It was only natural for me to ask him about Syria and Iran. This is the hot topic now. The man knew both countries and their leaderships. As usual, he was very candid. He said, “If my statements will be published in my name, then my position compels me to be reticent. But if you want me to talk frankly, then do not mention my name." Because I was looking for candid opinions, I agreed to the second option. He thus provided me with accurate and useful information, which I shall summarize here. - Look at the region in the few years that preceded the ‘Arab Spring.' Iran was in the driving seat. Its influence in Iraq was plain to see, and it bided its time waiting for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops. Its ties with Syria were deep while the balance was clearly tipped in favor of Tehran. Iran explicitly led the so called pro-resistance axis, which ran from Tehran to Syria and Lebanon, all the way to Palestine through Hamas and Islamic Jihad. - In the second half of the past decade, Iran made some unprecedented successes. First there was the July war in Lebanon, when Iranian missiles became part of the equation of Israeli security. Then there was the Gaza war, which perpetuated the Iranian role in the Palestinian arena, through Iran's Sunni ally Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. - On the Lebanese arena, and since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Iran became the number one player. Now, Damascus had to exercise its influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah. In this context, one can understand the events of May 7 and the ouster of Saad Hariri from his post as prime minister later. - Before that, Iran, through Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, disrupted Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under Yasser Arafat, and then later under Mahmoud Abbas. - Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq with Nuri al-Maliki remaining in his post, the pro-resistance axis now passed through Baghdad, and the Syrian policy in Iraq now completely identified with Iranian policy, without distinction. - The Arab Spring was an unpleasant surprise for Iran. Prior to it, Iran stood to benefit from the reign of Hosni Mubarak. That is to say, it suited the Iranians to have a rigid and antiquated leadership that the pro-resistance axis could accuse of serving the American project in the region. Iran gained greatly from the decline and contraction of Egypt's role. Then with Mohamed Mursi taking office, at the height of the conflict in Syria, Iran took a severe hit. Mursi's stance is unequivocally in support of President Bashar al-Assad's departure. - Today, Iran finds itself facing a regional wall, which we may call a Sunni wall, stemming from an agreement between Mursi's Egypt and Erdogan's Turkey, and one that is open to cooperation with the Arab Gulf bloc especially over the Syrian issue. This reality has changed the nature and the rules of the game in the region. - We may add to the above that the pro-resistance axis lost its only Sunni extension when Hamas chose to leave Syria. In recent days, Hamas even began to describe the events in Syria as being a “popular revolution." - For this reason, we can say that Iran is fighting “the mother of all battles" in Syria. There, Iran is defending not only its role, its borders and its longstanding investment in Syria as a hub and passageway for Hezbollah; but also its gains in Iraq and Lebanon. - Hezbollah is fighting an existential battle in Syria, because it is aware how crucial the Syrian crossing is for it to remain a regional player that is capable of launching war or withstanding one. Without Syria, Hezbollah becomes once again a mere local player governed by the game of sects and their sizes. - Iran knows that the fall of the Assad regime and the emergence of an alternative government allied with Turkey will perhaps pave the way for new facts on the ground in Iraq and Lebanon. This would simply spell the end for any major role player by Iran and portends to undermine the image of its leadership, particularly in light of the economic troubles it is facing as result of Western sanctions and the weight of its commitments in the region. - It is hard to believe that the Assad regime will be able to rule Syria in the same conditions that prevailed before the Arab Spring reached its soil. Most likely, Iran realizes this, but it is attempting to extend the life of the regime despite the costs. This policy, however, may turn Syria into an Arab version of Afghanistan, which is a source of concern for Turkey, Israel and other countries. - Iran is embroiled in the 'mother of all battles' in Syria, and it cannot afford to lose the battle for its role and the battle for the nuclear bomb. I thought that my interlocutor's assessment was noteworthy, especially since he knows very well Damascus and Tehran, and the decision makers in the two capitals.
