who alone hold the right of veto. The ten members elected for a period of two years do not have individual obstructing power such as the veto, but are nevertheless able to communally form what would be equivalent to the right of veto if they were to withhold the nine votes necessary to adopt any resolution. In the age of polarization, or the age of truce-seeking, the Security Council remains a compass that points to the quality of US-Russian relations (knowing that it used to be a battlefield of mutually exchanged veto and the best indicator of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War), US-Chinese relations (knowing that China is perhaps the most prominent country to have benefited from its membership in the Security Council by withholding its vote) and even US-EU relations (knowing that the stances of France and Germany towards the Iraq War at the Security Council stirred up a transatlantic enmity between Western countries). Today Barack Obama goes through the United Nations – including the Security Council – and this has an impact not just on the quality of US-international relations, but also on the way the great powers deal with each other in regional issues, when policies and interests intertwine in contradictory, competitive or identical strategies. Iran is one of these issues. Israel too has become a different issue from what it was before, as it feels that the Obama Administration is withdrawing its customary protection from accountability, and that the Security Council is no longer, as it was in the past, an institutional body in which it is forbidden to address Israel and its violations. Thus the Security Council is entering a new and different phase, one that will perhaps be one of the most important phases it has been through – not by issuing resolutions that allow wars or randomly impose sanctions, but rather by the major international issues going through it in the age of constructive engagement, which Barack Obama has adopted as a basis of the United States' foreign policy built on dialogue. Hence, the membership of a country such as Lebanon at the Security Council for the years 2010 and 2011 would benefit it if it makes good use of it as an opportunity to strengthen the sovereignty of the state and to prove itself as a responsible country not led by conflicts or crises. Then Lebanon will be able to impose itself on the international scene as a truly independent country, one that knows how to behave by virtue of high rank, proving that it is worthy of progress and respect, and not the victim of blackmail or the victim of policies of obstruction and their various innovations. Two basic opinions were prevalent before Lebanon was elected as a member of the Security Council, one of them characterized by fear over and from Lebanon as a member of the UN council, which would require it to take public stances – even when withholding its vote. The other opinion, characterized by optimism, was that this new responsibility would reflect positively on Lebanon's progress towards true sovereignty of the state. At first, the US Administration was prominent among those who were afraid and careful, as it voiced its opinion through the various channels and tried to convince the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to replace Lebanon as candidate for the Asian seat, with Lebanon obtaining the opportunity to become a member later on, after having crossed this difficult phase, and exchanging seats with Saudi Arabia. What the US Administration was afraid of was for Lebanon to pay, in exchange for voting on diverse issues – most prominently Iran, a political price in Beirut, and in fact in the streets of Beirut, as conveyed by informed sources. Washington feared that Lebanon would be destabilized for the most basic resolutions, feared the way decisions would be taken in Beirut, and feared for Lebanon in its transitional phase. Thus it sought to convince it to renounce its candidacy while waiting for a better time so as to, as one said, “pick the roses without their thorns, instead of potentially picking the thorns without roses”. Nevertheless, all of this came in a tone of advice, not one of insistence or threats. And when President of the Republic Michel Suleiman settled the issue by announcing from the podium of the General Assembly that Lebanon was moving forward with its candidacy, even the advice retreated and the US Administration started taking into account Lebanon's membership in the Security Council's new makeup. What it is taking into account is that Lebanon will not be a country whose stances are automatically presumed, and that it will be bound by many domestic and regional constraints when voting on Security Council resolutions, especially those regarding the Middle East – including resolutions regarding Lebanon. The US Administration is taking into account the fact that Lebanon's membership in the council may have a negative impact on the local internal situation and could lead efforts aimed at maintaining internal stability to be undermined or destabilized. According to the assessment of some in the US Administration, heated debate in Lebanon over which stance to adopt at the Security Council, even if it is that of withholding the vote, will form yet another seed for more division, which could lead to inflaming the political situation, characterized by instability, compromises, obstruction and outbidding. Indeed, even in the case of resolutions concerning Lebanon, such as 1559, 1701 and the resolution to establish the Special Tribunal, there is debate, differing stances, contrasting opinions and division. The case is similar when the issue regards Iran. Thus some in the US Administration consider that this membership in the Security Council is not useful, and in fact might be harmful to efforts towards concord and stability. As for Lebanon's weight at the Security Council, it will most probably not be the party that tips the balance, obstructs or makes resolutions. It may be detrimental to the United States in some issues, as it may not be able to join the consensus the US seeks after. Yet its vote will not be decisive, unless it happens that the US – or someone else – does not manage to gather 9 votes behind a resolution – either to have it adopted or dropped. Then the vote of every country elected will be of the utmost importance. Thus what could characterize Lebanon's membership in the Security Council is a way to make use of the opportunities available to Lebanon to reduce the likelihood of threats. The opportunity is available for Lebanon to prove that it is able to behave and contribute as a responsible state at the Security Council, one not led by conflicts and crises, and one that does not submit to internal dictates for internal considerations. However, if Lebanon were to fail to exercise such a role, it will not be met with understanding, nor will it move along without being held to account if it obstructs the work of the Security Council. Indeed, this is an international council concerned with the world's security and peace, and it will not yield to the narrow considerations of a member-state, especially if it is an elected member itself required to implement its resolutions. The wager is on the role of the state, and on insisting on its sovereignty in exercising its role independently and responsibly. Then there will be no need to speak of votes that would place Lebanon between civil peace and international considerations. And if it so happens that the climate of truce-seeking and understanding between the United States and Iran should reflect at the Security Council, then it would be for the best. And if a round of arm-wrestling were to begin between Washington and Moscow over the issue of Iran, for instance, it would be understandable for Lebanon to oppose rushing to strengthen sanctions. Moreover, if the issue were to simply be one of the majority of Arabs agreeing with the majority of the international community that the time has come to take a strict stance towards Iran with additional sanctions, then Lebanon would be the object of blame if it were to stand alone in opposition to such consensus. The situation would have been different had the United States been in the process of striking deals and understandings with Iran and Israel or Syria, and at the same time expecting Lebanon to stand in “the line of fire”. Hence, it is important for Lebanon to monitor the climate of international and regional relations in order to create opportunities and make use of occasions. Indeed, it is possible for Lebanon, while sitting at a reduced table of 15 countries, to behave with confidence, telling the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese, the French and the British: I am here. This is an opportunity to say: go through me. In other words, it is possible for Lebanon to play a leading role, one over which countries in the region would gather and compete, which is the role of mediator, or channel, or the party through which international policies towards the region pass. Such a role would hold much consideration. Here, within such a hypothesis, the opinion that insisting on moving forward with Lebanon's candidacy for a seat at the Security Council is the right decision becomes prominent. Indeed, if Lebanon had retracted the candidacy it obtained 20 years ago, it would have behaved as if it was a failed country, one unable to rule or be independent. In fact, even if Lebanon was forced to be “the defiant voice”, it would be better than fleeing from the opportunity of Lebanon returning to the Security Council after an absence of 56 years. Indeed, if Lebanon had said “we are not ready”, it would have been a blow to its sovereignty. Those who are of this opinion point to the fact that electing Lebanon is the pinnacle of translating strengthening the notion of its sovereignty and independence, and the crowning of international efforts in support of Lebanon as a country of diversity and institutions and as a center for dialogue. They say that membership in the Security Council is a guarantee for Lebanon and its unity, as opposed to what is being said of it being a motive for division. They say that there are unchanging principles in Lebanese foreign policy which will spare it from seeking advice in every random issue in the absence of a government cabinet – if it is not formed by the beginning of next year. They assert that the procedure for taking decisions counters the possibility of obstruction because such a procedure does not need a decision that would require changing general principles. They say that it is obstruction that requires a procedure that would call for departing from such principles, not the opposite. Those who are of this opinion consider electing Lebanon for membership in the Security Council an additional “guarantee, security and protection” for Lebanon. Why? Because when the country is at the heart of decision-making, it will have early warnings as it will benefit from being close to the great powers and able to understand their priorities. It would thus be able to understand the tendencies and anticipation instead of being the last to know. The wager is on the fact that it will not be in anyone's interest to make the internal situation worse or to cause Lebanon an embarrassment that would undermine its respect, sovereignty and independence on the international scene. Furthermore, it is important for all those concerned to gain an in-depth understanding of what takes place at the Security Council, how negotiations go, how consensus is built and how resolutions get dropped – if anyone has in mind the illusion of using Lebanon's membership to annul resolutions or have them dropped. Indeed, neither the methods of obstruction can have a resolution dropped, nor can any force of blackmail or barter. Thus there is no need to move the methods of obstruction from the Lebanese scene to the international scene, first because this would be insulting to Lebanon and an encroachment of the country's credibility and sovereignty, and second because these methods used on the Lebanese scene will produce no result or effect if practiced in the arena of the Security Council. Finally, the important issues at the Security Council will most probably include the Middle East peace process because the Barack Obama Administration has made it clear that it wants the Security Council and its members to be partners in making peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis and in making peace in the Middle East. What is new is that Israel will not remain exempt from being held accountable at the Security Council, whether it is thanks to the Goldstone report, which stated that Israel committed war crimes and perhaps crimes against humanity in Gaza, as did Hamas, or as a result of the US policy determined to drive towards a just peace and an end to the occupation. What is important is that this is a special opportunity to play a responsible and constructive role, one which could be historical if the Security Council exercises its responsibilities by working communally to convince, without abandoning the culture of non-impunity which has become one of the most important international principles of our age. And Lebanon has the opportunity to be party to this highly important phase of international politics, based on law, accountability and non-impunity.
