Hamas dug many tunnels to break the siege and bring in goods and weapons. The tunnels became a lifeline and a means for circumvention. It became a distinctive industry and a lucrative trade. Many things and illusions passed through the tunnels. Suddenly, Egypt turned the page on the Muslim Brotherhood. Khaled Meshaal could no longer visit Mohamed Morsi at Al-Ittihadiya Palace, after passing by the Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie. Meshaal's friends are now in prison, and for him, visiting Egypt is out of the question. Sisi's Egypt accused Hamas of taking part in pushing Egypt into the Muslim Brotherhood tunnel. Egypt closed the tunnels, which even Hosni Mubarak had not dared close. Hamas woke up and found itself in the tunnel. It lost Cairo after it lost Damascus, and Tehran is far and returning to being aligned to it is costly in the current reality of Sunni-Shiite relations. Hamas enjoyed a comfortable and special position in the axis of defiance. It was the only Sunni chain in the axis. Its leadership abroad was based in Damascus where it enjoyed many facilities. Its relationship with Hezbollah gave it the freedom of movement in Lebanon and the refugee camps there. Iran was also generous with Hamas, never withholding money or rockets. The primary sphere in which the head of its politburo Khaled Meshaal could move encompassed Damascus, Tehran, and Doha, with limited appearances in other capitals, according to the direction the wind was blowing. Hamas strengthened its legitimacy in Gaza when it confronted the Israeli war on the Strip. It repeated Hezbollah's feat in Lebanon in 2006, when Iranian rockets were introduced in the equation of the conflict with Israel. Hamas achieved something else as well. The Israeli airstrikes awoke Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Muslim Brotherhood tendencies, prompting him to think about challenging the siege on Gaza, with the ensuing profound crisis between Tel Aviv and Ankara. It was no secret that there was no love lost with Mubarak's Egypt. The Egyptian president would tell his visitors that relations between the Syrian leadership and Iran were deeper than many had thought. He also dealt with Hamas as being part of the axis that undermined Yasser Arafat's halo, and is currently undermining Mahmoud Abbas's position. It was thus not odd for Hamas to suffer from an "Egypt complex," especially as geography's verdict is final and irreversible. Hamas read the beginnings of the Arab Spring with two "pro-defiance axis" and "pro-Muslim Brotherhood" eyes. It rejoiced to see Zine El Abidine Ben Ali flee, ushering in the era of Ghannouchi in Tunisia. It rejoiced to see Mubarak step down, and the Egyptian Supreme Guide and his Muslim Brotherhood appear in the public squares and then take power. Some went far, predicting that Hamas would play a role in a new Middle East, between two supreme leaders, in Tehran and in Cairo. Damascus, too, read the Tunisian and Egyptian events with the eyes of the axis of defiance, before it turned out that the Arab Spring was weighed down by the winds of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than those of defiance. Damascus thought that being in the defiance camp was an insurance policy against the Spring. Perhaps Hamas's leadership shared this belief, but the winds soon struck in Syria. Meshaal observed the Syrian scene. The Syrian authorities observed Hamas's reaction. It was no secret that the rural areas that joined the uprising were Sunni. Meanwhile, the Syrian Brotherhood had an old score to settle with the regime. When blood was shed to prevent the protesters from establishing and seeking shelter in the equivalent of Tahrir Square in Egypt, or the Syrian equivalent of Benghazi, the situation became even more dangerous. New factors then entered into the fray, for example the position of Sheikh Qaradawi and Qatar's promotion of the Spring. Meshaal advised the Syrian officials to look for a political solution, "because the problem is not security in nature." He made contacts and semi-mediations. But the situation worsened. Damascus wanted Hamas to take a clearer stance, especially regarding Qaradawi's campaigns against the regime. Meshaal thus concluded that leaving was better and less costly than staying, and so he left. I write based on what he told me in Amman, but he was keen on stressing that he would never forget what Syria gave to the resistance and Hamas. Hamas's departure from Damascus almost led to complete estrangement between Hamas and Iran, were it not for the intervention of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who understands the need for Hamas in a region that is fast sliding into a devastating Sunni-Shiite conflict. Hamas resides today in the tunnel. The Syrian president accuses it of "betrayal and treachery." The current Egyptian regime accuses of playing dangerous security roles on Egyptian territory. It is no secret that Damascus now prefers Mahmoud Abbas, even as it once assigned Hamas and Islamic Jihad to undercut him. Cairo now prefers him too, and so does Amman. Only one man can help Hamas exit the tunnel. His name is Mahmoud Abbas. But his assistance will not be without a price, and Hamas must pay it. Ismail Haniyeh's speeches are not enough to exit the tunnel or help exit the tunnel. Hamas needs more.
