The Iranians did not miss the existing chance for dialogue with the West over their nuclear program, although their rhetorical positions over eight months implied otherwise. They realize that dealing with the world does not have an open time limit, like carpet weaving, and that some events are drawing near and there should be practical efforts to consolidate the gains and reduce the consequences. They also realize that the regional role requires financial capacities to protect it, ones that cannot be available in light of an open conflict with the world. Because they realize that the European recognition of their role and the members of their forces alone are not enough, they insisted that Washington sign any agreement or arrangement. The US forces are in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Americans, to a large extent, control Israel's decision on the war fronts in South Lebanon and Gaza, and have prevented until now an Israeli assault on the nuclear reactors in Iran. Two years ago, Iran had awaited one positive sign from Bush's administration. But this sign had never come. Iran wanted to manipulate the end of his tenure to gain whatever possible from him. At the time, it was willing to facilitate the situation of his forces in Iraq - in a prelude for their pullout – in return for Washington recognizing its role there and introducing a new arrangement in Lebanon which had just come out of the war. But Bush had different calculations and a different discourse, and thus the few timid meetings between both sides failed. For his part, Obama was clear from the beginning and decided to extend his hand to Tehran, implicitly recognizing its increasing influence. Since the main concern of the West will be of course to control Iran's nuclear file and curb its ability for enrichment after it was close to the point of possessing an [atomic] bomb according to a recent American report, Iran feels that it can obtain "concessions" in other dossiers that concern it directly. Therefore, it presented itself in a set of suggestions as though it were a complete partner in managing the world and solving its problems, and a regional player whose role is unquestioned – one that bypasses other parties that have held during the past decades the same strings, or some of them. The Iranian exaggeration has impacted the Arab allies of Iran who believed that Iran can sacrifice its interests for the sake of "principled" attitudes. Thus, they stood in its shadow, while it continued to move forward holding cards that are theoretically supposed to be in their hands, and used these cards during swaps. The Americans have also preferred to go to the source directly. They know who distributes salaries, weapons, and tickles sectarian sentiments. They also realize that the economic incentives entice Iran, whose budget suffers from sanctions, and inflation, fluctuating revenues, while it is in need for a substantial increase in spending on the development of oil and gas which are not available to it, and for foreign investments that re-launch its rusted economic wheel. The Westerners will carry to the negotiations two key dossiers: the energy security and Israel's security. Both dossiers require Iran's cooperation and are listed among its suggestions. Tehran has succeeded in imposing a new regional equation and achieving stability in the region, with this stability becoming impossible without the obligatory Iranian passageway. The inter-Palestinian reconciliation will remain difficult without Iran's blessing, the situation in Lebanon will remain complicated and open to different possibilities without its consent, and a stable government in Iraq will remain unlikely without its cooperation. This means that the negotiations will be arduous and long. But if a deal takes place, it will include a commitment that would restraint the allies and arrange solutions, ones that could make the "domestic" crises in Lebanon and Palestine anecdotes from the past.
