In order to assess joint UN-AL envoy Lakhdar Brahimi's tour of the region, the tremendous efforts he exerted and the grueling difficulties he suffered, one might wonder whether the odds of holding the Geneva II conference have improved, when compared to what they had been at the start of this tour. Brahimi began his tour with both the sponsors of Geneva II, Russia and the United States, publicly stating the dates for the conference to be the 22nd and 23rd of November, in two weeks' time. Brahimi ended his tour with talk of possibly holding the conference within weeks in the best of cases, if not cancelling it if the opposition refuses to attend. In other words, the tour did not tangibly contribute to any progress towards holding the conference, in spite of all the optimism coming out of the United Nations and its envoy, and of the compliments received by the latter from Moscow and Washington, in addition to frank praise from the Syrian regime, after it had declared him a traitor and classified him as an enemy. This may well have been the whole point of this entire tour, i.e. returning to Damascus and having the privilege of meeting with President Bashar Al-Assad. After the meeting and the praise obtained by Brahimi from the Syrian state media, one can understand the significance of the UN envoy's keenness to criticize the Syrian opposition and demand that it "convince" him that it really is an opposition, as well as his keenness for Iran to participate in the Geneva II conference. In this case, were those stances required from the joint envoy of the United Nations and the Arab League, in order to obtain the reception that he did in Damascus? He has paid in advance the political price for this meeting. Brahimi has no excuse for not having visited Riyadh during this tour, even if he had asked for an appointment and had not been given one. Indeed, the viewpoint supported by Saudi Arabia did not at all enter into Brahimi's preoccupations while preparing for this tour. It seemed in fact that the latter's main goal had been to meet with Assad and "obtain" the regime's agreement to attend Geneva II. There are also those who believed, at the United Nations and in the entourage of its Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, that such agreement had been obtained as a result of Brahimi's efforts. The Syrian regime "agreed" to attend Geneva II the day it placed its chemical arsenal crisis in the hands of Moscow, the latter working in order to rehabilitate this regime on dismantling the said arsenal and on obtaining the United States' approval of such rehabilitation. No credit is therefore due to Brahimi in this issue. His role in Damascus, and before arriving there, was to promote the regime's rehabilitation, to make it acceptable and make of it a partner in dialogue. On the one hand, such a role has turned him into a mediator promoting the understanding reached between the United States and Russia, not an envoy whose goal is to reach a solution to the conflict in Syria on the basis of the Geneva I statement. On the other, such a role has turned him into a cover for persisting in the process of exterminating the Syrian people, not a mediator whose goal is to put a stop to the violence. This is perhaps why Riyadh was not among the capitals he visited during his tour – because Saudi Arabia no longer considers the rehabilitation of the regime to represent a successful way for putting a stop to the killing and destruction in Syria. This is especially true, since such rehabilitation comes for political and diplomatic reasons, connected to American and Russian interests. It can thus be inferred from the declaration issued by Brahimi from Damascus that the opposition's refusal to participate in the conference would mean postponing it – this after having caused it embarrassment by criticizing it and by inviting Iran. This represents an attempt to make it responsible in advance for the conference's failure, while the regime had provided the conditions needed for its success by agreeing to attend. The American-Russian understandings that Brahimi is promoting are literally taking place at the expense of Syrian lives. This is because the conditions for rehabilitation inevitably involve further political weakening for the opposition, further exhaustion for civilians and further destruction for the country – in other words, leaving the regime the complete freedom to implement the security solution which it has started... This is why Brahimi deserved such praise from the Syrian state media and gained the favor of a meeting with Assad.
