The Arab summit in Sert was not expected to offer more than it did, not only due to the absence of prominent Arab leaders but also because the Arab ability to impact the course of events in the region is almost null. In the meantime, the old image of the Middle East has become part of history and the new Middle East, whether the “small” or the “big” one, has started to form at a record pace since the fall of the Taliban regime, the American invasion of Iraq, the July 2006 war in Lebanon and the Gaza war at the end of 2008, beginning of 2009. All of the latter events turned the balances of power upside down and rendered the Arabs' causes no longer theirs alone. Despite the fact that the Iraqi, Palestinian and Lebanese arenas are getting the most attention, what has happened and is still happening in Sudan, Yemen and Somalia is also the object of attention of the Arabs, although they have so far settled for repeating the same stands in all the closing statements of the various summits. Nonetheless, it was important for the Sert summit to adopt measures to manage the Arab disputes; to ratify a plan to rescue what remains of Jerusalem from the claws of the settlements; to reiterate its insistence on the unity of Iraq, Sudan and Somalia as well as its support of Lebanon; to call once again for a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction; to reject the region being led to war; to express its wish to establish a fruitful dialogue with Iran from an equal position just as it was urged by Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa; and to see the reform of this League's structure among other items to which we have become accustomed and which are featured in the other Arab statements. However, all of the latter positions are of no value unless they are tackled in the context of the unified vision or strategy addressed by the different summits, in order to set the foundation for an efficient Arab role in the heated regional and international race to build the “New Middle East” and redraw the security system in the region. As for the call of Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa during the inauguration of the summit to see the establishment of a league for the neighboring states, it has come too late. Indeed, the role of the neighboring states is already present and needs no visa, from the role played by Chad among other African and non-African states in Darfur after the South, to the role played by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia, by Iran in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and by Turkey in the Land of the Two Rivers and at the level of the settlement from Syria, to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. All of these roles point to the absence or impotence of the Arab role, while Amr Moussa's call which was imposed by the logic of geography, history, politics and joint interests, is one aiming at securing a late “Arab legitimization” of all these elements which have recently emerged and have acquired a growing presence in the region's security system. In this context, the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the summit was quite eloquent, at a time when Iran the absentee was present via its major nuclear dossier. I heard the leader of the Justice and Development Party speaking about Jerusalem, “the apple of my eye,” while digging into his Ottoman subconscious the expression “jewel of the Ottoman crown” used by the Caliphate in Istanbul to refer to the “fertile crescent.” However, the most eloquent and symbolic paradox amongst all was probably this Turkish presence at the level of the “details” as well, even if this was not made on purpose. Indeed, the Turkish “Rixos” company won the tender to offer the accommodation, catering, and hosting services for the guests of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi, while this time, the beauties of Anatolia replaced those of the Libyan leader who used to accompany him to such meetings! This Turkish presence undoubtedly upset the Islamic Republic, despite the exchanged visits, growing affinities and developing commercial relations between the two countries, seeing how this presence enhances competitiveness between the two major rivals or even renews their dreams in regard to the long-gone empires. Nonetheless, this competitiveness exposed the major Arab absence or impotence seen since the end of the Cold War until Baghdad's fall as the hostage of the competition between the United States and the Islamic Republic, and from the last Israeli attack on Lebanon to the war on Gaza and the wars of the Houthis. Erdogan's attendance of the Arab Summit in Sert corroborated the existence of a blunt and mutual Arab-Turkish wish to see Ankara playing a greater role in the region, in order to create a minimum level of balance with the Iranian momentum from the Eastern “gateway” of the Arab world to the Mediterranean Sea and Gaza, but also to get it involved in the Arab-Israeli settlement course and prevent Tehran from monopolizing the Palestinian dossier. This is especially true since Ankara can threaten Tel Aviv's relations with some countries in the Arab and Islamic world and can deepen the Israelis' fears in regard to the absence of settlement or peace. As for the scolding of Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos two years ago by Erdogan, Ankara's position toward the war on Gaza and the crisis of the Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv, they are mere samples of what could be done. Therefore, when Erdogan announced the day before last that Jerusalem was the apple of his eye, he was probably recollecting from his Ottoman subconscious what the Caliphate in Istanbul used to refer to as being the “Jewel of the Ottoman Crown” in reference to the “Fertile Crescent,” but also recollecting this Caliphate's early rejection of Herzl's efforts to take Palestine as the state of the Jews. Turkey's attendance of the Sert summit, albeit as a guest, and the Arab and non-Arab reliance on its renewed return to the region, definitely grant the Arabs a new strength in the face of Israel and its arrogance and contain Iran's enthusiasm. Therefore, both the Arabs and the West do not perceive its return to the region with objection or fear, but rather as being an important factor in ensuring the requirements of stability and peace, which naturally meets the demands and serves the interests of the international community. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is perceived as being a “factor undermining” the settlement in the region and as being a power seeking to control an arch of crises extending from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan, going through Lebanon, Palestine and the Gulf. Moreover, the increasing Turkish presence after such a long absence, did not only stem from an Arab and international wish, but also - and even more importantly - from the ambitions of the neo-Ottomans and their interests which extend from Europe to Central Asia and the Arab world. Today, Turkey is as concerned by the Palestinian cause and the future of Jerusalem as it is by Iran's expansion to the West and the East, by the Iranian nuclear dossier and by the tight link established by Israel between the two. It is aware that the eruption of small fires around the region will weaken its influence and undermine its growing economic, political and security ambitions from Syria, to Iraq and the Gulf. So, will Ankara disregard the dream of certain Israeli circles to propose the Hebrew state in itself as a nuclear umbrella to protect some Arabs from the Iranian nuclear threat, or will it await the detonation of the Iranian nuclear dossier in the form of a “comprehensive war” that would topple all of its vital and especially oil interests? These transformations and their possible repercussions are pushing Ankara toward playing an efficient role in the region. This Turkish weight that was added to that of the Arab group does not necessarily allow the prevalence of Ankara's role over Iran's role in an attempt to eliminate the latter. Indeed, the historical facts and the geographic, historic and denominational reality cannot be ignored, while the Arabs' utmost hope is probably the distancing of the ghost of the Sunni-Shi'i conflict, the prevention of a fourth war on the coasts of the Gulf and the areas under Iranian influence, and the prevention of a highly risky nuclear armament race. More importantly, they are seeking a minimum level of balance with the Israeli right wing government. In this context and through its close ties with the Islamic Republic, Turkey is undoubtedly capable of engaging in dialogue with the latter to mend the bridges of trust between it and a large number of Arab countries, or at the very least to mend the balance of power and alleviate Tehran's ambitions. Throughout the last three decades, there were many attempts to provide the Arab security system with momentum in order to limit the foreign, regional and international ambitions and interference but to no avail. Indeed, neither the Arab blocs, which emerged in the East and the West during the Iraqi-Iranian war lasted, nor did the project of the “Damascus Declaration” states following the liberation of Kuwait achieve the desired goals and the required balance between the Arab interests and those of the foreign powers. For its part, the tripartite Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian crane also failed to achieve that purpose while nothing on the horizon points to the fact that the Jerusalem Summit will mark a turn in the continuous absence of Palestinian reconciliation and the inability to clear the air between more than one Arab country. In the meantime, breakthrough is awaited, possibly as a result to the tense relations between the administration of President Barack Obama and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, in the hope of seeing the concord which was called for by Amr Moussa from Sert between the Arab states in order to show mercy to his League!
