Lakhdar Brahimi did not come out reassured after his third meeting with Bashar al-Assad. Not surprisingly, the second meeting was better. Delving into generalities exempted the two sides from revealing what they wanted to leave for the right moment. This time, Brahimi stepped into what Damascus considers to be “a restricted area." The meetings of the joint international-Arab envoy with the close circle of the president have reinforced his convictions about the difficulty of his task. A fourth meeting will in all likelihood be even more difficult, if not impossible. At the hotel in Damascus, Brahimi started analyzing the stances of the Syrian president. Assad believes that the Security Council is still closed to any attempts to adopt a resolution that would give cover to foreign intervention to uproot the regime. There is nothing to suggest that Russia is preparing to change its position. The same applies to China. Iran is another matter, as it recognizes that the fall of the regime means the fall of its role in the region. It would mean the failure of its offensive which has cost Iran many years and billions of dollars. It would mean that the battle would then move to focus on curbing its influence in Iraq and Lebanon. Moreover, the administration of Barack Obama is unlikely to intervene militarily in Syria. While the Syrian bloodletting harms civilians there, it also harms the regime and its allies. Washington can lie in waiting under Brahimi's hat. In truth, Assad, in the third meeting, acted on the basis that the primary striking groups of the Syrian army remained cohesive. One proof of this is the fact that some Syrian army units have moved to attacking targets around Damascus, achieving some progress. Assad did not conduct himself like he was looking for someone to help him get out of an impasse. When Brahimi touched upon the issue of the “transitional phase" and the “government with full powers", based on the Geneva Agreement, and hinted in the direction of “real change", Assad's response was clear and categorical. The legitimacy of the president came from the elections, and this can only be changed through elections. The problem is not in Damascus, but it lies in the assault being carried out against Syria, and the first step in the solution is “for the countries sponsoring terrorists to stop their support for them." In Moscow, Brahimi did not hear anything that would allow him to speak about a “breakthrough" or “significant progress." Lavrov said that Moscow does not consider it its task to call on Assad to step down, and that even if it did, Moscow does not believe Assad would comply, something that is also understood by those around Assad. But Lavrov stressed that his country did not back away from the Geneva Agreement. He said that Moscow is concerned about the fate of a country and not that of a person, and that Russia strongly opposes the collapse of the Syrian state and institutions and does want “a new Libya," especially that the information in its possession confirms a rising role for the jihadists in the Syrian opposition. But Lavrov emphasized to Brahimi that his country is committed to the Geneva Agreement despite differing interpretations. The exchange of messages increased after that. Brahimi said that the choice in Syria was between a solution and hell, and warned against the country turning into another Somalia. Then in his speech, Assad outlined a solution plan under the roof of his government, and not under a “transitional government with full powers." Brahimi, once again, stepped into the restricted area, and quoted the Syrians as “believing" that the rule of the Assad family has lasted for too long, and was subsequently accused by the official Syrian media of biasness. At the Geneva meeting, no common vision materialized. The U.S. seemed confused and preoccupied with building the foundations of Obama's second term. The American side clang to the demand that Assad should step down, but appeared also keen on the Syrian state not collapsing, and was not confident about the nature of the alternative. The American and Russian sides spoke about the dangers of a military solution and its exorbitant cost, and reiterated their support for the Geneva Agreement. Each of the two parties expressed its concern about the rise of extremism. The Russian side affirmed its confidence in Brahimi, and spoke about its support for efforts for a transitional phase, as though it was calling for keeping the issue of Assad's departure aside. The stances of the two sides seemed unripe for achieving a breakthrough, but they helped renew the lease on Brahimi's mission, even though he had delved into the “restricted area." The exchange of messages did not cease. After Geneva, Brahimi received a new message, this time through the Syrian newspaper Al-Watan. The newspaper said that Brahimi “dared" to raise the issue of the next presidential elections, and that Assad answered him, “I am not a captain who flees the ship when he feels that it started shaking," and then ended the meeting. Do we understand from this that the balance of power does not yet allow for a solution, but only more fighting to change this balance or impose new facts on the ground? Do we understand that the fourth meeting between Assad and Brahimi is now impossible, and that Damascus will try to buy time by demanding for an “impartial mediator?" How many Syrians will have to be killed before internal, regional and international conditions “mature"? God help the beleaguered Syrians at home, and those who have taken refuge abroad.
