From its assault on Gaza in 2008 to its current one, Israeli brutality has not changed at all. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu acts like a blind warrior who is armed to the teeth. Israel draws its words from an outdated lexicon, and refuses to read into the transformations that have taken place around it. But any observer following the events must no doubt feel that the current war on Gaza is taking place in a region that is almost altogether different. Indeed, it is no simple thing what Egypt has so far witnessed. For one thing, Egypt is a country that can never resign from Gaza's fate. And this goes beyond geography to calculations related to security, stability and the political role. Egypt's reins are now in the hands of the regime that was begotten by the revolution, and the Muslim Brotherhood, proceeding from the results of the elections. Hamas cannot – and does not want to – deal with Mohammed Mursi's Egypt, like it had dealt with that of Hosni Mubarak. The Israeli assault on Gaza has revealed that the Arab Spring, which erupted first against domestic oppression and corruption, did not drop the Palestinian question from its list of priorities. Israel's current aggression has given the various powers involved in the Arab Spring the chance to reaffirm that the prolonged injustice against the Palestinians is ever present in their collective consciousness, and that it would move up in rank as far as their policies are concerned. It is a changed region then. Or more accurately, it is a changing region. It would be no exaggeration to say that the Arab Spring, despite the attendant uncertainty, fears and the attempts to hijack it, may be the most important event in the region since the triumph of the Iranian revolution. When interpreting events, one must pay particular attention to the two states that launched the Mumana'ah [pro-resistance] attack in the outgoing period. Iran is suffering greatly because of the economic sanctions, and its role in the region is being eroded after coming to odds with the Arab Spring, particularly in its Syrian stop. Its nuclear program is being kept under strict observation by the Western powers. Meanwhile, the Arab link of the Mumana'ah chain, namely the Syria regime, has lost control over vast swaths of its territory, while its legitimacy is crumbling whether at the Arab, Islamic or international levels – albeit it continues to hold a number of cards that allows it to resist domestically. Hamas, with its leadership based in Syria, was the Sunni link in this Mumana'ah camp, which comprised Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Hamas was also the golden link, because it managed to bring the rockets and the policies of Mumana'ah to the heart of Palestine. The Palestinian element of this camp also included, in addition to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which was closer to the Iranian grand scheme – bearing in mind that its effectiveness in times of tension exceed many times over its actual presence in the Palestinian street. The Palestinian element of the Mumana'ah camp played a major role in the past two decades. It helped undermine the hopes that were pinned on the Oslo Accords; militarize the second intifada; and undercut the authority of Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas after him. Through its suicide attacks, the enemies of peace in the Israeli camp were strengthened, and through this element, Iran and Syria came to possess a veto right against any vision for Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace. The Arab Spring caught the Syrian regime by surprise, while the Hamas leadership based in Damascus sensed a Muslim Brotherhood-flavor in this spring. The leadership thus sought to overcome the embarrassment of its geographical location by means of advice and mediations, but the storm proved to be stronger. Hamas hence refused to take a stance against the statements made by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in support of the popular uprising in Syria, or to oppose this uprising. It was difficult for Khaled Meshaal to emulate Hezbollah's position, which was reconciled with its nature and with the stance of the Supreme Leader in Iran. Instead, Hamas chose to leave Damascus, and come to terms with its nature and identify with the stance of the Supreme Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hamas's leadership thus left Damascus, where the authorities closed down the Islamist movement's officers and sealed their doors with red wax. In light of these major changes, the new Israeli assault on Gaza has taken place. The Israeli planes brutally pounded targets in the Strip, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad responded by targeting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. But what is striking is that Hamas was quick to inform those seeking a truce that the reference point for any negotiations was in Egypt. President Mursi's phone thus did not stop ringing. Mursi has no choice but to seek a truce, and quickly. He cannot see Hamas being crushed in Gaza. He cannot risk Egypt's international relations and their rewards either. He cannot risk the Muslim Brotherhood's hold on Egypt's leadership. Most likely, Israel, which bombed an armaments factory in Sudan, is trying to neutralize Gaza and its rockets. Perhaps Israel is seeking a formula similar to the outcome of the July War in Lebanon, whereby Israel would refrain from striking, and Hezbollah would refrain from firing rockets and heating up the front. This formula has held for six years now. Of course, one must pay heed to the fact that Hamas's move away from one Supreme Leader to inch closer to another will not be a straightforward journey, whether within the Islamist movement or the relations with other factions in Gaza. The Muslim Brotherhood's Spring has given Hamas a depth that it was indeed in want of. But in order to swim in it, a price must be paid first.
