All eyes were shifted toward Sudan when the uprising erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. But the Arab spring did not continue its course up the Nile Valley, and moved eastward towards Syria. The Sudanese waited for the determination of the fate of the South at the beginning of 2011, one which ended with the South's full independence on July 9 of that same year, and it seemed clear afterwards that the regime of General Omar al-Bashir will face a fiercer and stronger opposition for having relinquished the country's unity. Hence, its opponents held it responsible for secession, accusing it of having wasted a great opportunity throughout six years - i.e. during the transitional phase stipulated by the peace agreement in Naivasha in 2005 - after which the Southerners headed to the referendum and decided their fate. Hence, these opponents did not respond to the regime's call for a real national unity government to face the new stage and its repercussions, and did not meet with it to draw up a new constitution that would replace the one ratified by the peace agreement. They wagered on the disputes and contradictions sweeping the ranks of the ruling Congress Party, its military men and politicians, who had exited the cloak of Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi early on. Still, they never dared engage in a popular uprising, although they kept calling for it during the past years. There are many reasons that have so far prevented the toppling of the regime that was introduced by the Islamic Front through the so-called national salvation revolution at the end of June 1989. At the time, the Islamists and military men of Al-Turabi preceded the two other parties, i.e. Al-Umma and the Democratic Unionist parties, and maybe other military sides that were preparing a coup. Consequently, a period of ambiguity prevailed among the Sudanese and their neighbors, especially the Egyptians, in regard to the identity of the revolutionaries. Soon enough, the Islamists became divided and their sheikh returned to the opposition ranks at times, and to prison at others. Among the reasons was the Northerners' fear over the country's unity and fate, especially since the South's secession was accompanied by rebellious actions in more than one province, from Darfur to South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. And all of the latter actions were carried out by armed movements, which heralded further division, not to mention the enduring problems with the new state in the South. Also among the reasons was the fact that Al-Bashir's regime was able to deepen the schism between the traditional parties, thus causing their failure to agree over one discourse or political program, which would make it easier for them to confront the regime. The latter even used a stick and carrot policy to get some of them to side with it and to appease others. This reached the point where the sons of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of Al-Umma Party, and Mohamed Othman al-Mirghani, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, were appointed as advisors at the presidency. The latter son had resigned along with the four ministers representing the Unionist Party in the government following the eruption of the last protests. And so far, the two traditional parties have not yet placed their weight behind the action. Indeed, Al-Mahdi merely called for the establishment of a new regime, considering that the way to achieve that was through wide-scale sit-ins in all the squares. He added that "if the government cooperates with this position, there will be a roadmap" for this regime, believing nonetheless that this can only be secured through "a transitional authority, under which a new constitution would be drawn up." Hence, it is as though he placed one foot on the squares and another in the regime's direction! This position is not far away from the one advocated by the opposition in general, i.e. the rejection of the calls of the "totalitarian regime" for concord in preparation for constitutional and non-constitutional reforms, before the halting of the war in some states, the provision of freedoms, and the relinquishing by the Islamists of their monopolization of power. The opposition thus considers that the explosive crisis today is not the product of the economic situation, but rather that of the political one. But the greatest accomplishment for the regime of Al-Bashir since his arrival to power 24 years ago, is that the Islamists did not waste any time following the success of their revolution. They managed to impose their control over all the pillars, branches, and security bodies affiliated with the military institution since the first year, thus cleansing the army from all the top commanders who were not loyal to them and their ideology. Consequently, many officers were sent to forced retirement, and others to prison or into exile. As a result, the army was no longer nationalistic or patriotic, but rather doctrinal, biased in favor of the ruling party and part of its structure. But the Islamists did not settle for that. They established the popular defense forces, i.e. the militia that fought the South and its revolution before secession and is now fighting wherever the regime is facing challenges or problems, akin to a national guard in support of the military. Today, the Islamists of the regime in Khartoum are probably reassured about the army's role in the face of the action and the demonstrators, seeing how it will not follow in the footsteps of the Egyptian or Tunisian army which sided with the people on the arenas and squares and provoked a quick change. The Islamists of the ruling National Congress Party have heeded the lessons of the previous experiences. When a popular revolution erupted against the regime of El-Ferik Ibrahim Abboud in 1964 and a student fell, the army sided with the citizens and the military regime was toppled. The same was seen again during the revolution against Gaafar an-Nimeiry, when Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Suwar al-Dahab led the army, toppled the military regime and surrendered power to the civilian parties which had gathered against it, from the communists to the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist party. What is probably preventing the major traditional parties from getting involved in the current action that is nowadays led by the youth and the students, is that these parties do not have militias or armed fighters to face the regime's machine, knowing that the regime is facing its opponents while reassured about the absolute loyalty of the military institution. Had this not been the case, the salvation revolution would not have lasted all those years. Indeed, did An-Nimeiry's rule not witness failed military coups before it was toppled? But the regime of the Islamists on the other hand witnessed one attempt a few months after they reached power, ending with the execution of 28 officers during the month of Ramadan of 1990. Then there was the failed attack launched by a fighting faction in Darfur in 2008. In light of these facts, there is an impression within the ranks of the Sudanese opposition that the regime will not show any leniency regardless of the number of victims. In addition, the regime does not seem nearly as fearful as the opposition, which is concerned about its reactions in light of international circumstances that might not favor real external interventions or pressures. The Syrian crisis is probably the best example for that, although the West had exercised massive pressures on President Al-Bashir's regime during the past decade and activated an arrest warrant against him by the international tribunal which is still pursuing him on war crime charges in Darfur. All of this – and what it featured in terms of an insistence on the sustainment of the regime – aimed to push Khartoum to respect the Naivasha peace accord and achieve the independence of the South, so that it would act as a wall or a dam in the face of the expansion of political Islam towards the center and south of the continent. This is why many are pessimistic about the current action's ability to induce the required change, while the Sudanese believe that peaceful demonstrations – regardless of their scope and size – will not force the regime to leave or succumb to the demands, unless there is a hefty price to be paid in blood and destruction. So far, the major traditional parties have not converged with the disgruntled youth and its leaders have not led the protests as they used to in the past. The regime is even acting confidently towards these protests, believing it can bring the situation back to normal. At this level, it addressed a clear message to its opponents through its violent and bloody repression of the demonstrators, realizing that at the end of the day, it cannot rely on the weaknesses of its opponents. Indeed, it knows very well that the harsh measures it adopted and constituted the spark that triggered the squares are not enough to stop the economic collapse and total bankruptcy of the state. Consequently, the people will not remain silent for long in the face of the price rise, the unemployment rates that have reached around 30%, the spread of corruption and the allocation of the largest portion of the budget to the various ongoing wars. In the meantime, the American sanctions are continuing to block foreign funding, while there is no need to recall Khartoum's losses following the South's secession with 75% of the oil revenues going to the newborn state. And if these economic factors are not enough for the regime to reconsider its calculations and the confrontation policy it is adopting on the internal scene, it cannot disregard the isolation it is facing in the region. It knows that the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt - which had given it hope about its stay in power - is no longer in place, and that its relations with Iran are not to the liking of the populations of the Gulf where the Sudanese Diaspora is widely present. But the most dangerous threat facing President Al-Bashir is probably the disgruntlement of some forces inside his ruling party, as they consider that the use of excessive power and the disregarding of the demands of the people might deepen the resentment and widen the protests, which could lead to the Syrian model and the country's destruction and division. In the meantime, the rebellious movements in states that are now being dubbed the "Neo South" are threatening with further killing, whose expansion to the point of reaching the capital cannot be prevented if it earns enough support from South Sudan among other neighboring states that perceive Khartoum with suspicion. The Sudanese know there are power centers and forces within the ruling party that had the upper hand in the toppling of Hassan al-Turabi - the main partner in the salvation revolution - and that they fought for a long time to avoid sharing the positions of power with the major traditional parties on the eve of critical political events, as this would have cost them many of their privileges. In light of the threats facing the regime internally and externally, the question is: Will those opposing the bloody suppression of the action or fearing for the fate of the regime, their privileges, and positions remain silent? Or will they act before it is too late upon the Al-Qasr coup, while relying on the experience of their coup against the true leader of the revolution, the head of the Popular Congress Party?
